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ABSTRACT  
 
Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force  
and Presidential Crisis Responses. (August 2006) 
David J. Brulé, B.A., Stephen F. Austin State University  
 
Chair of Committee: Dr. Alex Mintz 
 
 
This dissertation explores the role of public opinion in U.S. presidential decisions 
to employ various alternatives in response to an international crisis.  Presidents may 
choose from a range of force alternatives, including non-force alternatives, troop 
mobilizations, air strikes or ground assaults.  Using the Poliheuristic Theory, I argue that 
public attitudes toward the use of force in a given crisis play a key role in the decision 
making process leading to such choices.  The direction and intensity of public opinion is 
driven by a relative value assessment by which the public determines whether the 
benefits of a use of force are worth the costs.  Presidents are aware of this relative value 
assessment and rule out crisis responses that are likely to violate the public’s preferences 
in the first stage of the decision making process.  In the second stage, presidents choose 
among the remaining alternatives by weighing the relative merits of each with respect to 
military and international-strategic implications.   
To test hypotheses following from this theoretical argument, I employ two 
methodological approaches.  The first is statistical analysis.  I develop a new data set of 
presidential crisis response choices and expand an existing data set on U.S. public 
attitudes toward the use of force, from 1949 to 2001.  Using two extant data collections 
identifying international crises, I conduct Ordered Logit analyses, which produce results 
that are largely supportive of the hypotheses.  The second methodological approach is the 
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case study method.  I conduct two detailed case studies of decisions to use force in 
Bosnia (1995) and Afghanistan (2001).  These analyses are also supportive of the 
theoretical argument.  I conclude that presidents are largely responsive to public opinion 
in the selection of crisis responses.   
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Does public opinion influence the manner in which the president responds to 
international crises?  The conventional wisdom asserts that public support is a necessary 
condition for the successful implementation of military action abroad (e.g., Gelb 1972; 
Mueller 1973; Weinberger 1984).  U.S. military operations carried out since World War 
II appear to indicate that the president typically adheres to this truism: presidents tend to 
use force when the public is supportive of military action, but forego forceful responses 
when the public is opposed to military involvement (see Brulé and Mintz 2005).  For 
example, in response to the impending French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, 68% of 
Americans polled by Gallup opposed direct military action to help the French in their 
fight against the communists in Vietnam.1  President Eisenhower’s response was 
consistent with public opinion – the U.S. took no forceful military action (see also e.g., 
DeRouen 2003).  On the other hand, the American public supported the use of force 
against Iraq in 1991 to force Saddam’s armies from Kuwait (Sobel 2001).  President 
Bush subsequently launched an air and land offensive in the Persian Gulf (see Mintz 
1993).   
But presidential responses to international crises are not always as consistent with 
public opinion as these examples suggest.  For example, President Kennedy refused to 
launch an attack against Cuba despite public support for military action following the 
Cuban missile crisis.  President Nixon approved the invasion of Cambodia in 1970 over 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review. 
1 Poll data are accessed from the Roper Center via Lexis-Nexis.com. 
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public opposition.  In 1989, President Bush ordered the invasion of Panama to overthrow 
the Noriega regime in the face of opposition to such action.   
At times, presidential decisions to use force are congruent with public opinion 
and, at other times, they are not.  What explains this apparent inconsistency?  Previous 
explanations are as varied as the extent to which presidents are cowed by public opinion.  
Much of the research on the democratic peace suggests that democratic leaders are unable 
to pursue military responses to international crises in the face of public opposition (e.g., 
Doyle 1986; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994).  But other research (e.g., Ostrom and 
Job 1986; Margolis and Mauser 1989; Storrs and Serafino 1993) entertains the possibility 
that public opinion is the object of elite manipulation – presidents work to persuade the 
public to support their foreign policy proposal.   
Additionally, the literature points to at least three other explanations of the 
intersection between public opinion and the use of military force abroad.  According to 
the first of these, public opinion places a cap on the maximum amount of force the public 
is willing to allow the president to unleash abroad (e.g., Russett 1990; Sobel 2001).  
Another view points to different types of presidents – some who are responsive to public 
opinion and some who are not (Foyle 1999).  The final perspective asserts that the public 
simply does not matter in presidential decisions to use force (e.g., Lipset 1966; Cohen 
1973; Morgenthau 1973).   
But presidents may have little choice but to abide by the wishes of the public.  
Given that presidents risk electoral punishment or eroding their political capital for 
defying the will of the public (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989; 
Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1990), presidents should be reluctant to engage in 
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behavior that endangers their domestic political fortunes (e.g., Mintz 1993; Mintz, et al. 
1997; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 1999).  In other words, if presidents are to avoid political 
retribution, they must choose military options that are congruent with public preferences.  
But little systematic research explores the role of public opinion in presidential decisions 
to use force (but see Brulé and Mintz 2005).   
This dissertation will examine the effect of public opinion on the type of response 
used by U.S. president in an international crisis.  When faced with a crisis, presidents 
may choose from a range of policy alternatives.  These alternatives include, for instance, 
economic sanctions or diplomatic efforts.  Presidents may also employ such military 
force alternatives as the mobilization of forces, air strikes, and/or the insertion of ground 
forces.  Because presidents are reluctant to defy the preferences of the citizenry when 
making foreign policy decisions, they rule out alternatives that clearly violate the wishes 
of the people (Mintz, et al. 1997; Mintz 2004).  I argue that that the extent to which the 
public supports or opposes the use of force is driven by its prospective evaluations of the 
foreign policy benefits of using force relative to the expected costs in terms of American 
blood (e.g., Russett 1990; Larson 1996; Mueller 1996).   
I use Poliheuristic Theory (e.g., Mintz, et al. 1997; Mintz 2004), which posits a 
two-stage decision making process, to develop hypotheses about the role of public 
opinion in presidential crisis response decisions.  I contend that presidents eliminate crisis 
response alternatives in the first stage of the decision making process that are clearly at 
odds with the public’s assessment – regardless of the potential benefits of those 
alternatives on other decision making dimensions (i.e., military, international-strategic).  
For example, if a large majority of the public supports military involvement in a crisis, 
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the president is likely to reject such non-force alternatives as economic sanctions and 
diplomatic efforts.  Conversely, if the president is faced with a large majority of the 
public opposing the use of force, he is likely to eliminate the military alternatives from 
consideration.  But public opinion is frequently ambivalent or indifferent toward 
international crises (e.g., Redd 2001; Brulé and Mintz 2005).  In these cases, the 
president is likely to rule out passive, non-force alternatives as well as the alternatives 
that place large numbers of U.S. troops in harm’s way.  In the second stage of the 
decision making process, the president selects a choice among the remaining alternatives 
on the basis of that alternative’s ability to maximize expected benefits with respect to 
such military and international-strategic concerns as relative capabilities, and the 
president’s foreign policy reputation.   
I test the hypotheses using two different research methods.  First, I use statistical 
analyses to examine presidential crisis response choices across all crises involving the 
U.S. during the period 1949-2001.  This method is advantageous for at least two reasons.  
It allows the systematic comparison of many cases at once, ensuring that the patterns 
revealed are not limited to just one or two crises.  It also limits the possibility that the 
results support the argument by chance, which may occur when a small number of cases 
are examined (see e.g., King, Keohane and Verba 1994).  In addition to the statistical 
analysis, I also examine two individual cases in detail.  These case studies not only 
illustrate the theoretical argument, they also facilitate the testing of the hypotheses by 
revealing limitations of the theory.  The case study method also aids in the effort to 
examine nuance in key theoretical concepts that cannot be readily captured by 
operationalized variables.   
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OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation proceeds in seven chapters following this introduction.  Chapter 
II reviews the literature and develops the theoretical framework for addressing the 
research problem.  As highlighted above, this theoretical argument contends that 
presidential crisis decision making follows a two-stage process in which public opinion 
toward the use of force limits the alternatives the president considers in response to an 
international crisis; presidents rule out choices that are clearly inconsistent with public 
preferences in the first stage.  In the second stage of the decision making process, the 
president chooses the alternative that maximizes net benefits with respect to military and 
international-strategic factors.  The chapter postulates that public opinion is an expression 
of the extent to which the public is willing to tolerate casualties.  Consequently, 
presidents may choose alternatives that address this public concern without ruling out all 
military force alternatives.   
Chapter III introduces the empirical research design used to test the theories 
summarized in Chapter II.  This chapter describes the case selection procedure as well as 
how each of the variables is measured.  I use two prominent data sources to identify the 
crises involving the U.S. – International Crisis Behavior and Militarized Interstate 
Disputes.  To test the hypotheses, I develop a new categorical measure of the presidential 
use of force, reflecting the different ways in which the president can respond to an 
international crisis.  I also describe a new data set on public opinion toward the use of 
force to assess the impact of the public on presidential crisis response choices.   
Chapter IV tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter II using the research design 
described in Chapter III.  The results using two different sets of cases indicate that public 
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opinion is systematically associated with the president’s crisis response choice.  
Specifically, presidents choose alternatives that place more troops in harm’s way when 
the public is supportive of military action, and presidents pursue “safer” alternatives 
when the public is not clearly supportive of the use of force.  The results also reveal that 
military and international-strategic factors, thought to be important in the second stage of 
the decision making process, fail to systematically influence the president’s decision.   
Chapters V and VI supplement the quantitative analysis with in-depth case studies 
of President Clinton’s 1994 decision to launch air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs and 
President Bush’s 2001 decision to conduct a limited invasion of Afghanistan.  In these 
chapters, I take a closer look at the theoretical argument.  First, I examine whether public 
opinion is congruent with general attitudes concerning expected combat fatalities.  
Second, I disaggregate the public into the traditionally studied segments of the elite (or 
attentive) and mass publics to see if either group has a disproportionate influence on 
presidential crisis response choices.  I also consider whether society’s memory of a 
previous crisis experience (e.g., Vietnam, Gulf War) influence popular expectations and 
preferences about the use of force in response to the current crisis.  Finally, I am able to 
assess the particular challenges posed by the crisis for the military and international-
strategic dimensions.   
Chapter VII reviews the theoretical argument and findings presented in the 
dissertation.  It details the contributions of the study as well as the implications of this 
research for other areas of international relations research.  I conclude that public opinion 
is capable of restricting the set of options available to the president and that, once this set 
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is reduced, the president’s final choice is driven by case-specific military and 
international-strategic factors. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE AND THEORY 
Public opinion figures prominently in the research on domestic politics and 
international relations.  In international crises, this informal democratic institution is 
thought to strengthen a leader’s hand, inform an adversary, or constrain the set of 
available alternatives (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001; Bueno 
de Mesquita, et al. 1999).  But relatively little is known about the manner in which the 
preferences of the citizenry affect the choices of their national executives in international 
crisis decision making.  For U.S. presidents, public support for the use of force is thought 
to be essential for the effective conduct of military operations abroad (e.g., Gelb 1972; 
Mueller 1973; Weinberger 1984; DeYoung and Milbank 2001; see also Kull and Destler 
1999; Kull and Ramsay 2001).   
Even scholars who are skeptical of a central role for the mass public in every-day 
foreign policy decisions allow for the possibility that public opinion has a significant 
impact on presidential decisions to use force.  For instance, in a recent American Political 
Science Review paper, Jacobs and Page (2005) found that public opinion does not 
significantly affect foreign policy, except for issues of great salience to the domestic 
audience.  Moreover, the authors admit that no other foreign policy issue is more 
provocative and salient to the public than those concerning the use of military force 
abroad (see also e.g., Barnet 1990; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Mueller 1973).  Jacobs and 
Page have therefore left the door open for the possible influence of public opinion on use 
of force decisions.  Despite the apparent centrality of public opinion in presidential 
decisions to use force, relatively little empirical research has explicitly evaluated the 
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influence of public attitudes on presidential conflict behavior (but see Brulé and Mintz 
2005).   
As an effort to advance understanding of the role of public opinion in presidential 
decisions to use force, this chapter summarizes the predominant bodies of knowledge 
about the relationship between opinion and force.  Since Rosenau’s (1961) ground-
breaking study of the opinion-foreign policy linkage, there has been remarkably little 
progress in theory-building or understanding the actual influence of public attitudes on 
crisis response choices (e.g., Holsti 1992; Sobel 2001).  After summarizing and critiquing 
the main strands of relevant research, this chapter will build on existing theoretical 
insights to develop an account of public opinion and the presidential use of force that 
goes beyond the current theoretical and empirical limitations.    
OPINION MANIPULATION, CONSTRAINTS, AND THE USE OF FORCE 
The primary perspectives of public opinion and foreign policy differ markedly in 
their assumptions concerning the nature of public opinion as well as the president’s 
response to levels of support.  Generally, there are two competing accounts of the role of 
public opinion in presidential decisions to use force.  One of these describes a top-down 
process of public opinion formation in which the president and other elites move public 
opinion toward a favored policy.  The other perspective suggests that public opinion – 
specifically, a lack of support – serves as a constraint on certain policy options.  But these 
perspectives fail to fully specify the causal mechanisms at work in both of the relevant 
levels of analysis in a manner that is consistent with observation.  Consequently, we need 
to look to studies examining the impact of the use of force on public opinion to fully 
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understand how public attitudes are shaped by exogenous factors and how presidents 
respond to public attitudes.    
Opinion Manipulation: The “Top-down” Process 
According to the “top-down” process of public opinion formation (e.g., Wittkopf 
and McCormick 1993), presidents influence the public through leadership and 
manipulation (e.g., Margolis and Mauser 1989).  Presidents may increase public support 
for specific policies by “going public” (Kernell 1986), adding salience to world events.  
This view assumes that the public is largely uninformed and lacks coherent, stable 
opinions on foreign policy issues (e.g., Lippmann 1922; Almond 1950).  Rather than 
follow public opinion, presidents manipulate it in order to marshal support for their 
desired policies.   
Until the Vietnam War, the scholarly consensus on the relationship between 
public opinion and foreign policy was one in which policy makers were thought to have 
carte blanche in national security policy decisions (e.g., Gamson and Modigliani 1966; 
Verba et al. 1967; Mueller 1973).  Buttressing this claim are early studies of citizens’ 
foreign policy judgments, which suggest that public opinion on foreign policy is largely 
uninformed, indifferent, and unstable (e.g., Lippmann 1922; Almond 1950; Converse 
1964).  Ordinary citizens regard foreign policy issues as too remote, abstract, or 
confusing to warrant the expenditure of time and energy necessary to understand them 
(e.g., Graber 1984; Rielly 1995; Kegley and Wittkopf 1996).  Consequently, some 
scholars and policy makers considered the independence of foreign policy from public 
opinion as both an empirical fact and a normative good (e.g., Lipset 1966; Cohen 1973; 
Morgenthau 1973).   
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Although this account of an inattentive public suggests that foreign policy 
decisions on the use of force abroad are free from interference by the public, public 
opinion is not free from elite influence.  The president and other foreign policy makers 
may manipulate public opinion through the framing of alternatives and public relations 
campaigns (see e.g., Rosenau 1961; Margolis and Mauser 1989; Wittkopf and 
McCormick 1993).  A malleable public affords presidents the opportunity to 
simultaneously satisfy their own foreign policy goals, while appearing to do the people’s 
bidding.  Thus, according to this explanation, public support for the use of force is a 
result of opinion manipulation.    
A burgeoning body of research suggests that presidents not only manipulate 
public opinion in order to use force, but may also use force abroad in an effort to 
manipulate public opinion.  The so-called diversionary theory of war argues that national 
leaders distract public attention from domestic problems by initiating foreign wars (e.g., 
Blainey 1988; Levy 1989; Morgan and Bickers 1992).  Rooted in the sociological in-
group/out-group hypothesis (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956), which posits an increase in 
intra-group cohesion in the face of an external threat, diversionary theory argues that 
leaders may exaggerate the threat posed by a foreign state when faced with domestic 
unrest or revolution.  When the relevant domestic groups are confronted by a common 
menace, they are expected to put aside their differences and unite in support of the 
national leader in his or her effort to defeat the enemy (e.g., Levy 1989).  This 
explanation of diversionary theory has enjoyed the support of a number of historical and 
anecdotal accounts of war initiation (see e.g., Hastings and Jenkins 1983; Mayer 1971).  
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However, early empirical research failed to uncover the link between internal turmoil and 
external conflict.2   
Subsequent efforts to examine the role of domestic problems in the use of force 
abroad typically focus on more innocuous forms of domestic discontent.  In the American 
case, supportive evidence for incentives to divert initially appear in the form of the “rally-
‘round-the-flag” effect – a short-term boost in presidential approval ratings following the 
use of force (e.g., Mueller 1973; Lee 1977; MacKuen 1983).  U.S. presidents may have 
an incentive to use force in order to raise their public approval ratings.  When presidential 
popularity is low, presidents may manufacture or add salience to international crises in 
order to boost their popularity.  Indeed, much of the use of force literature suggests that 
presidents are motivated to engage in aggressive foreign policy under deteriorating 
domestic political conditions in order to bolster their domestic popularity (Marra, Ostrom 
and Simon 1990; Russett 1990; DeRouen 1995).  A number of studies find that presidents 
are more likely to use force when faced with such domestic political conditions as 
declining public approval (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991; Morgan 
and Bickers 1992) and a flagging economy (e.g., DeRouen 1995; Hess and Orphanides 
1995; Fordham 1998a).   
But the diversionary explanation for the presidential use of force suffers from two 
serious theoretical problems.  The first concerns the value of incentives to divert – 
specifically, using force to address domestic political problems fails to improve the 
leader’s position and may make the domestic situation worse.  The “rally-‘round-the-
flag” effect is thought to be too small and short-lived to offer sufficient incentives for 
presidents to engage in a diversionary use of force (Brody and Shapiro 1989; Lian and 
                                                 
2 Levy (1989) offers a comprehensive review of these early empirical studies.   
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Oneal 1993). Additionally, using military force in response to a declining domestic 
economy may crowd out private investment and put upward pressure on prices, 
exacerbating flagging growth and inflation (see e.g., Fordham 1998a).  Thus, once the 
initial boost in popularity subsides, diverting presidents may find themselves in worse 
standing with an economically miserable citizenry than before the diversion (see also 
Meernik and Waterman 1996).   
A second theoretical problem concerns the conspiratorial nature of the argument.  
The explanation is rather cynical, relying on an assumption of duplicitous behavior by the 
president (Richards, et al. 1993; Lian and Oneal 1993; Meernik and Waterman 1996).  To 
be sure, assuming that presidents rarely use force in response to genuine threats to U.S. 
national security interests requires a supporting assumption about the nature of the 
public’s foreign policy beliefs and attitudes toward foreign policy issues.  Historically, 
public opinion toward foreign policy has been considered inattentive, unstable, and 
responsive to elite manipulation (Holsti 1992), which is consistent with the diversionary 
explanation.  But recent research suggests that the public is actually “pretty prudent” 
(Jentleson 1992; Oneal, Lian and Joyner 1996; Jentleson and Britton 1998).  In other 
words, public attitudes toward foreign policy are structured, coherent, and largely 
resistant to elite manipulation (e.g., Caspary 1970; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Edwards 
2003).  These studies cast doubt on the malleability of public opinion, making the 
diversionary theory less believable.   
Overall, the “top-down” perspective conceives of a public whose opinions are 
malleable and readily subject to manipulation.  Presidents may manipulate public opinion 
through framing, public relations campaigns, or the actual use of force.  However, the 
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top-down process of opinion formation is challenged by studies that suggest that public 
opinion on foreign policy issues is stable and coherent (e.g., Caspary 1970; Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1987; Page and Shapiro 1992).  Moreover, Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and 
Britton (1998) contend that public support for the use of force is structured by the 
perceived “prudence” of the policy objectives.  A recent study by Edwards (2003) also 
argues that presidents’ efforts to garner support through public addresses are typically 
ineffective and often counterproductive.  This stands in stark contrast to the view of the 
American public as the unwitting object of elite manipulation.   
Public Opinion as a Constraint on Presidential Decision Making 
Unlike the top-down account, the other theoretical perspective posits an active 
role for the public.  The constraints account holds that public opinion serves as a 
constraint on foreign policy decision making (e.g., Russett 1990; Powlick and Katz 1998; 
Foyle 1999; Sobel 2001).  Stemming from Key’s (1966) theory of public opinion as a 
“system of dikes” that channels the flow of policy, this perspective contends that mass 
public opinion is capable of limiting the use of force.  It figures prominently in the 
structural, or institutional constraints, explanation of the democratic peace phenomenon 
(e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993).  The constraint 
perspective draws micro-theoretical support from empirical studies finding that public 
opinion is coherent (e.g., Achen 1975; Wittkopf 1990), stable (e.g., Caspary 1970; Page 
and Shapiro 1992), and influenced by such reasonable factors as individuals’ core values 
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Stimson 1991), international events (e.g., Mueller 1973; 
Jentleson 1992), and additional information revealed through national debates (Zaller 
1992; 1994).   
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Given that public opinion on foreign policy is largely “sensible” (Ninic 1992), the 
possibility exists that voters may punish leaders who ignore the constraint imposed by 
public preferences (e.g., Fiorina 1981; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode 1990; Mintz and 
Geva 1993).  Indeed, like domestic issues, voters consider foreign policy issues in their 
retrospective evaluations of elected officials’ performance (e.g., Kusnitz 1984; Aldrich, 
Sullivan, and Borgida 1989).  Consequently, when public support for a specific policy is 
inadequate, presidents are unable to implement that policy.  On the other hand, when 
public support is deemed adequate, presidents have free rein to pursue their desired 
course of action.   
Mounting evidence appears to support the view that public opinion acts as a 
constraint on foreign policy outcomes.  Empirical studies exploring the public’s impact 
on levels of defense expenditures in the U.S. appear to confirm this suggestion.  A 
number of studies (e.g., Bartels 1991; Hartley and Russett 1992; Knopf 1998) find that 
changes in public preferences with respect to military spending are followed by policies 
reflecting public opinion.  Similarly, large-N studies of the correspondence between 
public preferences and foreign policy outputs suggest a link between citizens’ judgments 
and the policies leaders pursue (e.g., Monroe 1979; Page and Shapiro 1983).   
But the public-opinion-as-constraint perspective is flawed methodologically, as 
well as theoretically.  One methodological flaw is related to research designs, which have 
provided supportive evidence of the perspective.  A correspondence between public 
opinion and a policy output does not point to a specific causal mechanism at work in the 
relationship.  Indeed, a direct relationship between public support for a given policy and 
the implementation of that policy may be construed as supportive of the top-down 
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perspective.  Such a relationship may be the result of successful opinion manipulation by 
the president through framing or agenda setting.  Connecting the direction and intensity 
of public preferences with the ultimate policy outcomes does not sufficiently isolate the 
unobserved process underlying public opinion formation.   
A second methodological flaw is related to the leap between studies finding a role 
for public opinion in non-violent foreign policy and the untested assumption that public 
opinion constrains the use of military force abroad (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).  An abundance of 
case studies reveal a clear pattern: leaders are aware of – and constrained by – public 
opinion in use of force decisions (e.g., Russett 1990; Mintz 1993; Foyle 1999; Sobel 
2001; DeRouen 2003).  Yet there is a dearth of systematic evidence investigating this 
relationship.   
Finally, the public-opinion-as-constraint perspective implies a possible outcome 
that seems to be inconsistent with its own view of the relationship between public opinion 
and the use of force.  While this perspective focuses on the conditions under which 
presidents are able to act (i.e., public support), it ignores the possibility of constraints on 
presidential inaction.  Specifically, this constraints perspective suggests that public 
opposition to a policy places it largely beyond the administration’s consideration.  But 
public support for a policy does not necessarily rule out the pursuit of other, less costly 
alternatives.  The constraining effect of public opinion is akin to a price cap – the public 
places limits on the amount it is willing to pay for a “good.”  If the public is willing to 
pay a relatively high price for a good, it should be willing to pay a lower price for a 
comparable good.  In decisions concerning the use of force abroad, public opposition to 
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the use of force constrains that alternative, making the pursuit of a less costly, non-force 
alternative more likely.  Conversely, public support for the use of force affords the 
president greater freedom of action to carry out any policy – up to and including the use 
of force.  Thus, public support provides the president with a “blank check,” giving him 
considerable latitude in decisions to use force.   
The blank check perspective suggests that leaders are concerned about being 
punished in the next election if they use force in the face of public opposition.  But 
leaders are relatively unconcerned about electoral retribution if they fail to use force in 
defiance of widespread support for that course of action.  Unless we assume that the 
president’s utility for the use of force constantly exceeds his utility for other foreign 
policy alternatives, there is little reason to expect public support for the use of force to be 
systematically related to military action abroad.   
The public-opinion-as-a-constraint perspective seems intuitively pleasing and 
plausible at first blush.  However, like the opinion manipulation perspective, this account 
of the role of public opinion in decisions to use force is plagued with theoretical 
shortcomings and a dearth of convincing, systematic evidence.  Neither of these 
explanations appear to have well-developed micro-theoretical accounts of how 
exogenous factors shape public support and opposition toward the use of force.  
Moreover, these explanations fail to specify macro-theoretical accounts of how public 
opinion shapes specific military responses to international crises.  To better understand 
the mechanisms at work (at both the micro and macro levels), it may be useful to 
examine a research agenda that treats public support and opposition as an endogenous 
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variable – the impact of the use of force on public support for and opposition to ongoing 
military operations.    
Toward Understanding the Role of Public Opinion in Decisions to Use Force 
Much of the research investigating public attitudes toward the use of force 
examines the relationship between U.S. troop casualties and public opinion (e.g., Mueller 
1973; 1994; Lorell, Kelley and Hensler 1985; Gartner and Segura 1998).  The U.S. public 
is thought to be, in general, averse to troop losses (Mueller 1973; 1994; Gartner and 
Segura 1998).  In other words, as the number of U.S. troop casualties increases, public 
support for ongoing military operations erodes.  However, some scholars (e.g., Lorell, 
Kelley and Hensler 1985; Larson 1996 see also Nincic and Nincic 1995; Mueller 1996) 
contend that focusing on the costs associated with military force provides only half of the 
picture.  Instead, public support or opposition toward ongoing military operations is a 
product of cost-benefit calculation by the mass public – are the objectives worth the 
costs?   
This cost-benefit assessment by the public may not be limited to retrospective 
evaluations.  In observing a correspondence between foreign policy objectives and ex 
ante public opinion toward military intervention, Jentleson (1992; see also Jentleson and 
Britton 1998) concludes that the public is more likely to support the use of force when a 
crisis threatens American interests.  Indeed, in international crises that are of great 
importance to the U.S. and its interests abroad, the public appears to be willing to tolerate 
troop fatalities in order to achieve the president’s foreign policy objectives (e.g., Larson 
1996; Mueller 1996; Kull and Destler1999).  According to Mueller (1996: 8), “[a] 
substantial loss of American lives may have been tolerable if the enemy was the bombers 
  
19
of Pearl Harbor or international Communism, but risking lives for a goal as ungraspable 
and vaporous as policing a small, distant, perennially-troubled, and unthreatening place 
has proved difficult to manage.”  Public opinion toward military involvement in a crisis 
appears to be driven by the public’s relative value assessment – the expected benefits of 
foreign policy success relative to the anticipated costs in terms of American blood.   
Not only is there evidence that the public bases its support for or opposition to the 
use of force on its relative value assessment, additional research suggests that presidents 
and other foreign policy makers are aware of these determinants of public support (e.g., 
Kull and Destler 1999; Kull and Ramsay 2001).  Presidents are thought to regard public 
attitudes as an estimate of the extent to which the public believes that the foreign policy 
objectives are worth the anticipated level of U.S. casualties.  Indeed, efforts to “educate” 
the public in order to increase public support for a proposed foreign policy are often 
attempts to convince the public that the benefits of an operation outweigh the costs (see 
e.g., Powlick 1991; Hinckley 1992; Storrs and Serafino 1993).  If the president uses 
public opinion toward the use of force to gauge the public’s relative value assessment, the 
level of public support or opposition should condition the way the president carries out a 
use of force.   
The Use of Force in the Empirical Literature  
Presidents have at their disposal a range of crisis response alternatives that vary 
categorically according to the manner in which force is employed.  For example, a 
president may respond to a crisis with a non-violent signal such as a show of force or a 
mobilization.  Similarly, a president may respond violently with an aerial bombardment 
or a ground assault.  In order to satisfy public opinion, presidents may use force in such a 
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way as to bring about a desired foreign policy outcome that risks the lives of many U.S. 
troops.  On the other hand, presidents may also carry out a use of force in a manner that 
places a premium on service members’ lives while jeopardizing the success of the foreign 
policy objectives (e.g., Pape 1996; Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999; Horowitz and Reiter 
2001).  But previous research fails to rigorously examine types of military force.  Most 
use of force studies examine a count of uses of force (e.g., Fordham 1998a), a force/no 
force dichotomy (e.g., Miller 1995; Wang 1996) or the level of force used (e.g., Meernik 
1994; DeRouen 1995).  None of these conceptualizations capture the thrust of how force 
is employed.3  Nor do they meaningfully capture the twin concerns of foreign policy 
success and U.S. troop fatalities.   
I seek to take the above criticisms to heart in the construction of a theoretical 
framework specifying the role of public opinion in presidential decisions to use force.  
Using literature on military strategy and coercive diplomacy, I develop a categorical 
concept of military force type – crisis response choice.  Then, I explicitly incorporate the 
public’s relative value assessment as the driving force behind support and opposition 
toward military involvement in an international crisis.  At the macro-theoretical level, I 
specify how the public’s relative value assessment – expressed as public opinion – 
influences the president’s crisis response choice.   
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
When confronted by an international crisis, presidents may choose a response 
                                                 
3 Blechman and Kaplan (1978) distinguish between different types of military components employed in a 
use of force – land units, air units, or sea units.   But such a typology can potentially conflate a use of force 
primarily consisting of sea units with an operation characterized by an assault by land forces – for instance, 
an amphibious assault.  Other studies examine military strategy – maneuver, attrition, and punishment (e.g., 
Bennett and Stam 1996; Reiter 1999).  Focusing on strategy fails to distinguish between types of force.   
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from a wide range of policy alternatives.  In order to arrive at an ultimate decision, 
presidents carry out a two-stage decision making process (e.g., Mintz, et al. 1997; Mintz 
2004).  In the first stage, alternatives that clearly defy public preferences are ruled out.  
Blatant defiance of the will of the people may result in electoral retribution or a loss of 
political capital, preventing the president from pursuing his foreign policy or domestic 
political agenda.  Consequently, presidents monitor public opinion polls during the 
decision making process.   
In order to identify which alternatives to rule out in the first stage, the president 
regards public opinion toward the use of force as an estimate of the public’s relative 
value assessment – the prospective benefits of a foreign policy success relative to the 
costs of placing U.S. troops in harm’s way.  Presidents eliminate alternatives that fail to 
comport with public preferences over foreign policy success and U.S. troop fatalities in 
the first stage of the decision making process.  The surviving crisis response alternatives 
promise the greatest likelihood of a foreign policy success within the limits of the 
public’s threshold for casualties.  In the second stage of the decision making process, an 
ultimate selection is made among surviving alternatives based on the alternatives’ ability 
to maximize utility with respect to military and international-strategic concerns.   
Crisis Response Alternatives 
Rather than characterize presidential responses to international crises as a 
dichotomous “use of force/no use of force” outcome (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and 
Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992), I develop a new concept that better captures the 
range of alternatives available to the president – “crisis response.”  Crisis response refers 
to the president’s choice of one option within a set of general alternatives available in 
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response to an international crisis.  Each crisis response is a generic category that may 
include a variety of specific tactics or choices.  In general, the president can respond to an 
international crisis with any of the following: 1) pursue non-force responses; 2) engage in 
a show of military force; 3) employ an aerial bombardment; and 4) utilize land forces in a 
ground assault.  Although these alternatives are qualitatively different from each other in 
a number of respects, they are ranked from lowest to highest in terms of each category’s 
capacity to bring about a foreign policy success.  Conversely, the alternatives are ranked 
from highest to lowest in terms of each category’s capacity to minimize U.S. troop 
casualties.   
Non-force responses  
Non-force responses include policy responses that do not include the use of 
military force.  For example, the president may issue a verbal denunciation of one or 
more participants in an international crisis.  The president may pursue negotiations or 
offer to provide a mediator.  Diplomatic or economic sanctions may be imposed.  The 
president may also threaten the use of force.  Of course, the president may choose to do 
nothing.  The central feature of the non-force category is that no military force is actually 
employed.  Consequently, when a non-force response is selected, no U.S. troops are 
placed in harm’s way.  The primary disadvantage of choosing a non-force alternative as a 
policy response to an international crisis is that the success of the policy rests nearly 
entirely with the target of the policy (see e.g., Schelling 1966).  For instance, in the year 
and a half during which the Clinton administration actively sought the restoration of the 
Aristide government in Haiti, the president at various times employed policies of 
negotiations with the military junta, diplomatic and economic sanctions, and threatened 
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to use military force to achieve his foreign policy objective (Morely and McGillion 
1997).  Nearly all of these efforts were ineffective and none of them produced immediate 
results.   
Show of force responses 
A show of military force typically entails the deployment of military forces near 
the borders or coastline of a target state.  This crisis response may also include deploying 
troops into crisis situations in which no sustained fighting is anticipated (e.g., Lebanon 
1958, Bosnia 1995).  The defining feature of this category of crisis response alternatives 
is that while military forces are mobilized and deployed, they are not expected to attack 
and/or be attacked.  Thus, the expected level of U.S. troop fatalities is near zero, but 
slightly higher than non-force policies due to the (albeit small) possibility that U.S. forces 
may be attacked or killed in accidents.  A show of military force is not much of an 
improvement over non-force alternatives in terms of the likelihood of foreign policy 
success.  Although this crisis response category is useful for deterring a target, it is 
typically not effective in compelling desired behavior (see e.g., Schelling 1966; Pape 
1996).  For example, the deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia following the 1990 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was largely successful in deterring further Iraqi aggression.  
However, Operation Desert Shield failed to compel Iraqi compliance with U.S. and 
coalition demands that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait.   
Aerial bombardment responses  
The third crisis response category – aerial bombardment – includes any actual 
violent use of military force by which a target is attacked, but land forces are not placed 
in harm’s way.  Operations that fall within this category are air strikes, missile strikes, 
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and naval bombardments.  The characteristic distinguishing aerial bombardment from 
other categories of military force is that bombs and/or missiles are delivered to a target 
from a relatively safe distance.  Compared with other use of force alternatives, aerial 
bombardment promises minimal friendly casualties.  For example, during NATO’s 1999 
air war with Serbia, the U.S. suffered no combat fatalities (Byman and Waxman 2000: 
35).  Moreover, as the firebombing of Dresden, the destruction of Hiroshima, and the pin-
point accuracy of precision-guided ordinance in the Gulf War attest; aerial bombardment 
is capable of achieving operational objectives.  But aerial bombardment alone appears to 
have limited utility in achieving foreign policy objectives (see e.g., Clodfelter 1989; Pape 
1996; Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999).  Indeed, the capacity of this crisis response category 
to achieve foreign policy success appears to rest with the strategy underlying the 
operation as well as the attributes of the target (Pape 1996; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; 
Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2002).4  Like economic sanctions (e.g., Hufbauer, Schott and 
Elliot 1990) and naval blockades (e.g., George, Hall and Simons 1971), the success of an 
aerial bombardment largely depends on the amount of pain and suffering a target can 
endure (see Pape 1996).  History suggests that few targets are quick to acquiesce in order 
to stop the bombing (Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2002).  Most bombing campaigns require 
complementary land forces or the credible threat of a ground invasion to compel targets 
to acquiesce.  This was the case in Bosnia in 1995 when NATO air strikes against 
Bosnian Serbs were buttressed by a Bosnian Croat ground campaign (Johnson, Mueller 
and Taft 2002).  Thus, while aerial bombardment is successful in keeping potential U.S. 
                                                 
4 Coercive military strategies that may be carried out through aerial bombardment include punishment and 
denial (Pape 1996; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Mueller 1998).  Because this research is interested in the use 
of different types of military components, I will not take the military strategy underlying the use of force 
into account.   
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casualties in check, this crisis response category is seldom effective in achieving a 
foreign policy success alone.5   
Land force assault responses 
The final crisis response category involves the use of land forces in direct 
confrontation with enemy forces.  Land force assaults include clashes, raids, or invasions 
in which ground forces are inserted into territory where they are expected to attack or be 
attacked.  Operations in which land forces are backed by air or naval support are also 
included in this crisis response category.  The hallmark of land force assault responses is 
the relatively high expectation of U.S. casualties.  Even in minor operations, the 
proportion of battle-related fatalities can be disheartening.  For instance, in the 1975 SS 
Mayaguez rescue mission, 18 of the 109 Marines directly participating in the assault were 
killed.  Another 23 U.S. service members supporting the operation died in accidents 
(Rowan 1975; United States Congress 1975).   
In spite of the risk to the lives of U.S. troops, land force assault responses appear 
to promise a greater likelihood of achieving foreign policy objectives than operations that 
fall within other crisis response categories.  For example, from 1991 until 2003, the U.S. 
led an economic sanctions regime and conducted intermittent aerial bombardments 
against Iraq – actions which were aimed at obtaining unfettered access to Iraqi weapons 
and weapons programs (see e.g., Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2002).  However, these 
foreign policy objectives were not fully realized until after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 
                                                 
5 Of course, the extent to which a policy is successful largely depends on the objectives of the policy.  For 
example, consider the 1986 Operation El Dorado Canyon in which the U.S. conducted air strikes against 
Libya in response to Libya’s sponsorship of terrorism.  If the foreign policy objectives of this operation 
were simply to “punish” Libya for its sponsorship of terrorism, the operation may be regarded as 
successful.  But if the foreign policy objectives included deterring additional sponsorship in the future, the 
air strikes cannot be regarded as successful – Libya continued its sponsorship of terrorist activities (see e.g., 
Pape 1996; Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2002). 
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in March 2003.  Other recent U.S. military operations that featured the use of land forces 
brought about the downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, forced the Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait in 1991, stopped Panamanian-government complicity in the 
international drug trade in 1989, and eliminated Cuban and Soviet influence in Grenada 
in 1983 (Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2002).  As these operations illustrate, land force 
assault responses tend to be well-suited for successfully implementing foreign policy 
objectives during international crises.   
It is evident from the preceding discussion that the president’s choice among the 
crisis response alternatives is characterized by a tradeoff between efforts to maximize the 
likelihood of foreign policy success and minimize expected casualties.  As the risk to 
U.S. troops decreases, the likelihood of foreign policy success also declines.  Below, I 
develop a Poliheuristic account of presidential crisis response choice.   
Poliheuristic Theory 
Poliheuristic Theory (Mintz 2004; Mintz, et al 1997) explicitly acknowledges the 
primacy of domestic politics in democratic leaders’ foreign policy decisions.  It also 
posits a central role for public opinion in decisions to use force.  The theory postulates a 
two-stage decision making process.  In the first stage, leaders employ a noncompensatory 
decision making strategy, which reduces the menu of alternatives through the elimination 
of options that are unacceptable on a critical decision making dimension.  A high score 
on a less critical dimension cannot compensate for a low score on the key dimension.  In 
the second stage, leaders choose among the remaining alternatives by using analytic 
decision rules (see Mintz 2004).   
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Unlike other decision making approaches (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
1992; Steinbruner 1974), the Poliheuristic Theory identifies a key dimension that must be 
satisfied in order for an alternative to be accepted.  Alternatives are not evaluated 
simultaneously.  Instead, leaders reduce the set of alternatives in the first stage by 
rejecting those options that fail to breach a minimum threshold on the key decision 
dimension.  Because leaders are often self-interested politicians who seek to ensure their 
domestic political survival, Mintz (1993; 2004) suggests that this key dimension is 
typically domestic politics – the sine qua non of decision making.  For example, if a 
given alternative seriously threatens the electoral prospects of a democratic leader, that 
alternative is rejected.  A high score on other dimensions cannot compensate for a low 
score on the domestic political dimension.   
In the second stage, a choice is selected from the remaining alternatives based on 
its ability to maximize expected benefits on other relevant dimensions (Mintz et al., 
1997).  In other words, decision makers choose from the remaining options based on an 
alternative’s ability to maximize expected net benefits.  These remaining dimensions are 
nontrivial (e.g., Mintz, Geva and DeRouen, 1994) and previous studies applying 
Poliheuristic Theory (e.g., Mintz, 1993; Redd, 2001; DeRouen, 2003) propose that 
decision makers evaluate the remaining alternatives on military and strategic dimensions.  
For example, an alternative may maximize expected benefits on the military dimension 
when the alternative can be implemented with relatively low costs, or when the 
alternative has the greatest probability of success.  Similarly, an alternative may 
maximize expected benefits on the strategic dimension when the alternative does not 
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threaten to undermine alliance arrangements, enable the enlargement of an adversary’s 
influence, or compromise the nation’s international credibility.   
The two-stage, multi-dimensional decision making strategy posited by the 
poliheuristic theory does not privilege process validity over outcome validity, or vice 
versa (see Mintz, 2004).  Indeed, it mirrors the manner in which decisions are often made 
(e.g., Mintz et al., 1997).  Additionally, the theory has exceptional predictive power (e.g., 
DeRouen, 2000; 2003; Redd, 2001; Sathasivam, 2003).   
Domestic Political Dimension: Public Opinion  
Consistent with Poliheuristic Theory (e.g., Mintz, et al. 1997; Mintz 2004), when 
considering how to respond to an international crises, the president rejects alternatives 
that threaten his domestic political fortunes in the first stage of the decision making 
process.  Throughout the postwar period, opinion polls concerning policy proposals have 
been prevalent, facilitating the communication of the public’s wishes to elected officials 
(Margolis and Mauser 1989; Russett 1990; Holsti 1992; Powlick 1995).  In the search for 
a response to an international crisis, presidents can refer to public opinion polls in which 
respondents are asked whether the United States should “send troops,” or use “military 
force” in order to resolve the crisis.  Reviewing the results of opinion polls may aid the 
president in identifying and rejecting alternatives that the public finds particularly 
objectionable.   
Although presidents seek to rule out alternatives that clearly defy public 
preferences, international crises are rarely so simple that presidents and policy makers 
may formulate a response directly from public opinion (e.g., Russett 1990).  Moreover, 
opinion poll results may not present the president with an unequivocal picture of support 
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or opposition concerning a proposed course of action.  Instead, opinion polls may suggest 
that the mass public is largely ambivalent or indifferent toward military involvement in 
an international crisis, providing the president with “mixed signals” concerning public 
preferences.  Rather than granting the president greater discretion in his choice of a crisis 
response, these mixed signals complicate presidential efforts to avoid domestic political 
punishment.  If the president chooses to send combat troops when the public is 
indifferent, mounting U.S. casualties may turn a majority of Americans against him (e.g., 
Mueller 1973; 1994; Gartner and Segura 1998).  On the other hand, if the president relies 
on diplomacy when public opinion is evenly divided, a large segment of Americans may 
criticize the president for not doing enough to resolve the crisis.   
Micro-theoretical foundations: relative value 
How does the president select the alternative(s) to eliminate in the first phase of 
the decision making process?  Previous scholarship on public opinion and the use of force 
(e.g., Larson 1996; Mueller 1996; Kull and Destler 1999) suggests that the public chooses 
whether to support or oppose a military endeavor on the basis of a cost-benefit 
calculation.  That is to say, members of the citizenry ask themselves about the relative 
value of the operation: are the foreign policy objectives worth the costs?  Like domestic 
policy, foreign policy is “judged in terms of expected costs and benefits for the individual 
and his or her family, friends, favored groups, and the nation or world as a whole” (Page, 
Shapiro and Jacobs 1987: 23).   
According to this line of thought, public opinion toward military involvement in a 
crisis is an aggregation of relative value assessments conducted by individual members of 
society.  Individuals weigh the potential benefits resulting from a foreign policy success 
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against the expected costs to the country.  When the preponderance of individuals 
believes that the costs outweigh the benefits, public opinion is supportive of military 
involvement.  When the bulk of these individuals believe that the benefits are not worth 
the costs, public opinion is opposed to the use of force.  But when there is no prevailing 
assessment of the relative value of a proposed foreign policy – no sizable majority of 
individuals believes that the costs outweigh the benefits or vice versa – public opinion is 
either ambivalent or indifferent to the use of force.   
Costs 
In the event that the president chooses to use force abroad, “casualties to U.S. 
service men is the most highly visible and important costs to the public” (Lorell, Kelley, 
and Hensler 1985: 28).  To be sure, the costs of military operations are frequently 
measured in terms of blood and treasure, but as Russett (1990: 46) observes, “[o]f the 
two, blood (American) seems the more important.”  In Korea, Vietnam, and – to a lesser 
extent – the two wars with Iraq, U.S. casualties have eroded American public support for 
military operations (e.g., Mueller 1973; 1994; Lorell, Kelley, and Hensler 1985; Gartner 
and Segura 1998).  Consequently, the public’s prospective estimate of U.S. casualties is 
an essential part of public support or opposition to military alternatives (e.g., Luttwak 
1994; Mueller 1996).    
Benefits 
The benefits considered by the public are the expected results of the president’s 
foreign policy objectives.  Benefits are not as one-dimensional as costs – i.e., casualties.  
Although one of the expected benefits is typically the resolution of the crisis, the public 
may evaluate the merits of a foreign policy according to the extent to which it serves the 
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U.S.’s “vital interests” or fulfills the humanitarian needs of an unfortunate people (e.g., 
Ladd 1980; Rielly 1991; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Haass 1999).  Benefits may also be 
gauged with respect to such goals as challenging aggression or promoting democracy 
(Russett and Nincic 1976; Jentleson 1992; Nincic 1997; Jentleson and Britton 1998).  In 
short, the expected benefits of the president’s foreign policy objectives vary across crises.  
Thus, the public assesses the merits of these objectives on the basis of each case (e.g., 
Larson 1996; Mueller 1996).   
When presented with an international crisis involving the use of military force, 
the public conducts a relative value assessment.  Public attitudes toward the use of force 
are driven by the extent to which the public believes that the foreign policy objectives of 
a proposed military operation are worth the costs in terms of expected casualties.  The 
public is willing to tolerate more casualties when the foreign policy objectives are 
deemed worthwhile (Larson 1996).  But the public “does not have – and never has had – 
much stomach for losing American lives in ventures and arenas that are of little concern” 
(Mueller 1996: 8).  To come to the point, public opinion toward the use of force is 
congruent with the public’s relative value assessment.  Therefore, public support for the 
use of force indicates a greater tolerance for U.S. casualties, while opposition signifies 
greater aversion to casualties.   
Hypotheses: Presidential Responses to Public Opinion 
Presidents and policy makers are aware that public attitudes toward the use of 
force are shaped by a relative value assessment (e.g., Kull and Destler 1999; Kull and 
Ramsay 2001).  Indeed, presidents and policy makers attempt to manipulate the relative 
value assessment inherent in public opinion toward the use of force by convincing the 
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public that the merits of an intervention outweigh the costs (e.g., Powlick 1991; Hinckley 
1992; Storrs and Serafino 1993).  But such efforts – euphemistically referred to as 
“education” campaigns – frequently fail to increase public support for a policy (see e.g., 
Sobel 1993; Edwards 2003).   
How does public opinion affect the president’s crisis response choice?  In the first 
stage of the decision making process, the president can infer the public’s relative value 
assessment – the public’s estimate of the expected benefits of a foreign policy success 
relative to anticipated U.S. casualties – from public opinion polls.  The president can then 
rule out crisis response alternatives that clearly violate the preferences of a sizeable 
segment of the public.  For example, when the bulk of the public supports the use of 
force, the president may conclude that the public is mostly tolerant of U.S. casualties, 
preferring a foreign policy success.  In this case, the president may rule out alternatives 
that have a low probability of achieving foreign policy success – i.e., non-force 
alternatives such as diplomatic efforts or economic sanctions – to circumvent potential 
domestic political punishment.   
H1: Public support for the use of force is likely to be associated with higher Crisis 
response alternatives.     
If an overwhelming majority of Americans oppose military involvement in an 
international crisis, the president may conclude that the public is largely averse to U.S. 
casualties in the crisis under consideration.  In order to avoid domestic political 
retribution, the president may simply discard the alternative that is likely to result in the 
highest number of American fatalities – Land force assault.   
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H2: Public opposition to the use of force is likely to result in the selection of 
lower Crisis response choices.   
Presidential decision making in the face of public ambivalence or indifference is 
not as straightforward as situations in which public preferences are unequivocal.  In these 
cases, the president is reluctant to risk the lives of U.S. service members because no 
sizeable segment of the public stands in support of military involvement, indicating that 
the public is not clearly tolerant of troop fatalities.  But the president is also disinclined to 
risk a foreign policy failure because the public is not unambiguously opposed to forceful 
action.  In such situations, presidents can be expected to reject alternatives that lay at the 
extremes in terms of anticipated casualties and foreign policy success.  In other words, 
mixed signals or apathy on the part of the public should lead presidents to reject non-
force alternatives as well as the utilization of land forces in the first stage of the decision 
making process.   
H3: Public ambivalence or indifference about the use of force is likely to result in 
the selection of intermediate Crisis response choices.   
The above discussion focuses on the first stage of the Poliheuristic decision 
making process.  In this stage, presidents rule out alternatives that clearly violate the 
public opinion prerequisite.  Thus, the hypotheses are stated in such a way as to specify 
negative relationships between the levels of public opinion and the various crisis response 
choices.  In the following subsections, I discuss how military and international-strategic 
considerations shape the president’s ultimate choice in the second stage of the 
Poliheuristic decision making process.   
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The Military Dimension 
While any number of nontrivial dimensions can be considered in the second stage 
of the decision making process (Mintz, Geva and DeRouen 1994), presidents weigh the 
implications of the remaining alternatives on the military and strategic dimensions (see 
e.g., Mintz 1993; Brulé 2005).  The remaining alternatives are evaluated in the second 
stage according to their ability to maximize benefits (minimize costs) simultaneously on 
the military and strategic dimensions.  On the military dimension, remaining alternatives 
are assessed with respect to such military considerations as capabilities, logistics, and the 
likelihood of success.  Alternatives that have the capacity to defeat enemy forces in the 
target area, are well-suited to such logistical factors as distance to the crisis location, and 
promise the highest probability of successfully achieving the foreign policy objectives 
articulated by the president will have the highest “score” on the military dimension (see 
Brulé 2005).   
Since World War II, U.S. troops have faced the prospect of fighting forces with a 
similar level of military capabilities in relatively few situations – e.g., the Chinese in 
Korea and Vietnam as well as the Soviets in Berlin and Cuba.  Yet an aversion to military 
defeat is a prominent consideration to presidents (e.g., Russett 1990; Haass 1999).  This 
does not mean that presidents are reluctant to take risks and approve daring, uncertain 
operations (see also Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Mintz 1993; Vertzberger 1998).  For 
example, military operations like those aimed at rescuing U.S. hostages in Iran and 
Cambodia hold little room for error and offer a relatively low probability of success (see 
e.g., Rowan 1975; Brulé 2005).  But a risky operation may be the “best” alternative 
remaining after the president has ruled out other options expected to damage his domestic 
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political fortunes.  When considered in conjunction with international-strategic factors 
(see below) and, perhaps, normative considerations, presidents may be unwilling to bring 
all of the U.S.’s military might to bear on a crisis (e.g., Tannenwald 1999).   
In addition to the fighting capabilities of the U.S. military, presidents have the 
luxury of projecting force virtually anywhere on the globe (Haass 1999).  Forward-
deployed forces in Europe and East Asia can be quickly positioned to intervene in nearby 
crises.  Similarly, naval and air forces can be routed to troubled areas with relative ease 
and speed.  Consequently, distant crises are rarely ignored on the basis of their locations.  
However, distance coupled with terrain may be a factor.  For example, vast distances 
characterized by dense jungles or harsh desert may influence the president’s crisis 
response choice (Bennett and Stam 1996).   
Although the U.S. possesses sufficient military capabilities to overcome a number 
of logistical and operational obstacles, relative capabilities and distance can be expected 
to play a role in influencing the president’s choice.  To be sure, both of these concerns 
may impact the expected duration of an operation should the president choose to employ 
the military in response to a crisis.  A stubborn adversary may thwart U.S. attempts to 
achieve objectives and kill many U.S. troops, prolonging military operations and 
reducing domestic support for the intervention (e.g., Russett 1990; Mintz 1993).  
Likewise, mobilizing and deploying troops to locations far from U.S. shores or overseas 
bases may make an alternative such as a land force assault less attractive.   
H4: As the U.S. relative capabilities increase, presidents are more likely to choose 
higher Crisis response choices.   
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H5: When the location of a crisis is near the U.S., the president is more likely to 
choose higher Crisis response choices.    
The International-Strategic Dimension 
The strategic dimension for the U.S. is largely concerned with the implications of 
the remaining alternatives for such factors as the global balance of power and grand 
strategy.  Until 1989, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union dominated 
world affairs.  During the Cold War, the U.S. typically challenged Soviet efforts to obtain 
military or materiel advantages.  Similarly, the U.S. grand strategy of containment sought 
to prevent the Soviet Union’s expansion of political influence (see e.g., Gaddis 2005).  
For example, consider the Carter administration’s decision to launch a rescue mission to 
free U.S. hostages in Iran in 1980 (see e.g., Brulé 2005).  A noteworthy international 
development that occurred during the hostage crisis was the Soviet invasion of Iran’s 
neighbor, Afghanistan, in December 1979, which would have implications for U.S. 
military action in Iran.  If the U.S. failed to take action to free the hostages, it might 
signal a lack of resolve to the Soviets, undermining U.S. foreign policy credibility (e.g., 
Excerpts from President’s Interview 1980).  However, a large-scale use of force against 
Iran held the potential to push the nascent revolutionary regime into the arms of the 
Soviet Union (e.g., Hoffman 1980).  This result would undermine the grand strategy of 
containment.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has yet to articulate a grand strategy as 
singular and coherent as Kennan’s strategy of containment.  But a variety of competing 
visions has served (at least) four overarching foreign policy goals: 1) nonproliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, 2) “democratic enlargement” – promotion of democracy, 3) 
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the war on terrorism, 4) maintenance of strategic alliances such as NATO (see e.g., Posen 
and Ross 1996; Brinkley 1997; Art 1998; Haley 2004).  Clearly, there is a large variety of 
overarching foreign policy goals and grand strategies over time and across crises.  This 
complicates the task of objectively assessing the president’s concerns with the 
international-strategic implications of a crisis response alternative across a large number 
of cases.  In general, we should expect a difference in the president’s crisis response 
choice according to whether a crisis occurs during the Cold War or post-Cold War 
period.   
H6: The Cold War is likely to critically affect the president’s crisis response. 
In summary, the president rules out crisis response alternatives in the first stage of 
the decision making process on the basis of each alternative’s ability to satisfy the public 
opinion prerequisite.  Alternatives that clearly violate the public’s preferences with 
respect to the public’s relative value assessment of a use of force are rejected.  In the 
second stage of the process, the president selects a crisis response choice among 
surviving alternatives by identifying that which maximizes benefits (minimizes costs) in 
terms of military and international-strategic concerns.   
CONCLUSION 
Although public opinion toward foreign policy has been treated as malleable and 
unstable (e.g., Lippmann 1922; Almond 1950; Converse 1964), recent research suggests 
that it is coherent, stable and rational (e.g., Caspary 1970; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; 
Page and Shapiro 1992).  But these attributes of mass public opinion are not sufficient to 
specify the particular causal mechanisms that link public opinion to presidential decisions 
to use force.  Using insights from empirical studies examining the influence of casualties 
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on public opinion and the Poliheuristic Theory, I have developed an explanation that 
seeks to remedy previous shortcomings in the literature.  As a starting point, I have 
identified four types of presidential crisis responses and linked them theoretically to 
expected casualties and the likelihood of foreign policy success.  Then, I describe the 
micro-theoretical foundations concerning the determinants of public attitudes toward the 
use of force.  Specifically, public opinion is driven by the public’s ex ante relative value 
assessment of using force abroad.  Presidents have an understanding of the forces at work 
in shaping public opinion and – because they are reluctant to deliberately defy the 
preferences of the citizenry – they rule out alternatives that are clearly at odds with the 
public in the first stage of the decision making process.  The president’s ultimate crisis 
response choice is selected during an analytic process in which the remaining alternatives 
are weighed on the military and international-strategic dimensions.   
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this chapter, I will describe the research design for empirically evaluating the 
hypotheses concerning the impact of public attitudes toward the use force as well as 
military and international-strategic factors on the president’s selection of a crisis response 
across international crises.  The aim is to make as explicit as possible the procedures by 
which cases were selected, data were collected, and variables operationalized and 
measured.  Because different research designs may produce contradictory results, it is 
also necessary to discuss how the research design described here differs from other 
designs used to evaluate the presidential use of force.  Indeed, empirical studies of the 
presidential use of force have employed a diversity of measures and case selection 
criteria.  When these differences are not explicitly acknowledged, a body of disparate 
findings may thwart the progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge about the 
presidential use of force.   
This chapter will proceed as follows.  First, I will discuss the case selection 
procedures.  I use two different data collections to identify international crises.  Second, I 
describe the dependent variable, which is an ordinal, categorical measure of presidential 
crisis response choice.  Third, I explain how the key independent variables specified by 
the theoretical argument are measured.  Fourth, I detail a set of control variables intended 
to take account of alternative explanations of the use of force.  Finally, I briefly contrast 
this research design with previous studies and conclude.     
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DATA 
I identify a set of relevant international crises during the years 1949 to 2001 using 
the International Crisis Behavior data (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).  In order to assess 
the robustness of the findings, I also employ the Militarized Interstate Disputes data 
(Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996).   These data sets were compiled for somewhat 
different purposes and use different definitions and criteria.  If similar results obtain 
across both datasets despite these differences, we can have greater confidence in the 
relationships indicated by the findings.   
The unit of analysis is the international crisis, which facilitates inferences about 
crisis-specific factors.  In this study, each observation is a crisis or incident in which the 
United States responded in some way.  This design eliminates many of the problems 
associated with temporal dynamics (Mitchell and Moore 2002).  There are 206 crises in 
the ICB data in which the U.S. was involved in some way and 215 according to the MID 
data.   
There is some debate concerning the underlying process by which presidents 
perceive international crises.  Many studies of the presidential use of force assume (either 
implicitly or explicitly) that there is a constant stream of possible opportunities to use 
force (James and Hristoulas 1994; Hess and Orphanides 1995; Fordham 1998a; 1998b).  
These research designs examine some unit of time (e.g., years, quarters, etc,) in order to 
draw inferences about temporal factors that serve as facilitating conditions for the use of 
force.  But other research (e.g., Meernik 1994; Wang 1995; Meernik and Waterman 
1996) examines crises in order to draw inferences about attributes of the crisis or U.S. 
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adversaries and allies participating in the crisis.  These studies imply that opportunities to 
use force arise because of exogenous events.   
Research design choices appear to have serious consequences for the conclusions 
of use of force studies.  Some scholars (e.g., Leeds and Davis 1997; Smith 1996; 
Fordham 1998a) suggest that presidents perceive crises on the basis of certain factors, 
leading to selection effects.  This self-selection process may produce bias if presidents 
select themselves into crises on the basis of unobserved factors associated with the 
dependent variable (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 135; Collier and Mahoney 
1996).  For example, a president may choose to get involved in a crisis based on his 
current approval rating.  But when such factors are correlated with the dependent variable 
but not included in the estimation, the effect of included explanatory variables may be 
attenuated, leading to erroneous inferences (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 130; 
Collier and Mahoney 1996).  Because the research design I have developed is aimed at 
estimating the influence of crisis-specific factors, I must elucidate how temporal factors 
such as approval ratings and economic conditions are likely to influence the results.   
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: CRISIS RESPONSE CHOICE 
In order to assess the theoretical argument, I developed a new categorical variable 
called crisis response choice, which consists of four outcomes: non-force, show of force, 
aerial bombardment only, and land force assault.  This new measure serves as the 
dependent variable in this research.  Each category corresponds to the modal manner in 
which force is employed in response to a given crisis.  Previous operationalizations of the 
presidential use of force include a dichotomy between instances in which force was used 
and those in which it was not (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991) as well  
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Table 3.1.  Selected Empirical Studies of the Use of Force.   
Study Units of Analysis 
Spatio-Temporal 
Domain Dependent Variable(s) 
Blechman and Kaplan 1978 Years U.S., 1949-1976 Uses of force per year 
Ostrom and Job 1986 Quarters U.S., 1949-1976 Use of major force 
James and Oneal 1991 Quarters, crises U.S., 1949-1976 1)  Use of major force 2)  Force level used 
Morgan and Bickers 1992 Quarters, incidents U.S., 1953-1976 
1)  MID initiation   
2)  Days between presidential 
approval survey and MID initiation 
Meernik 1994 Opportunities to use force U.S., 1948-1988 Force level  
James and Hristoulas 1994 Quarters U.S., 1949-1976 International crisis involvement 
DeRouen 1995 Quarters U.S, 1949-1984 1) Highest force level used 2)  Presidential approval 
Wang 1996 Crises U.S., 1954-1986 U.S. major response to crisis 
Meernik and Waterman 1996 Opportunities to use force U.S., 1953-1988 Use of force 
Gowa 1998 Years U.S., 1870-1992 1) MID involvements per year 2)  Uses of force per year 
Fordham 1998a Years, quarters U.S., 1949-1994 1)  Uses of force per year/quarter 2)  Opportunities to use force 
Fordham 1998b Quarters U.S., 1949-1994 Uses of force per quarter 
Meernik 2000 Months, crisis-months U.S., 1948-1990 
1)  Crisis occurrence 
2)  Use of force in crisis month 
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as the frequency of uses of force during a time period such as quarters or years (e.g., 
Gowa 1998; Fordham 1998a).  Although some studies examine the level of force used by 
the president, the level varies according to the extent of violence or number of units 
deployed to the crisis (e.g., Meernik 1994; DeRouen 1995; Howell and Pevehouse 2005).  
Table 3.1 summarizes many of the previous use of force operationalizations.  These 
previous definitions of the use of force fail to distinguish between the modes of crisis 
response choice I identify and prevent the assessment of the theoretical linkages I have 
specified in the previous chapters.   
Non-Force Response 
I indicate that a crisis resulted in a non-force response when the policy pursued 
did not include the use of military force.  Such responses consist of, for example, verbal 
denunciations, negotiations, sanctions, threats to use force, and no response (i.e., 
nothing).  In crises identified by the ICB data, the outcome of the dependent variable is 
coded as non-force when “major Response” is less than 6 and the U.S. is a crisis actor.6  
If the U.S. is not coded as a crisis actor but is involved in some way in the crisis, ICB 
identifies these crises as well.  In these crises, the outcome of the dependent variable is 
coded as non-force when “U.S. Involvement” is less than 7.7  In crises identified by the 
                                                 
6 The five categories of Major Response in the ICB data that are collapsed here are: 1) No response, 2) 
Verbal act, 3) Political act, 4) Economic act, 5) Other non-violent act.   However, in some instances, 
another ICB Major Response category, “Covert or Semi-military,” is included here when the extent of U.S. 
involvement is military aid.   
7 The categories of U.S. Involvement in the ICB data that are collapsed here are: 1) U.S. not involved, 2) 
U.S. non-intervention or neutrality, 3) U.S. political involvement, 4) U.S. economic involvement, 5) U.S. 
propaganda involvement.  Cases coded as U.S. covert or Semi-military involvement are included when 
U.S. troops are mobilized or deployed top the crisis area.   
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MID data, I coded the outcome as non-force when “hostility Level” was equal to 1 or 2 
(“no militarized action” and “threat to use force,” respectively).8   
Show of Force 
I code a crisis as having a show of force outcome if military forces are utilized in 
a non-violent manner.  A show of force response includes outcomes in which military 
forces were placed on alert, mobilized or deployed in response to the crisis.  In crises 
identified by the ICB data, the outcome of the dependent variable is coded as show of 
force when “major Response” is equal to 6 or 7 (“non-violent military act” and “multiple 
including non-violent military act,” respectively) and the U.S. is a crisis actor.  If the U.S. 
is not coded as a crisis actor but is involved in some way in the crisis, the outcome of the 
dependent variable is coded as show of force when “U.S. Involvement” is equal to 7 
(“U.S. semi-military involvement”).  In crises identified by the MID data, I coded the 
outcome as non-force when “Hostility Level” was equal to 3 (“Display of force).   
Aerial Bombardment 
I code crises as having an aerial bombardment outcome when U.S. forces carry 
out an attack, but no ground forces are employed.  Aerial bombardment responses include 
air strikes, missile strikes, and naval bombardments.  Despite the interest in aerial 
bombardment as an independent and dependent variable (e.g., Pape 1996; Daalder and 
O’Hanlon 1999; Horowitz and Reiter 2001), neither the ICB nor the MID data code 
crises such that uses of force that entailed only aerial bombardments can be identified.  
Consequently, I examined the narratives of the crises listed for ICB in Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld (2000) to identify whether a crisis resulted in an aerial bombardment by the 
                                                 
8 I also coded as Non-force instances in which Customs agents or Coast Guard personnel seized cargo or 
fishing vessels.   
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U.S.  Similarly, I obtained details concerning the crises listed in the MID data using 
Fordham and Sarver (2001).  Additionally, I cross-checked these sources with additional 
sources such as The New York Times, Pape (1996), Grimmett (1999), and Facts on File.   
Land Force Assault 
The dependent variable is coded as having a land force assault outcome if land 
forces were in direct confrontation with enemy forces at some point during the crisis.  
Like the aerial bombardment outcome, the ICB and MID data do not identify land force 
assaults in their variable operationalizations.  Once again, I turned to the narratives (e.g., 
Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Fordham and Sarver 2001) and other sources (e.g., The 
New York Times; Pape 1996; Grimmett 1999; Facts on File) to identify whether U.S. 
military involvement in a crisis could be characterized by a land force assault.  It should 
be emphasized that crisis outcomes that included both aerial bombardment and land force 
assault were coded as land force assault responses.   
These four outcomes of crisis response choice may be conceptualized as ordered 
when understood in terms of their expected effects with respect to casualties and foreign 
policy success.  However, there is nothing inherently ordinal about the dependent 
variable.  Indeed, each category of crisis response choice can be thought of as 
qualitatively different the others.  This will have implications for the choice of estimators, 
which I discuss near the end of this chapter.  Crisis response choice is coded as follows: 
0 Non-force response 
1 Show of force  
2 Aerial bombardment  
3 Land force assault 
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By these criteria, 141 crises identified in the ICB data resulted in non-force 
responses by the U.S. (68%); in 36 crises, the U.S. responded with a show of force 
(17%); the president ordered aerial bombardments in 15 crises (7%); and 14 crises 
resulted in land force assaults (7%).  Crisis responses according to the crises identified in 
the MID data break down in the following way: the president responded with a non-force 
alternative in 74 crises (34%); 95 crisis ended in a show of force (44%); aerial 
bombardments were employed in 27 crises (12.5%); and land force assault characterized 
the thrust of the president’s crisis response in 19 crises (8.8%).   
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the frequency of each crisis response according to the 
data set used to identify crises.  The modal category for crises identified by the ICB data 
is Non-force, while the nodal category in the MID data is Show of force.  The differences 
in the distributions of the dependent variable across these two datasets are due primarily 
to coding decisions used to identify crises.  ICB identifies crises on the basis of three 
conditions: “a threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of a finite time 
for response to the value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military 
hostilities” (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 3).  A Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) is 
identified as any explicit threat, display, or use of military force by one state against 
another (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 166-167).  Clearly, the two datasets differ 
markedly.  On the one hand, ICB includes a wider range of interstate behaviors such as 
alliance formations or dissolutions, economic or diplomatic sanctions, and treaty 
violations – none of which are required to escalate to the threat of a use of force in order 
to be identified as a crisis (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).  On the other hand, the 
more narrow definition of MID lends itself to the identification of actions that were not 
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necessarily directed by an individual with the responsibility of foreign policy making.  
Consequently, MID data include many more inadvertent clashes, as well as fishing boat 
incidents (see e.g., Fordham and Sarver 2001).   
The key difference between the two data sets concerns the perceptions of high-
ranking foreign policy officials.  If historical documents indicate that a leader perceived 
an interstate crisis in which military force was a possibility, ICB includes these crisis.  
But MID do not code cases on the basis of perceptions, only actions.  These different 
coding decisions are clear in the differences between the distributions and will, as will be 
seen in Chapter IV, have implications for observed relationships.   
KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
The key independent variables are those that are explicitly identified by the 
theoretical framework.  The Poliheuristic explanation I set forth in the previous chapter 
points to a key variable on the domestic political dimension (public opinion), two key 
variables on the military dimension (relative capabilities and contiguity), and a key 
variable on the international-strategic dimension (Cold War years).   
The Domestic Political Dimension: Public Opinion 
On the domestic political dimension, public opinion is divided according to the 
direction and intensity of aggregate preferences – Public support, Public opposition, and 
Ambivalence/indifference.  These variables portray the extent to which the American 
public supports the use of military force in response to an international crisis.  The source 
for these data is Mintz and Brulé (2004).   
These data were collected by conducting thorough searches of opinion poll data 
using the name of the target state in order to find poll questions that pertain to public  
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Figure 3.1. Dependent Variable, International Crisis Behavior Data 
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Figure 3.2. Dependent Variable, Militarized Interstate Disputes Data 
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preferences concerning the U.S. use of military force against these countries.9  Polls 
conducted any time before the ultimate crisis response and the up to five years prior to 
the ultimate crisis response were included.10  In order to ensure temporal sequence,  
evaluations of completed or ongoing military operations are not included.  From these 
questions, the values corresponding to the proportion of persons polled who indicate that 
they support and oppose the use of force were recorded (Mintz and Brulé 2004). 
Two problems encountered during the collection of the data center on priming 
effects and conditional statements.  First, in some cases, pollsters apparently sought a 
different reaction from respondents based on the inclusion of certain information in the 
question.  For example, one poll asked the following question during the 1991 Persian 
Gulf crisis: “Iraq has over a million troops, more than 5,000 tanks and more than 500 
combat aircraft. Do you think the United States should or should not invade Iraq to force 
it to withdraw from Kuwait?”  During the same time period, pollsters also queried 
respondents with the following question: “Would you favor or oppose using U.S. troops 
to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait?”  Clearly, the former question was designed to 
elicit a different response from the latter.  Whenever possible, I simply avoided questions 
that appeared to have been laden with priming statements when other, neutrally worded 
and temporally proximate polls were available.   
The second problem encountered during the data collection surrounds the use of 
conditional statements in poll questions.  A number of poll questions consist of 
conditional, “if… then” statements.  These questions were not used unless they were 
                                                 
9 The Roper Center’s polls and surveys database available via lexis-nexis.com was searched.   
10 Because non-force responses and shows of force may be precursors to eventual violent military 
responses, I include all relevant polls prior to the cessation of the crisis for crises in which non-force and 
show of force responses were the ultimate crisis response.    
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directly concerned with the central issue of the international crisis in question.  For 
example, in the crisis preceding the Persian Gulf War of 1991, pollsters asked 
respondents whether they favored the use of force if the U.S. hostages held in Iraq were 
released.  Because the central issue in the 1991 Persian Gulf crisis centered on Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, the issue of the U.S. hostages held by Hussein was of peripheral 
importance.  Consequently, such polls were not used.  However, poll questions consisting 
of conditional statements eventually approximated reality, they were included in the 
construction of the public opinion variables.  For example, respondents were asked prior 
to the commencement of Operation Desert Storm whether they favored the use of force in 
the event that economic sanctions against Iraq failed to persuade Hussein to withdraw his 
forces from Kuwait before January 15, 1991.  The conditions specified in this query were 
satisfied by events and, accordingly, this poll was used in the construction of the public 
opinion variables.   
Public support 
The primary independent variables are dichotomous and are constructed from raw 
proportions of persons polled.  Public support takes on the value of “1” when the 
proportion of persons polled who indicate that they support the use of force is greater 
than 60%.  I expect Public support to have a positive effect on presidential crisis response 
choices, resulting in higher responses.   
Public opposition  
Public opposition is equal to “1” when the proportion of persons polled who 
indicate that they are opposed to the use of force exceeds 60%.  Public opposition should 
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have a negative effect on presidential crisis response choice.  Specifically, opposition 
should result in lower crisis response choices. 
Public ambivalence/indifference 
Ambivalence/indifference assumes the value of “1” when both Public support and 
Public opposition are equal to zero – the proportion of persons who support the use of 
force and the proportion of those opposing the use of force are both less than 60%.  In 
other words, the segments of the public opposing and supporting the use of force are 
approaching equality or neither group has a clear majority.  I expect Public 
ambivalence/indifference to be associated with intermediate crisis response choices.   
No guidance 
Because opinion polls were not conducted for all crises in which the U.S. became 
involved, limiting the analyses to only those crises for which data are available may 
contribute to selection bias.  In order to compare the effect of public opinion with crisis in 
which the public did not register its preferences, I include a dichotomous variable 
reflecting crises in which no polls were taken.  This variable – termed, “No guidance” – 
indicates the absence of opinion polls pertaining to a crisis; that is, the public does not 
register its preferences and, consequently, the president is unable to make use of its 
guidance.   
Intuitively, one might expect No guidance to be associated with intermediate 
crisis response choices – show of force and aerial bombardment – because it may be 
thought of as laying between support and opposition.  But previous theoretical literature 
(see e.g., Kusnitz 1984; Russett 1990; Powlick 1991; Stimson 1991; Foyle 1999) 
suggests that democratic leaders may rule out certain alternatives on the basis of expected 
  
53
opposition.  A lack of opinion poll data may indicate that the president was reluctant to 
emphasize U.S. participation in an international crisis, which accounts for few news 
stories and, consequently, the lack of polling activity.  Consequently, it may be more 
likely that No guidance is associated with non-force alternatives due to efforts by the 
president to bury U.S. participation in a crisis.   
Alternate measures of public opinion  
In addition to our use of two data sets, I assess the robustness of relationships by 
defining public opinion for three different time periods during the course of the crisis.  
The first of these is the average of all public opinion polls taken during the course of the 
crisis.  The second is the earliest poll available relevant to the crisis.  Finally, I define a 
set of dummy variables corresponding to the last poll taken prior to the president’s major 
crisis response choice.  This gives a total of nine public opinion dummy variables.  If I 
consistently obtain the expected results across these measures, more confidence can be 
had in the observed relationships.   
I should also address here the potential charge that the operational definitions of 
the categorical measures of public opinion appear to be arbitrary.  Admittedly, defining 
the thresholds for public support and opposition at greater than 60% seems to be devoid 
of rigorous theoretical guidance.  Why not 61%?  To address this matter, I conduct 
sensitivity analyses in which I sequentially redefine the threshold values of support and 
opposition, and then re-estimate their influence on the dependent variable.  This 
procedure assesses the sensitivity of the operational definitions and tells us which ranges 
of values are associated with the president’s crisis response choice (see Appendix B).   
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Figure 3.3. Average Public Opinion, International Crisis Behavior Data 
Public Opinion toward the Use of Force: 
Categories of Opinion
122
23
57
4
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
No guidance Opposition Ambivalence
/indifference
Support
N=206
  
55
Figure 3.4. Average Public Opinion, Militarized Interstate Disputes Data 
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Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show how the public opinion data are distributed when the 
average of all polls are used to construct the categories of public opinion toward the use 
of force.  In the ICB data, No guidance is the modal category, accounting for 59% of the 
crises.  The public was opposed to the use of force in 11% of the crises.  In 28% of the 
crises, public opinion was ambivalent or indifferent.  The public was supportive of the 
use of force in only 2% of the crises.  Oddly, in crises defined according to the MID data,  
No guidance accounts for the same number of crises as the ICB crises – although the 
crises identified by each dataset are not identical.  No guidance accounts for public 
opinion in 56% of the crises identified by the MID data.  The public was opposed to the 
use of force in 9% of the crises and, in 29% of the crises; public opinion was ambivalent 
or indifferent.  The public was supportive of the use of force in 5% of the crises identified 
by the MID data.   
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 display the distribution of the public opinion categories when 
only the earliest available poll pertaining to the crisis is used to compute the dummy 
variables.  In the ICB data, the public initially opposed the use of force in 12% of the 
crises.  The public’s initial reaction to the use of force was ambivalence or indifference in 
25% of the crises and, in 3.3% of the crises identified by the ICB data; the public was 
supportive of the use of force at the outset.  According to crises identified by the MID 
data, the public was opposed to the use of force in the earliest available polls in 12% of 
the crises.  The public was ambivalent or indifferent about the use of force in 26% of the 
crises.  In 5.5% of the crises identified by the MID data, the public was initially 
supportive.   
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Figure 3.5. Initial Public Opinion, International Crisis Behavior Data 
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Figure 3.6. Initial Public Opinion, Militarized Interstate Disputes Data 
Public Opinion toward the Use of Force: Categories 
of Opinion
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Figure 3.7. Latest Public Opinion, International Crisis Behavior Data 
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Figure 3.8. Latest Public Opinion, Militarized Interstate Disputes Data 
Public Opinion toward the Use of Force: Categories 
of Opinion
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Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show how the public opinion data are distributed when the last 
poll prior to the president’s major crisis response is used to construct the categories of 
public opinion toward the use of force.  In 12.6% of the crises identified in the ICB data, 
the latest poll available to the president before the ultimate crisis response indicated that 
the public was opposed to the use of force.  The latest polls indicated that the public was 
ambivalent or indifferent toward the use of force in 26% of the crises.  Public support 
accounts for 4% of the latest poll results according to the ICB data.  In the MID crises,  
the public was opposed to the use of force in 8.8% of the crises.  The public was 
ambivalent or indifferent in 29% of the crises and, according to the latest poll information 
available, the public indicated support for the use of force in 6% of the crises identified 
by the MID data. 
It worth emphasizing here that the distributions of categories of public opinion are 
remarkably similar across the ICB and MID datasets.  Despite the different data 
collection criteria used by these collections, the categories and time periods used to 
compute them produce comparable distributions.  I suspect that these similarities have to 
do with the salience of crises recorded by both datasets, which resulted in polling for a 
similar number of crises.   
Military Dimension: Relative Capabilities 
In order to assess Hypotheses 4a and 4b on the military dimension, I examine the 
impact of relative capabilities on the president’s crisis response choice.  Relative 
capabilities are thought to be an important factor in both crisis onset and escalation (e.g., 
Blainey 1988; Waltz 1979; Organski and Kugler 1980).  According to the Poliheuristic 
account, the U.S. is less likely to resort to forceful crisis response alternatives when doing 
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so may lead to a protracted conflict with a powerful state.  I include the variable Relative 
capabilities from the COW data on national material capabilities (Singer, Bremer, and 
Stuckey 1972).  To measure Relative Capabilities, I calculate the U.S.’s share of 
capabilities within the dyad (i.e., U.S. capabilities/(U.S. + Target’s capabilities), subtract 
.5, and take the absolute value.  The variable ranges from 0 (equality) to .5 (one state 
possesses all capabilities within the dyad).   
As a measure of the expected difficulties for military operations, Relative 
capabilities has some shortcomings.  For example, it does not gauge the will of the U.S.’s 
adversary, difficulty of terrain, or the favored tactics of the U.S.’s enemy (e.g., guerilla 
warfare, suicide attacks) – all of which may diminish the advantages of a U.S. 
preponderance of military power (e.g., Bennett and Stam 1996).  If the adversary is 
expected to be willful – thwarting U.S. objectives and killing many U.S. troops – 
domestic support for the intervention may erode (e.g., Russett 1990; Mintz 1993).   
Military Dimension: Contiguity 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b suggest that presidents are more likely to respond to 
international crises with forceful alternatives when the crisis is geographically proximate 
to U.S. shores, allies or overseas bases.  In the literature, geographic proximity has been 
shown to exert a strong influence on the probability that two states experience a crisis 
(e.g., Bremer 1992).  Although U.S. presidents have the luxury of projecting force 
virtually anywhere on the globe (Haass 1999), crises that are located near the U.S. or its 
forward-deployed bases may be particularly tempting targets for the U.S.  U.S. military 
forces can be inserted with relative logistical ease when they are already located near a 
crisis.  I include a dummy variable, Contiguity, that equals 1 when a crisis is located in a 
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state sharing a land border – or is separated by 150 miles or less of water – with the U.S., 
its allies, or states hosting an American military installation.   
International-Strategic Dimension: Cold War 
Hypothesis 6 indicates a significant role of the Cold War period in presidential 
crisis response.  I include a dummy variable that takes on the value of “1” for the years 
1949-1989 and zero otherwise.  Although crisis opportunities increased during this period 
as the U.S. became one of two superpowers engaged in a proxy war for global power and 
influence, the looming risk of war with the Soviet Union also served as a constraint on 
U.S. military intervention (Gaddis 2005; Gowa 1998).  
CONTROL VARIABLES  
In addition to the variable explicitly identified by the theoretical framework, a 
number of other explanations exist for the presidential use of force.  Although these are 
frequently “diversionary” arguments – the president responds to declining domestic 
circumstances by using force abroad – other factors such as the “supply” of international 
crises and war involvement may also influence presidential decisions.   
Presidential Approval 
The primary way in which public opinion enters into previous analyses of the use 
of force is presidential approval ratings (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 
1991; DeRouen 2000).  The logic behind inclusion of this measure has been rooted in the 
“rally-‘round-the-flag” phenomenon (e.g., Mueller 1973).  Given that presidents can 
boost their approval ratings by using force abroad, they may be more likely to undertake 
foreign adventures during times in which their approval is low (see e.g., Ostrom and Job 
1986).  However, with the exception of DeRouen (1995), most of these studies find a 
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positive relationship between presidential approval and the use of force (e.g., Ostrom and 
Job 1986; James and Oneal 1991).11  I include a standard measure of Presidential 
approval to gauge the effect of presidential incentives to distract the public from poor 
domestic political conditions.  Presidential approval is measured quarterly as the lag of 
the average percent of persons responding in the affirmative to periodic Gallup polls 
which ask, “do you approve of the job (name of president) is doing as president?” 12   
Although I expect a negative relationship between Presidential approval and 
higher crisis response choices, selection effects may attenuate the impact of this variable.  
If presidents are selecting themselves into international crises on the basis of low 
approval ratings, this reduces the observed variation in the Presidential approval variable 
and is unlikely to be significantly associated with a use of force (e.g., Fordham 1998a).   
Economic Indicators 
In order to weigh the effect of the economy on the use of force, I will include 
three measures of domestic economic conditions.  A number of previous studies find that 
when economic conditions are poor, presidents are more likely to use force (e.g., Russett 
1990; DeRouen 1995; 2000; Fordham 1998a).  While many of these use the “misery 
index” (e.g., James and Oneal 1991; Ostrom and Job 1986), Fordham (1998a) shows that 
diverse economic effects may have varying effects across different groups, which may 
facilitate or impede the use of force.  Therefore, I will include quarterly measures of the 
unemployment rate along with the rate of inflation (consumer price index).  Additionally, 
                                                 
11 Morgan and Bickers (1992) find that as presidential approval among the president’s co-partisans 
declines, use of force is more likely.  Additionally, Meernik (1994) and Meernik and Waterman (1996) find 
no relationship between presidential approval and the use of force.   
12 The source for Presidential approval is Fordham (1998a); updated from 1994 to 2001 from The Gallup 
Poll (retrieved from The Roper Center via Lexis-Nexis.com).   
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I will include the quarterly growth rate of gross domestic product. 13  Like Presidential 
approval, selection effects may obscure the impact of the economy on the president’s 
crisis response choice.   
Elections 
A body of research on elections and the presidential use of force (e.g., Stoll 1984; 
Gaubatz 1991) contends that presidents may exploit their primacy in foreign policy in an 
effort to secure reelection or the election of their preferred successors.  Previous studies 
(e.g., Fordham 1998a; 1998b; Stoll 1984) find that presidents tend to use force more 
frequently during elections.  Thus, I include a dummy variable for elections, which takes 
on the value of “1” during the three quarters preceding a presidential election.      
Concurrent Crises 
The realist tradition contends that uses of force are primarily a function of forces 
located in the international environmental, rather than domestic political influences (see 
e.g., James and Oneal 1991; Meernik 1994).  According to this perspective, we might 
expect presidents to be more likely to use force when they are inundated with 
international crises.  The measure of concurrent crises is a quarterly count of the 
“universe” of new or ongoing crises, not just those to which the United States responds.  
In analyses using the ICB2 data, the measure reflects a count of all international crises 
recorded in the ICB2 data set.  In analyses using MID data, the measure is a count of all 
new or ongoing disputes according to the MID data set (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996). 
                                                 
13 All economic variables are lagged.  The sources for inflation, unemployment, and GDP are Fordham 
(1998a) from 1949 to 1994; updated to 2001 with data from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (retrieved from http://www.bea.doc.gov/) and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (retrieved from http://www.bls.gov/).  
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Cumulative Battle Deaths 
The United States’ involvement in wars is thought to reduce the probability that a 
president will use force in response to other crises.  As Fordham (1998a) observes, the 
pool of available military resources with which force can be used elsewhere is reduced 
when large number of personnel are committed to a war.  Moreover, Mueller (1973) 
shows that the when high casualties are sustained, public opinion tends to turn against the 
use of force.  Thus, I control for the impact of casualties sustained during the Korean, 
Vietnam, and first Gulf War conflicts.  Like Mueller, the measure is the log of the 
cumulative war dead occurring during the year of observation.14   
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has laid the basis for the quantitative analysis of the influences of 
presidential crisis response choice in the next chapter.  It has described the most suitable 
measures for capturing the impact of domestic and international factors thought to be 
associated with the presidential use of force.  It has also discussed some of the limitations 
of these variables in the research design.  Table 3.2 summarizes the independent 
variables, displaying the definitions, sources, and examples of previous studies including 
the variables.  Although this study is novel with respect to the measurement of the 
dependent variable and the inclusion of explicit measures of public opinion toward the 
use of force, the table suggests that the empirical framework used to evaluate the 
president’s crisis response choice is the result of a cumulative process.  Many of the 
variables are prominent in presidential use of force research as well as international 
conflict studies.   
                                                 
14 A quarterly measure of battle deaths was unavailable.  The source for cumulative battle deaths is Meernik 
(2001).   
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The next chapter will subject the research design described in this chapter to a 
series of statistical analyses in order to assess the impact of the independent variables on 
presidential crisis response choice.   
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Table 3.2. Independent Variables   
Independent Variable Operational Definition Sources Hypothesized influence   
Public support 
Greater than 60% of respondents 
indicate that they support the use 
of force 
Mintz and Brulé (2004); Roper Center Public 
Opinion Research Collection (various years) Positive: This study 
Public opposition 
Greater than 60% of respondents 
indicate that they oppose the use of 
force 
Mintz and Brulé (2004); Roper Center Public 
Opinion Research Collection (various years) Negative: This study 
Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
Public support and opposition are 
both less than or equal to 60% 
Mintz and Brulé (2004); Roper Center Public 
Opinion Research Collection (various years) Positive: This study 
No guidance No opinion polls are available pertaining to the crisis  
Mintz and Brulé (2004); Roper Center Public 
Opinion Research Collection (various years) Negative: This study 
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Table 3.2 (continued).  
Independent Variable Operational Definition Sources Hypothesized influence   
Relative capabilities  The U.S.’s share of national capabilities in a conflict dyad Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972 
Positive: This study 
Negative: Organski and Kugler 1980; Bremer 1992; 
Meernik 2000 
Contiguity  
The crisis state is nearer than 150 
miles to the U.S. or states hosting 
its forward-deployed forces 
Stinnett, et al. 2002 Positive: This study; Bremer 1992 
Cold War Years from 1949-1990 Fordham 1998a Positive: This study; Gowa 1998; Fordham 1998a 
Presidential Approval 
The average percent of persons 
responding in the affirmative to 
periodic Gallup polls which ask, 
“do you approve of the job (name 
of president) is doing as 
president?”  
Fordham 1998a; 
The Gallup Poll (retrieved from The Roper 
Center via Lexis-Nexis.com). 
Positive: Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 
1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Wang 1996; 
Meernik 2000; Howell and Pevehouse 2003 
Negative: Meernik 1994; DeRouen 1995; DeRouen 
2000 
No Influence: Meernik and Waterman 1996 
GDP growth rate The percent change in the quarterly U.S. gross domestic product. 
Fordham 1998a; U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(retrieved from http://www.bea.doc.gov/). 
Negative: Russett 1990; Miller 1995; Leeds and 
Davis 1997; Gowa 1998; Fordham 1998a; Fordham 
2002 
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Table 3.2 (continued).  
Independent Variable Operational Definition Sources Hypothesized influence   
Unemployment  The quarterly unemployment rate. 
Fordham 1998a; U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (retrieved from 
http://www.bls.gov/) 
Positive: Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 
1991; DeRouen 1995; Fordham 1998a; Fordham 
1998b 
Inflation  The quarterly inflation rate (cpi).   
Fordham 1998a; U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(retrieved from http://www.bea.doc.gov/) 
Positive: Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 
1991; DeRouen 1995; Fordham 1998a; Fordham 
1998b 
Election cycle 
Dichotomous measure that takes 
on the value of “1” during the three 
quarters preceding an election 
during peacetime. 
Fordham 1998a Positive: Stoll 1984; Fordham 1998a; Fordham 1998b 
Concurrent crises The number of other crises occurring during the same quarter. 
Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Jones, Bremer 
and Singer 1996 
Positive: Wang 1996; DeRouen 2000; Howell and 
Pevehouse 2003 
No Influence: Fordham 1998a 
Cumulative war dead 
The log of the sum of battle deaths 
occurring during the Korean, 
Vietnam, and Persian Gulf 
Conflicts. 
Meernik 2001 
Negative: Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 
1991; DeRouen 1995; Meernik and Waterman 1996; 
DeRouen 2000 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS 
I argued in the second chapter that the president’s crisis response choice is influenced 
by 1) the level of public support or opposition to the use of force, 2) factors affecting the 
likelihood of military success, and 3) implications of using force for the United States’ 
international-strategic goals.  Specifically, presidents employ a Poliheuristic decision making 
process when considering how to respond to an international crisis.  In the first stage, 
presidents rule out alternatives that are incongruent with the public’s preferences – weighing 
the twin concerns of foreign policy success and troop fatalities.  The president makes an 
ultimate choice by evaluating the surviving alternatives with respect to the likelihood of 
military success and the implications of each choice for the U.S.’s international-strategic 
position.  The theory offers explicit expectations concerning the impact of public opinion, 
military factors and concerns over geopolitical implications.  This chapter tests this theory 
against all of the crises in which the U.S. was involved during the years from 1949 until 
2001.   
This chapter proceeds in five parts.  The first is a discussion of the estimation 
technique employed to gauge the impact of the independent variables on Crisis response 
choice.  The second is a general summary of all of the empirical findings.  The next two parts 
entail more careful scrutiny of the influence of the variables corresponding to the two stages 
of the decision making process.  The final part is a discussion of the robustness of the 
findings, which checks the ability of the relationships to hold up in a different set of crises.  
Ultimately, I conclude that public opinion is a robust predictor of presidential crisis response 
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choices, while other factors are sensitive to model specification as well as the source data 
used to identify crises.   
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
I evaluate the impact of the independent variables on the president’s crisis response 
choice using maximum likelihood estimation.  Because the dependent variable, Crisis 
response choice, is categorical rather than continuous, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation is inappropriate.  When used to estimate a model including a categorical 
dependent variable, OLS assumes that the distances between categories are equal.  This 
assumption is violated in cases where the dependent variable is ordinal (e.g., Greene 2003; 
Long 1997; Maddala 1983).   
I use Ordered Logit to estimate the hypothesized relationships.  Although the 
categories of the dependent variable may be regarded as qualitatively different from each 
other – which implies that Multinomial Logit or Multinomial Probit is the appropriate 
estimator – the theoretical argument suggests that crisis response choices are rank-ordered in 
terms of the extent to which each category is expected to risk the lives of troops as well as 
produce foreign policy success.  This suggests that either Ordered Probit or Ordered Logit is 
the appropriate estimator (Greene 2003; Long 1997).15   
The Ordered Logit model allows us to exploit information about the ordinal nature of 
the dependent variable by considering a latent linear regression model (see e.g., Long 1997; 
Greene 2003): 
εβ += Xy '*  
                                                 
15 To evaluate whether the dependent variable could be treated as nominal, I estimated the specified models 
using Multinomial Logit.  However, Hausman tests indicated that the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption (IIA) could not be satisfied (Hausman and McFadden 1984).  Moreover, the estimator failed to 
converge at a maximum of the log-likelihood function.   
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where y* is an unobserved, underlying index of the conditional propensity of the president to 
choose a given crisis response choice.  What we do observe is 
y = 0 (non-force) if y* ≤  1τ  
y = 1 (show of force) if 1τ < y* ≤  2τ  
y = 2 (aerial bombardment) if 2τ < y* ≤  3τ  
y = 3 (land force assault) if y* > 3τ  
Each τ  is an unknown threshold parameter to be estimated with  
)exp(1
)exp()(
Z
ZZ +=Λ , where Z – given the set of independent variables identified in the 
previous chapter – takes the following linear form:  
Z = 1β (Public Support) + 2β (Public Opposition) + 3β (Public Ambivalence/indifference) + 
4β (No Guidance) + 5β (Relative Capabilities) + 6β (Contiguity) + 7β (Cold War) + 
8β (Presidential Approval) + 9β (Growth) + 10β (Inflation) + 11β (Unemployment) + 
12β (Ongoing Crises) + 13β (Battle Deaths) + ε  
 
It is also necessary to point out that the public opinion variables are exhaustive, 
mutually-exclusive categorical variables.  Public support, Public opposition, Public 
ambivalence/indifference, and No guidance exhaust all of the possibilities of public opinion.  
Inclusion of all four of these variables in a single estimation would result in perfect 
multicollinearity, making estimation mathematically impossible.  Consequently, it is 
computationally essential that one of these categories be excluded from estimation.  This 
poses no problems for Ordered Logit estimation (or estimation in any regression framework), 
but the estimates obtained for the included variables will reflect those variables’ effect on the 
dependent variable relative to the excluded variable (see e.g., Lewis-Beck 1980).  I exclude 
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No guidance from the specifications, which means that the coefficients for Public support, 
Public opposition, and Public ambivalence/indifference indicate their influence on Crisis 
response choice in comparison with No guidance.   
SUMMARY OF GENERAL FINDINGS 
The quantitative analyses provide credible support for the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter II.  Tables 4.1 through 4.4 show the results of Ordered Logit analyses 
with different definitions of public opinion and various model specifications among 
international crises identified by the ICB data.  To check the robustness of the findings, I 
replicated the analyses using the MID data.  These analyses are summarized in Tables on 
pages 108 through 111.  Here, I briefly summarize the overall findings and discuss the 
statistical analyses in greater detail below.   
All of the Ordered Logit models confirm that Public support and Public 
ambivalence/indifference significantly increase the likelihood that a higher Crisis response 
choice is selected by the president, supporting Hypotheses 1 and 3.  Indeed, the influences of 
Public support and Public ambivalence/indifference are impervious to the source data (i.e., 
ICB or MID) utilized, the definition of measurement (i.e., average, latest, initial), or the 
model specification.  Public support and Public ambivalence/indifference are remarkably 
robust predictors of presidential crisis response choice.   
The estimated relationships between Public opposition and Crisis response choice 
appears to fail to offer general support Hypothesis 2.  Public opposition increases the 
likelihood that a higher Crisis response choice is selected relative to the excluded reference 
category, No guidance.  However, Public opposition reduces the probability  
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Table 4.1. Ordered Logit Estimates of Domestic and International Influences on Presidential 
Crisis Response, 1949-2001 
 Average Public Opinion 
Initial Public 
Opinion 
Latest Public 
Opinion 
Public support 3.39***   (.678) 
3.14***    
(.435) 
3.62***   
(.825) 
Public opposition .867*    (.600) 
1.28***    
(.541) 
1.21**    
(.674) 
Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
2.51*** 
(.562) 
2.43***    
(.525) 
2.33***    
(.551) 
Relative capabilities 1.36* (.834) 
.854    
(.708) 
1.42*    
(1.01) 
Contiguity  .554*    (.427) 
.601**    
(.339) 
.571*    
(.406) 
Cold War -.035 (.358) 
-.235    
(.405) 
-.063    
(.384) 
Presidential approval .001    (.014) 
.007    
(.015) 
.011    
(.017) 
GDP growth rate -.06    (.061) 
-.059    
(.06) 
-.067      
(.061) 
Inflation -.078 (.065) 
-.041    
(.060) 
-.037    
(.063) 
Unemployment .14    (.128) 
.121    
(.138) 
.163    
(.142) 
Election year .509*    (.334) 
.685**     
(.346) 
.544**    
(.323) 
Concurrent crises -.110 (.090) 
-.104    
(.086) 
-.167**    
(.094) 
Cumulative battle deaths 2.71e-05***    (1.28e-05) 
2.45e-05**    
(1.46e-05) 
2.47e-05** 
(1.35e-05) 
1τ  3.31 3.13     4.01   
2τ  4.79 4.57     5.47    
3τ  5.78  5.53    6.45    
Chi-square 138.15*** 155.33*** 108.01*** 
N 206 206 206 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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 Table 4.2. Alternative Specifications with Average Public Opinion: Domestic and 
International Influences of Presidential Crisis Response Choice, 1949-2001 
     
Average Public support 3.55***   (.610) 
3.41***    
(.64) 
3.13***   
(.731) 
3.26***    
(.754) 
Average Public 
opposition 
1.15** 
(.536) 
1.14** 
(.505) 
1.08**   
(.489) 
1.04**    
(.517) 
Average Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
2.60***  
(.524) 
2.68*** 
(.555) 
2.62***   
(.522) 
2.62***   
(.562) 
Relative capabilities    1.07*    (.827) 
Contiguity     .346    (.345) 
Cold War    -.011    (.409) 
Presidential approval .006    (.014) 
.005    
(.013)   
GDP growth rate -.053   (.062) 
-.06    
(.062)   
Election year .502**    (.299) 
.457*    
(.314)   
Concurrent crises -.105*   (.072)    
Cumulative battle deaths 2.06e-05* (1.39e-05)    
1τ  1.91    2.12    1.87 2.87   
2τ  3.37   3.53  3.25    4.26   
3τ  4.35    4.48   4.19    5.21    
Chi-square 61.01*** 42.10*** 29.88*** 49.25*** 
N 206 206 206 206 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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 Table 4.3. Alternative Specifications with Latest Public Opinion: Domestic and International 
Influences of Presidential Crisis Response Choice, 1949-2001 
     
Latest Public support 3.70*** (.767) 
3.57*** 
(.756) 
3.28*** 
(.697) 
3.33*** 
(.675) 
Latest Public opposition 1.50*** (.556) 
1.45*** 
(.556) 
1.43*** 
(.548) 
1.38** 
(.609) 
Latest Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
2.38*** 
(.505) 
2.47*** 
(.562) 
2.35*** 
(.527) 
2.37*** 
(.580) 
Relative capabilities    .996 (.972) 
Contiguity     .308 (.311) 
Cold War    -.052 (.416) 
Presidential approval .011 (.015) 
.008 
(.014)   
GDP growth rate -.063 (.062) 
-.078 
(.061)   
Election year .541** (.287) 
.499* 
(.315)   
Concurrent crises -.129** (.066)    
Cumulative battle deaths 1.9e-05* (1.4e-05)    
1τ  2.07 2.33 1.87 2.77 
2τ  3.51 3.72 3.22 4.12 
3τ  4.48 4.65 4.13 5.04 
Chi-square 50.47*** 38.05*** 28.36*** 57.62*** 
N 206 206 206 206 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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 Table 4.4. Alternative Specifications with Initial Public Opinion: Domestic and International 
Influences of Presidential Crisis Response Choice, 1949-2001 
     
Initial Public support 3.36***    (.439) 
3.36***    
(.453) 
3.02***   
(.453) 
2.97***  
(.428) 
Initial Public opposition 1.41***    (.525) 
1.35***     
(.505) 
1.35***   
(.467) 
1.34***   
(.484) 
Initial Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
2.52***    
(.471) 
2.63***    
(.511) 
2.50***   
(.495) 
2.49***   
(.519) 
Relative capabilities    .619    (.652) 
Contiguity     .368*  (.250) 
Cold War    -.148    (.394) 
Presidential approval .007    (.014) 
.006    
(.014)   
GDP growth rate -.058    (.060) 
-.071    
(.059)   
Election year .652**   (.313) 
.628**    
(.329)   
Concurrent crises -.089*    (.061)    
Cumulative battle deaths 1.8e-05    (1.5e-05)    
1τ  2.04 2.23 1.87 2.34 
2τ  3.46 3.62 3.22 3.69 
3τ  4.42 4.56 4.13 4.61 
Chi-square 94.82*** 80.16*** 51.60*** 69.83***
N 206 206 206 206 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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that the president selects higher Crisis response choices relative to Public support and Public 
ambivalence/indifference.  I discuss the substantive interpretations of the Public opposition 
coefficients in greater detail below as well as offer some possible explanations for why the 
relationship between Public opposition and Crisis response choice appears to defy 
expectations.   
Turning to military and international-strategic factors, Relative capabilities exerts a 
statistically significant influence on Crisis response choice in some (but not all) 
specifications, providing qualified support for Hypothesis 4.  Although the coefficients are 
positive (as expected) across all model specifications, the U.S.’s share of capabilities relative 
to those of its likely adversary in a crisis significantly contributes to the likelihood that the 
president chooses a higher Crisis response choice primarily in the ICB data.  The 
performance of Contiguity challenges my expectations as well.  In most of the analyses of the 
ICB data, the impact of Contiguity on Crisis response choice is positive and significant, as 
expected.  But when the relationship is considered in the MID data, Contiguity exerts a 
negative effect on Crisis response choice.  Consequently, Hypothesis 5 is supported by the 
evidence from the analyses of the ICB data, but refuted by those of the MID.  Hypothesis 6 
suggests that Cold War years should critically affect the president’s Crisis response choice.  
However, the coefficients for Cold War fail to attain statistical significance in any of the 
specifications.   
The performance of the control variables is largely underwhelming.  Many of these 
fail to attain statistical significance.  Some attain significance in the MID data, but not the 
ICB and vice versa.  The controls that are systematically associated with Crisis response 
choice exert an influence on the dependent variable that is at odds with previous research.  
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For example, Presidential approval is positive and significant in the models estimated with 
the MID data, but insignificant in those estimated with the ICB data.  Inflation also exerts a 
positive and significant influence on Crisis response choice in some of the MID 
specifications.  Election year and is positive and significant in the three models in the ICB 
data, but fails to have a significant influence on Crisis response choice in any of the models 
estimated using the MID data.  Finally, Cumulative battle deaths is positive and significant in 
some of the ICB specifications, but not systematically associated with Crisis response choice 
in any of the models using the MID data.   
The Ordered Logit estimates presented in the Tables are not immediately 
interpretable.  Consequently, I employ simulation procedures developed by King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg (2000) to estimate the predicted probabilities of observing each Crisis response 
choice outcome under various values of the independent variables.  In the next section, I 
investigate the substantive impacts of the theoretically-relevant independent variables on 
Crisis response choice in the International Crisis Behavior data, leaving a summary of the 
MID findings for a subsequent summary.   
PUBLIC OPINION   
  Public opinion taps the domestic political dimension.  In the first stage of the 
Poliheuristic decision making process, presidents assess the direction and intensity of public 
attitudes toward the use of force, ruling out Crisis response choices that clearly defy public 
preferences.  I measure public attitudes toward the use of force using three different criteria: 
1) the first poll pertaining to the crisis, 2) the last poll preceding the president’s major 
response, and 3) the average of all polls taken during the course of the crisis.  These 
measures capture (in a theoretical sense) the extent to which the public believes that the 
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foreign policy objectives are worth the costs of American lives.  I include these different 
measures in separate estimations.  I will consider the results of each in turn. 
Average Public Opinion 
The dummy variables computed from the average of all public opinion polls 
conducted during the course of a crisis offer a mixed view of the role of the public in 
presidential crisis decision making.  The coefficient for Average Public support is positive 
and significant, suggesting that when the mean level of support over the crisis-relevant polls 
exceeds 60%, the president is likely to choose a higher Crisis response choice – i.e., Aerial 
bombardment or Land force assault.  Conversely, when the average level of public support 
exceeds 60%, presidents are likely to rule out lower crisis responses – i.e., Non-force 
alternatives and Show of force.  This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1.   
The effect of Average Public opposition requires some understanding of dummy 
variable regression (see e.g., Lewis-Beck 1980).  The positive sign of the coefficient is 
somewhat misleading.  Its coefficient suggests that crises in which the mean level of 
opposition is greater than 60% are more likely to result in a higher Crisis response choice 
than crises in which no polls were collected (i.e., No guidance).  However, as we will see 
below, Average Public opposition exerts a negative impact on Crisis response choice when 
considered in comparison with Average Public support or Average Public 
ambivalence/indifference.  Consequently, the observed impact of Average Public opposition 
is consistent with Hypothesis 2.   
The coefficient for Average Public ambivalence/indifference is positive and 
significant, as expected.  This indicates that when the average level of public support and 
opposition both fail to breach 60%, presidents are likely to choose higher crisis response 
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choices.  The coefficient provides qualified support for Hypothesis 3.  But we need to take a 
closer look at the findings to determine whether Average Public ambivalence/indifference is 
associated with intermediate Crisis response choices.   
Table 4.5 shows the predicted probabilities associated with each Crisis response 
choice according to the category of average public opinion.  These probabilities were 
calculated from the full specification displayed in the first column of Table 4.1.  The value in 
each cell represents the predicted probability of the crisis response choice in that column 
when the corresponding public opinion condition is present – while all the other variables are 
held at baseline values (that is, continuous variables are held at their means and dummy 
variables at zero).  For example, in the top-right cell, .247 represents the predicted probability 
of a Land force assault when Average Public support exceeds 60%.    
The predicted probabilities are derived from the King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000) 
procedure in which repeated simulations are conducted to estimate expected values for each 
β  coefficient, as well as expected probabilities derived from transforming the coefficients.  
The simulations provide a distribution of expected probabilities for each outcome on the 
dependent variable, given the set of independent variables.  This makes it possible to 
construct confidence intervals and conclude whether variations in the independent variables 
produce statistically significant differences in the probability of choosing a given crisis 
response.   
In Table 4.5, the shaded cells contain the highest observed probability for the 
corresponding crisis response choice category.  This gives us a good idea about how each 
category of public opinion is associated with each Crisis response choice.  Thus, a crisis is 
likely to result in a Non-force alternative when there is No guidance from the public;  
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we are likely to observe a show of force when the public is (on average) ambivalent or 
indifferent about the use of force; and we are likely to observe either an Aerial bombardment 
or a Land force assault when average public opinion is supportive of military involvement in 
a crisis.  With the exception of the effect of Average Public opposition, this is largely 
consistent with my expectations.  As the average level of support increases, presidents seek 
to attain foreign policy objectives by choosing alternatives that pose a greater risk of troop 
casualties.  That the highest observed predicted probability for the Show of force crisis 
response category corresponds to Average Public ambivalence/indifference confirms 
Hypothesis 3, as Show of force is an intermediate Crisis response choice.   
Initial Public Opinion 
The dummy variables computed from the public attitudes collected from the first 
opinion polls pertaining to the crisis also offer a mixed view of the role of the public in 
decisions concerning international crises.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for 
Initial Public support is positive and significant, suggesting that when the initial level of 
support is in excess of 60%, the president is likely to choose a higher Crisis response choice 
– i.e., Aerial bombardment or Land force assault.   
Like Average Public opposition, the coefficient for Initial Public opposition is 
positive and significant.  Again, this is simply a result of dummy variable regression.  Recall 
that Hypothesis 2 argues that Public opposition should be associated with lower Crisis 
response choices.  Although crises in which the initial level of opposition is greater than 60% 
are likely to result in a higher Crisis response choice than crises in which no polls were 
collected (i.e., No guidance), Initial Public opposition (as evidenced by Table 4.6) has a 
negative impact on Crisis response choice relative to Initial Public support and Initial Public  
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Table 4.5. Probabilities of Response Category by Average Public Opinion Condition. 
 Presidential Crisis Response 
Average Public Opinion Non-Force Show of force Aerial Bombardment 
Land force 
Assault 
Public support .232* .317* .202* .247* 
Public 
ambivalence/indifference  .401* .336* .144* .119* 
Public opposition .759 .172 .039 .03 
No guidance (baseline)  .888 .084 .016 .012 
Note: Probabilities computed from Average Public Opinion Model in Table 4.1. *The 
difference between the baseline and experimental value is statistically significant at p<.05.   
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ambivalence/indifference.  Thus, the positive coefficient can be construed as supportive of 
Hypothesis 2.   
Because it is positive and significant, the coefficient for Initial Public 
ambivalence/indifference offers tentative support for Hypothesis 3.  Although this result 
indicates a direct relationship between a lack of clear support or opposition and Crisis 
response choice, the Ordered Logit estimate is insufficient to tell us which Crisis response 
choice is likely to be selected under such conditions.   
Table 4.6 shows the predicted probabilities associated with each Crisis response 
choice according to the category of initial public opinion.  Again, the shaded cells contain the 
highest observed probability for the corresponding crisis response choice category.  
According to the table, a crisis is likely to result in a Non-force alternative when there is No 
guidance from the public.  But Initial Public support yields the highest predicted probabilities 
for the remainder of the Crisis response choice categories.  In other words, Initial Public 
support is more likely than the other categories of public opinion to result in a Show of force, 
an Aerial bombardment, or a Land force assault.  If presidents choose crisis responses on the 
basis of the initial public opinion poll, it will be difficult for analysts to predict how the 
president will respond to high levels of public support.   
Latest Public Opinion 
The public opinion dummy variables computed from the last polls immediately 
preceding the president’s major crisis response offer a remarkably similar picture to those of 
Initial public opinion.  The coefficient for Latest Public support is positive and significant, 
which indicates that when the latest level of support exceeds 60%, the president is likely to 
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choose a higher Crisis response choice – i.e., Aerial bombardment or Land force assault.  
This finding provides additional support for Hypothesis 1.   
The coefficient for Latest Public opposition, like Average Public opposition and 
Initial Public opposition, appears to have the wrong sign.  However, this is, again, a result of 
dummy variable regression.  Latest Public opposition has a positive impact on Crisis 
response choice relative to the excluded category of public opinion – No guidance – but a 
negative impact on the dependent variable relative to Latest Public support and Latest Public 
ambivalence/indifference.  Intuitively, one might expect that all of the measures of Public 
opposition would have a negative impact on Crisis response choice regardless of which 
category of public opinion serves as the reference.  I will discuss some possible explanations 
for this apparent challenge to intuitive expectations below.   
Latest Public ambivalence/indifference is positive and significant, as expected.  This 
indicates that when the latest level of public support and opposition both fail to breach 60%, 
presidents are likely to choose higher crisis response choices.  The coefficient provides 
qualified support for Hypothesis 3.  But, as before, we need to inspect the predicted 
probabilities to determine whether Latest Public ambivalence/indifference is associated with 
intermediate – i.e., Show of Force or Aerial Bombardment – Crisis response choices.   
Table 4.7 shows the predicted probabilities computed from the Latest Public Opinion 
Model in Table 4.1.  Again, the shaded cells contain the highest observed probability for the 
corresponding crisis response choice category, facilitating interpretation of the Ordered Logit 
estimates.  According to the simulations, a crisis is likely to result in a Non-force alternative 
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Table 4.6. Probabilities of Response Category by Initial Public Opinion Condition. 
 Presidential Crisis Response 
Initial Public Opinion Non-Force Show of force Aerial Bombardment 
Land force 
Assault 
Public support .250* .323* .198* .226* 
Public 
ambivalence/indifference  .399* .321* .150* .129* 
Public opposition .662* .223* .065* .048* 
No guidance (baseline)  .877 .089 .019 .014 
Note: Probabilities computed from Initial Public Opinion Model in Table 4.1. *The difference 
between the baseline and experimental value is statistically significant at p<.05.   
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when there is No guidance from the public.  A  Show of force is the likely response when the 
public is ambivalent or indifferent about the use of force, which provides more precise 
support for Hypothesis 3.  Finally, either an Aerial bombardment or a Land force assault is 
the likely outcome when latest public opinion is supportive of military involvement in a 
crisis.  Again, these results are largely consistent with my expectations.  As the latest level of 
support increases, presidents seek to attain foreign policy objectives by choosing alternatives 
that pose a greater risk of troop casualties.   
PUBLIC OPPOSITION: DEFYING (INTUITIVE) EXPECTATIONS? 
Despite the supportive evidence concerning the role of Public support in presidential crisis 
decision making, the coefficients for Public opposition do not provide unambiguous support 
for Hypothesis 2.  The simulations summarized in Tables 4.5 through 4.7 indicate that Public 
opposition effectively lowers the probability that the president chooses higher Crisis response 
choices relative to Public support and Public ambivalence/indifference.  But Public 
opposition consistently increases the probability of the selection of higher Crisis response 
choices relative to the excluded category of public opinion – No guidance.  Intuitively, we 
might expect significant public opposition to the use of force to constrain democratic leaders’ 
conflict behavior even when compared to crises for which public attitudes were not tapped.  
Here, I take a closer look at the impact of Public opposition.   
Explaining the Effect of Opposition   
The findings discussed so far concerning the role of public opinion in presidential 
crisis response appear to suggest the following: on the one hand, the president is responsive 
to supportive and ambivalent/indifferent attitudes; but on the other, the president is more 
likely to choose a military response when faced with opposition than when no guidance from  
  
89
Table 4.7. Probabilities of Response Category by Latest Public Opinion Condition. 
 Presidential Crisis Response 
Latest Public Opinion Non-Force Show of force Aerial Bombardment 
Land force 
Assault 
Public support .205* .288* .216* .289* 
Public 
ambivalence/indifference  .448* .319* .128* .103* 
Public opposition .659 .202 .054 .046 
No guidance (baseline)  .889 .081 .016 .012 
Note: Probabilities computed from Latest Public Opinion Model in Table 4.1. *The 
difference between the baseline and experimental value is statistically significant at p<.05.   
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the public is available.  There are three possible explanations for these seemingly inconsistent 
findings. 
The first possible explanation is that presidents simply ignore public opinion when 
making choices about international crises (see e.g., Gamson and Modigliani 1966; Verba et 
al. 1967; Mueller 1973).  A correspondence between high levels of public support and the 
president’s Crisis response choice may be coincidental.  Given that the public is frequently 
attentive to prominent foreign policy crises (e.g., Schattschneider 1960; Jacobs and Page 
2005), public attitudes may be shaped by the same events that influence the president’s 
ultimate decision (e.g., Mueller 1973; Jentleson 1992; Zaller 1992).  In those relatively rare 
crises in which there is a mismatch between public preferences and presidential decisions, the 
president may be making decisions based on information that is not available to the public.   
But the empirical evidence presented in this chapter appears to be at odds with the 
notion that presidents ignore public opinion.  Coincidence alone cannot account for the 
systematic relationships between the measures of public opinion and Crisis response choice.  
Indeed, when Average public opinion is operationalized as an ordinal variable, the fit 
between public opinion and Crisis response choice is remarkable ( 73.=γ ; 68.842 =χ , 
p<.001).16  The notion that presidents ignore the public would seem more plausible if we 
found a correspondence between public preferences and a more broadly defined measure of 
the use of force.  But given that there is a fairly good match between each category of 
opinion and the expected categories of Crisis response choice, it is difficult to accept that 
presidents simply ignore the public. 
                                                 
16 Specifically, the Average public opinion ordinal variable was operationalized such that No guidance = 0, 
Average Public opposition = 1, Average Public ambivalence/indifference = 2, and Average Public support = 3.   
  
91
The second possibility is that – rather than simply responding according to the wishes 
of the public – presidents use public opinion as a foreign policy instrument to signal resolve 
to potential adversaries.  The presence of opinion polls indicates saliency, not just at home 
but also abroad (e.g., McCombs and Shaw 1972; Gans 1980; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
Powlick and Katz 1998).  A possible explanation is that presidents increase the salience of 
international crises by “going public” (e.g., Baum 2004; Kernell 1986), incurring potential 
audience costs and signaling their resolve to back up threats and promises with military force 
(e.g., Fearon 1994; Smith 1998; Schulz 2001).  If the president subsequently backs down, he 
faces punishment from the citizenry or opposition party in the legislature.   
This signaling account of crisis bargaining explains why presidents may be more 
likely to use force when faced with domestic Public opposition.  But in a strategic setting, 
such a process would be unlikely to produce the observed results with respect to Public 
support.  The literature on audience costs and strategic signaling (e.g., Fearon 1994; Smith 
1998; Schulz 2001) finds that adversaries frequently anticipate each others’ actions.  The 
decisions of U.S. adversaries are conditioned by their beliefs about the likelihood that the 
president will engage in a military use of force against them if they do not comply with his 
demands.  Public opinion is thought to be the ultimate source of signaling credibility (e.g., 
Sobel 2001; Schultz 2001; Baum 2004).  Thus, Public opposition should embolden the U.S.’s 
adversary to ascertain whether the president is bluffing, producing a positive relationship 
between Public opposition and Crisis response choice.  This is, in fact, what we observe in 
most of the model specifications presented here – that is, relative to No guidance.  However, 
the signaling account also suggests that Public support should bolster the president’s threats, 
which would result in the capitulation of the target and produce a negative relationship 
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between Public support and Crisis response choice.  The empirical results presented in this 
chapter do not bear out this expectation of the signaling account.   
The final possible explanation is that the results are due to selection effects.  A 
selection bias imposed by “nature” may account for the unexpected relationship between 
Public opposition and Crisis response choice (King, Keohane and Verba 1994).  Unlike 
researcher-imposed selection bias (e.g., King, Keohane and Verba 1994; see also Achen and 
Snidal 1989; Collier and Mahoney 1996), selection imposed by nature – “selection effects” – 
refers to bias resulting from the possibility that individuals select themselves into certain 
processes on the basis of unobserved factors associated with the dependent variable or one of 
the included explanatory variables (e.g., King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 135; Fordham 
1998a).   
When a crisis arises, presidents frequently have the capacity to choose either to 
become involved or to stay out of it.  These crisis-selection decisions may be based (in part) 
on expected public attitudes toward the use of force.  If the public is expected to oppose 
military involvement, the president may be reluctant to get involved in these crises (e.g., 
Kusnitz 1984; Powlick 1991; Stimson 1991; Foyle 1999) – perhaps because the alternatives 
available to the president in resolving the crisis are limited by public opposition.  Similarly, 
presidents may downplay the U.S.’s role in crises in which public support is not anticipated 
(see e.g., Baum 2004), reducing the likelihood that opinion polls are conducted (e.g., Russett 
1990; Powlick and Katz 1998; Sobel 2001).  But among the crises in which Public opposition 
arises, the president may be more committed to using force than in those for which opinion 
polls have not been taken.  Such a selection process would explain the positive relationship 
between public opposition and crisis response choice, relative to No guidance.   
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The selection effects explanation for the effect of Public opposition on Crisis 
response choice is perhaps the most accurate of the possibilities.  It is largely consistent with 
the theoretical framework and the empirical results.  Indeed, looking at the predicted 
probabilities in Tables 4.5 through 4.7, it is evident that the expectation of each Crisis 
response choice category when the public is opposed to the use of force comports with 
Hypothesis 2 when considered relative to Public support and Public 
ambivalence/indifference.  In other words, if we imagine that the row containing the 
predicted probabilities for No guidance is absent from the tables, we see that we are more 
likely to observe a Non-force outcome under Public opposition and less likely to observe 
Show of force, Aerial bombardment, or Land force assault outcomes under Public opposition 
than Public support or Public ambivalence/indifference.  When considered relative to these 
categories of public opinion, the influence of Public opposition is consistent with Hypothesis 
2.   
Unfortunately, the current research design is inappropriate for identifying the extent 
to which selection effects are responsible for the qualified support for the hypotheses 
presented in this chapter.  The Public opinion variables are measured at the crisis level – the 
poll results collected pertain to the crises and not to general attitudes concerning the use of 
force against the likely adversaries.  I leave to future research to explore the impact of 
selection on the observed relationships, which may prove to be worthwhile endeavor.   
A Closer Look at Public Opposition and Crisis Response Choice 
Although the current research design is poorly-suited for detecting selection effects as 
an explanation for the ambiguous relationship between Public opposition and Crisis response 
choice, I am able to take a closer look at the findings to determine 1) whether the theoretical 
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expectations concerning this relationship are accurate and 2) whether the case selection 
criteria are appropriate.  First, the theory I develop in Chapter II argues that Public opposition 
limits the president’s utility for Land force assault alternatives.  Consequently, a statistical 
test of the influence of Public opposition on the probability that the president chooses a Land 
force assault alternative will directly evaluate this claim.  Second, it is possible that I have 
included some cases that should be excluded (namely, crises that are part of costly wars) 
because the process driving decision making in these crises are thought to be different from 
those driving other international crises (see e.g., Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Ostrom and Job 
1986; Fordham 1998a).  Thus, inclusion of these crises may bias the coefficient capturing the 
relationship between Public opposition and Crisis response choice.   
To directly evaluate the relationship between Public opposition and the Land force 
assault choice, I redefine the dependent variable such that  
0 Non-force response 
0 Show of force  
0 Aerial bombardment  
1 Land force assault 
Now, the dependent variable is dichotomous and captures the probability that the president 
chooses a Land force assault alternative.  According to the framework in Chapter II, 
presidents should be reluctant to choose this alternative when faced with Public opposition 
because the public does not believe that the foreign policy objectives pursued by the U.S. are 
worth the risks to American troops.  This indicates a negative relationship between Public 
opposition and Land force assault.   
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Table 4.8 shows the results of this analysis.17  The coefficient for Public opposition is 
negative and significant in two of the three.  When Public opposition is defined as the mean 
of all polls taken during the course of a crisis greater than 60%, the president is unlikely to 
choose a Land force assault alternative.  Similarly, the president is unlikely to choose a Land 
force assault alternative when the first poll taken after the start of a crisis indicates that Public 
opposition to the use of force exceeds 60%.  But the coefficient for Latest Public opposition 
fails to attain statistical significance.  Recall that Latest Public opposition is measured as the 
last poll taken prior to the president’s major response is in excess of 60%.  This result 
indicates that there is no systematic relationship between Latest Public opposition and Land 
force assault.  Once again, the insignificant coefficient for Latest Public opposition in Table 
4.8 – in a statistical sense – means that the effect of Latest Public opposition is no different 
from crises in which no public opinion polls were taken, No guidance.  Given that we already 
know the relationship between No guidance and Land force assault (i.e., negative), this 
insignificant result is not a refutation of the hypothesis.   
Two crises were anomalies, failing to comport with the theory in the evaluation of the 
relationship between Latest Public opposition and Land force assault.  According to the latest 
polls available, large segments of the public opposed using force in response to the Iran 
Hostage Crisis (1979-1980) and the War in Lebanon (1982-1983).  In spite of public 
opposition, the U.S. sent ground troops to engage hostile forces in both crises.  In the Iran 
Hostage Crisis, Iranian revolutionaries held American hostages and threatened to kill them if 
any military moves were made against Iran.  Although public opinion at that time indicated 
that most Americans were anxious for their release, the public was also reluctant to advocate  
                                                 
17 I also conduct an examination of the Land force assault dichotomous dependent variable using the crises 
identified by the MID data.  This analysis is included in Appendix B.   
  
96
Table 4.8. Logit Estimates of Public Opinion and Land Force Assault, 1949-2001 
Variable Average Opinion Latest Opinion Initial Opinion 
Public support 2.87** (1.56) 
3.03*** 
(1.11) 
2.22** 
(1.28) 
Public opposition -15.67*** (.525) 
.610 
(.899) 
-15.53*** 
(.524) 
Ambivalence/ 
indifference   
1.42** 
(.648) 
.898 
(.721) 
1.42** 
(.634) 
Relative 
capabilities 
1.98 
(2.51) 
1.78 
(2.68) 
1.31 
(2.51) 
Contiguity  .457 (1.19) 
.534 
(1.20) 
.489 
(1.16) 
Cold War 1.56** (.749) 
1.86** 
(1.00) 
1.44** 
(.728) 
Constant -6.45** (2.41) 
-6.56** 
(2.81) 
-5.71** 
(2.42) 
Log pseudo-
likelihood -44.63 -47.07 -44.91 
N 206 206 206 
* p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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a military operation which may have place the hostages in additional danger.  President 
Carter sent a small rescue force with orders to conduct a lightning-quick raid to liberate the 
hostages without detection (see e.g., Brulé 2005).  Although this decision appears to have 
violated the “letter” of public opinion, it did not violate the “spirit” of the public’s 
preferences – preserve the lives of the hostages.   
In the War in Lebanon, U.S. Marines were sent in as part of an international 
peacekeeping force trying to stabilize the country, which had been torn by a civil war 
between Christians and Muslims (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Grimmett 1999).  In 
addition, Israel and Syria were actively supporting the opposing forces in Lebanon.  The U.S. 
forces in Lebanon ultimately engaged Syrian-backed forces in a number of clashes (e.g., 
Bernstein 1983; Smith 1983).  Although there was adequate public support – according to the 
theory in Chapter II – for a peacekeeping presence in Lebanon, President Reagan faced clear 
opposition from the public for a wider U.S. role consisting of open hostilities toward Syria 
and its protégés in Lebanon.   
U.S. involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s is an illustrative case of “mission 
creep.”  Like that case, there is some suggestion that, once engaged in a military conflict, 
democratic leaders disregard public opposition and desperately seek to “win,” fearing that the 
political retribution associated with capitulation may be worse than a costly victory (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 1999; Downs and Rocke 1994; see also Fearon 1995).  Indeed, some 
empirical studies of the use of force (e.g., Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Ostrom and Job 1986; 
Fordham 1998a) exclude crises that were part of interstate wars for this reason.  Because the 
ICB (as well as the MID) data disaggregate wars (particularly, the Vietnam and Korean 
Wars) into separate crises, it is possible that the results are driven by the president’s disregard 
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for public opposition to these intra-war crises and use force in spite of the public’s 
preferences.  To check this possibility, I re-estimated the models without crises that were part 
of the Vietnam and Korean Wars.  First, I only excluded the Korean War crises, and then 
only the Vietnam War crises.  Finally, I excluded all of the crises that were part of those two 
wars.  The exclusion of these intra-war crises made no substantive difference in the results.  
They are included in Appendix B.18   
Despite the ambiguity associated with the performance of the Public opposition 
variables, the results are largely supportive of the theoretical framework.  Public support is 
consistently associated with higher levels of Crisis responses, while Public 
ambivalence/indifference is associated with intermediate Crisis responses.  Relative to No 
guidance, Public opposition is related to lower Crisis responses.  I was also able to verify that 
Public opposition typically leads to the rejection of Land force assault alternatives.  But the 
evidence presented in this chapter tends to point to a selection effect: presidents select 
themselves into international crises on the basis of expected opinion.  Presidents are more 
likely to become involved in crises in which opinion is expected to be supportive, and less 
likely to enter into crises in which the public is expected to oppose the use of military force.  
In other words, presidents anticipate public opinion in decisions about crisis selection.  Such 
a process of anticipation is likely to attenuate the effect of opposition on the president’s 
ultimate Crisis response choice – making crises in which the public opposed the use of force 
statistically indistinguishable from those for which no public opinion data was available.    
                                                 
18 I also conducted these analyses excluding the Vietnam and Korean Wars using crises identified by the MID 
data.  The results of these analyses also appear in Appendix B.   
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MILITARY AND INTERNATIONAL-STRATEGIC FACTORS 
According to the theoretical framework set forth in chapter II, presidents choose a 
final Crisis response choice from the remaining set of alternatives on the basis of the choice’s 
ability to satisfy military and international-strategic criteria in the second stage of the 
Poliheuristic decision making process.  Presidents choose the alternative that is expected to 
successfully achieve military success as well as enhance the U.S.’s geopolitical position.  
Three variables – Relative capabilities, Contiguity, and Cold War – are meant to gauge the 
impact of military and international-strategic factors on the president’s Crisis response 
choice.   
Relative Capabilities 
Hypothesis 4 suggests that presidents are likely to employ alternatives they believe 
will be the most effective, indicating that presidents are likely to choose higher crisis 
response choices when the U.S. enjoys a preponderance of power over its opponent.  This 
expectation tends to be borne out in the analyses: the U.S.’s share of capabilities in the dyad 
tends to contribute to a higher Crisis response choice.  However, a robust finding in the 
international conflict literature is that parity of military capabilities between adversaries tends 
to be associated with a greater likelihood of conflict (e.g., Organski and Kugler 1980; Bremer 
1992).  While the performance of Relative capabilities offers support for Hypothesis 4, the 
results do not appear (prima facie) to be consistent with the bulk of studies examining 
international conflict.  According to the logic of power shift theories (e.g., Organski and 
Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981: see also Schelling 1966), military success in battle is not the soul 
purpose of accumulating capabilities.  Instead, the threat of using overwhelming force is the 
mechanism that determines crisis outcomes among disparate states.  When a relatively weak 
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state is threatened by a more powerful opponent, the weaker state is likely to back down 
without a fight, resulting in a lower likelihood that force must be used to resolve the crisis.   
Indeed, there appears to be some support for both the power shift explanation as well 
as the theoretical argument specified in chapter II when the changes in predicted probabilities 
are compared.  Table 4.9 shows the predicted probabilities of each Crisis response choice 
category according to shifts in Military and International-Strategic variables.  The row 
corresponding to Relative capabilities displays the predicted probabilities when that variable 
is equal to its maximum.  A cursory inspection of the values along that row indicates an 
increase, followed by a decrease in the predicted probability of the Crisis response choice.  
Increasing U.S. capabilities relative to those of the likely adversary reduces the probability of 
the president choosing Non-force alternatives only slightly – 1.3%.  But when the U.S.’s 
share of capabilities is shifted from the mean to the maximum, the probability of a Show of 
force increases by 10%.  The maximum of Relative capabilities is most closely associated 
with the Aerial bombardment alternative.  The predicted probability of an Aerial 
bombardment rises by 12% when Relative capabilities is raised from its mean to the 
maximum.  But the impact on the probability of a Land force assault is smaller – 10%.  The 
predicted probabilities displayed in Table 4.9 suggests that increases in Relative capabilities 
are associated with higher Crisis response choices, but that these changes decline at the 
highest Crisis response choice – Land force assault.     
Contiguity 
Hypothesis 5 indicates that Contiguity should be positively associated with higher Crisis 
response choices.  From a military operations standpoint, crises that occur near the U.S. 
should have lower logistical costs connected to the deployment of troops and supplies (e.g., 
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Bueno de Mesquita 1981).  The analyses indicate that this is the case.  The coefficient for 
Contiguity is positive and significant in each of the models using the ICB data.  But an 
inspection of the changes in predicted probabilities across the four Crisis response choices 
suggests something akin to a declining marginal utility for higher levels of Crisis response 
choices with increases in Contiguity.  When Contiguity is equal to “1,” the probability of the 
president choosing Non-force alternatives falls by 8%.  However, the gap between the 
baseline probability and the predicted probability for crises that are contiguous with the U.S. 
begins to climb dramatically for the remaining three Crisis response categories.  Shifting 
Contiguity from zero to “1” yields a 63% increase in the probability of a Show of force; the 
probability of an Aerial bombardment increases by 75%; and the probability of a Land force 
assault rises by 88%.   
Cold War 
Hypothesis 5 suggests that years of the Cold War (1949-1989) should critically affect 
the president’s Crisis response choice.  This period was marked by an intense and ongoing 
competition for power and influence between the United States and the Soviet Union (Gaddis 
2005).  The hypothesis does not offer a direction (positive, negative) of the expected 
relationship.  On the one hand, one may expect that such intense efforts would be 
characterized by higher Crisis response choices by the president, attempting to counter Soviet 
activities.  This was the case in Southeast Asia from the 1950s until the 1970s.  On the other 
hand, presidents may be expected in such circumstances to exercise restraint in order to 
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Table 4.9. Probabilities of Response Category by Military and International-Strategic 
Factors. 
 Presidential Crisis Response 
 Non-Force Show of force Aerial Bombardment 
Land force 
Assault 
Relative capabilitiesa .875* .091* .018* .013* 
Contiguityb  .812* .135* .027* .022 
Cold Warb .891 .079 .015 .011 
(Baseline probability) .887 .083 .016 .012 
Note: Probabilities computed from Average Public Opinion Model in Table 4.1.  
a The predicted probability is computed by shifting Relative capabilities from its mean value 
to its maximum.   
b The predicted probability is computed by shifting the dichotomous independent variable 
from zero to one.     
*The difference between the baseline and experimental value is statistically significant at 
p<.10, one-tailed test.   
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prevent “pushing” some countries into the arms of the Soviet Union (Hoffman 1980), or 
engaging in direct confrontation with the Soviets (Allison 1971).  These cases can be 
illustrated with references to the Iran hostage crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, respectively.  
Clearly, the relevance of the Cold War and the implications of using the various Crisis 
response choices in each crisis are difficult to delineate a priori in a systematic study.  Not 
surprisingly, crises occurring during the period from 1949-1989 do not appear to be 
statistically distinguishable from those occurring from 1990-2001.   
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Seven variables included in the models account for alternative explanations of the use 
of force, generally.  Overall, the performance of these variables does not bode well for these 
alternative explanations.  Only three of the controls – Election year, Concurrent crises, and 
Cumulative battle deaths – attain statistical significance in any of the specifications 
summarized in Tables 4.1 through 4.4.   
Presidential approval, GDP growth rate, Inflation, and Unemployment all capture 
some aspect – either directly or indirectly (e.g., see DeRouen 1995) – of the top-down, 
divisionary theory of the use of force.  According to the diversionary account, presidents use 
force abroad in order to distract voters from deteriorating domestic circumstances.  In other 
words, the president manipulates the public for domestic political gain.  As I pointed out in 
chapter II, Presidential approval is the primary way in which public opinion is considered in 
the bulk of studies on the presidential use of force (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and 
Bickers 1992; DeRouen 1995).  When considered in the ICB models (Tables 4.1 - 4.4), 
Presidential approval is not related to Crisis response choice.  Similarly, the three economic 
measures – GDP growth rate, Inflation, and Unemployment – also fail to have a significant 
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effect on the president’s Crisis response.  These null findings are consistent with previous 
studies of the use of force that employ crises, disputes, or “opportunities” as the units of 
analysis (e.g., Meernik 1994; Wang 1996).  Such studies typically fail to find an effect of 
such trend variables as approval ratings and economic performance.  However, studies that 
use quarters or years as the units of analysis tend to find such a relationship (e.g., Ostrom and 
Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Fordham 1998a).  This is, once again, suggestive of a 
selection effect in which presidents select themselves into crises on the basis of such factors 
as approval ratings or economic performance.  Once in the crisis, however, the effect of such 
variables is attenuated (see e.g., Fordham 1998a).   
Akin to the logic of the diversionary theory, the basis for including Election year is 
rooted in the possibility that presidents seek to gain favor with the voters during an election 
campaign by using force abroad.  According to the analyses summarized in Tables 4.1 
through 4.4, this possibility appears to be well-founded.  The coefficient for Election year is 
positive and significant, indicating that presidents choose higher Crisis responses during 
election years.  A presidential election year reduces the probability of the president choosing 
a Non-force alternative by 7%.  But during election years, the probability of a Show of force 
rises by 60%.  The impact on the predicted probability is even greater for the probability that 
the president chooses either an Aerial bombardment (76% increase) or Land force Assault 
(77% increase).  A number of previous studies have found that presidential elections 
significantly increase the likelihood of a use of force (e.g., Stoll 1984; Fordham 1998a; 
1998b).  The findings with respect to Election year are clearly consistent with this body of 
research.   
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Concurrent crises are included to take into account demands on U.S. resources as well 
as the amount of attention the president can devote to any given crisis at one time.  Although 
there is much research on opportunities to use force (e.g., Leeds and Davis 1997; Fordham 
1998a; Miller 1995), these do not provide a consistent description of what impact the number 
of ongoing international crises should have on the likelihood that the president uses force.  
Clearly, if no opportunities – however conceptualized – exist, the president should be 
unlikely to use force abroad.19  However, some of the specifications indicate that the number 
of ongoing crises reduce the president’s propensity to choose higher Crisis responses.  Using 
the estimates from Model 4.3, a shift in the Concurrent crises variable from its mean value to 
its maximum increases the probability of a Non-force response by 7%.  The predicted 
probability of a Show of force, Aerial bombardment, or Land force assault each decrease by 
approximately 50% when the number of ongoing crises increases from 4 to 10.   
Cumulative battle deaths is thought to be associated with fewer available military 
resources for use in a new crisis (e.g., Fordham 1998a).  Moreover, Mueller (1973) argues 
that mounting casualties produce public opposition to the president and the use of force 
generally.  But the coefficient for Cumulative battle deaths is positive and significant in all 
but one of the models displayed in Tables 4.1 through 4.4.  When the Cumulative battle 
deaths variable is raised from its mean to its maximum, the probability of the president 
choosing a Non-force alternative is reduced by 19%.  The same operation produces a 132% 
increase in a Show of force, a 233% increase in Aerial bombardment, and a 200% increase in 
Land force assault.  In light of the theoretical basis for including a measure of war deaths, 
this set of findings is surprising.  One possible explanation is centered on the process of case 
                                                 
19 However, some scholars (e.g., James and Hristoulas 1994; Fordham 1998a) argue that the incentives 
produced by domestic politics and the capabilities at the disposal of the president provide him with the capacity 
to manufacture a crisis at almost any time, regardless of the presence of ongoing crises.   
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selection.  Studies of the presidential use of force (e.g., Ostrom and Job 1986; Meernik 1994; 
Fordham 1998a) typically examine uses of force that were not part of wars.  I include all 
crises identified by the ICB data – even those that are part of an ongoing war.  The ICB data 
set disaggregates the Korean and Vietnam Wars into separate “intra-war crises.”  Since most 
of these crises entailed a violent use of force (i.e., Aerial bombardment, Land force assault), 
it is unsurprising that Cumulative battle deaths has a positive impact on Crisis response 
choice.   
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
As an additional robustness check, I also estimated the relationships described above 
using a different source data set, Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID), to identify the crises.  
The MID data were collected for somewhat different purposes from the International Crisis 
Behavior (ICB) data used in the analyses discussed above.  Moreover, the two data sets 
employ different definitions of what constitutes an international crisis.  Specifically, for an 
event to be considered by the MID, a state must threaten, show, or actually use military force 
against another state (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996).  This is not necessary for an event to 
be included in the ICB data, where practically any act by one state, which is perceived as 
negative by another, can serve as a crisis trigger (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).  Testing the 
theoretical framework against two different case selection criteria provides an unsympathetic 
assessment for the hypotheses.  If the results are similar across data sets, this should enhance 
confidence in the hypothesized relationships and, by implication, the account of Crisis 
response choice developed in chapter II.   
Tables 4.10 through 4.13 show the replicated results of Ordered Logit analyses using the 
MID data rather than ICB data.  The Ordered Logit estimates confirm the robustness of the 
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influence of the public opinion variables.  These variables are not sensitive to the source data 
(i.e., ICB or MID) utilized, the definition of measurement (i.e., average, latest, initial), or the 
model specification, suggesting that these variables are remarkably robust predictors of 
presidential crisis response choice.  Although Public support and Public 
ambivalence/indifference remain positive and significant among crises identified by the MID 
data, the coefficients for the effect of Public opposition again require an understanding of 
dummy variable regression.  The estimated coefficients for Public opposition tend to indicate 
that Public opposition increases the likelihood that a higher Crisis response choice is selected 
relative to No guidance.  But because the coefficient for Public opposition is typically 
smaller than those for Public support and Public ambivalence/indifference, Public opposition 
reduces the probability that the president selects higher Crisis response choices relative to 
Public support and Public ambivalence/indifference.  This constitutes tacit support for 
Hypothesis 2. 
An obvious difference between the analyses utilizing the MID data and the ICB 
results is that the coefficient for Public ambivalence/indifference is larger than that for Public 
support across the specifications.  This suggests that Public ambivalence/indifference has a 
larger impact on the predicted probability of higher Crisis responses than Public support.  
Table 4.14 summarizes the predicted probabilities for each Crisis outcome according to the 
category of public opinion.  The shaded cells indicate the highest estimated probability for 
the outcome.  Looking down the columns corresponding to the Crisis response choice 
categories, it is evident that the probability of observing either an Aerial bombardment or a 
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Table 4.10. Robustness Checks: Ordered Logit Estimates of Domestic and International 
Influences on Presidential Crisis Response (MID), 1949-2001  
 Average Public Opinion 
Initial Public 
Opinion 
Latest Public 
Opinion 
Public support 1.54**    (.806) 
1.62**    
(.719) 
1.77**    
(.882) 
Public opposition .433 (.443) 
1.27***    
(.367) 
.895*    
(.569) 
Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
2.29***    
(.60) 
2.02***     
(.602) 
2.01***     
(.492) 
Relative capabilities .45    (.761) 
.407    
(.755) 
.328    
(.728) 
Contiguity  -1.03***   (.366) 
-1.08***    
(.359) 
-1.09***    
(.366) 
Cold War -.295 (.429) 
-.357    
(.467) 
-.376    
(.451) 
Presidential approval .018**    (.008) 
.019***    
(.008) 
.018**    
(.008) 
GDP growth rate -.008    (.027) 
-.008    
(.028) 
-.006    
(.028) 
Inflation .045    (.041) 
.057*    
(.039) 
.055*    
(.041) 
Unemployment .066    (.074) 
.038    
(.083) 
.039    
(.087) 
Election year -.266    (.324) 
-.257    
(.361) 
-.281    
(.369) 
Concurrent crises .116    (.124) 
.094    
(.125) 
.092    
(.119) 
Cumulative battle deaths 1.8e-06    (1.2e-05) 
-2.85e-07     
(1.3e-05) 
1.23e-06     
(1.3e-05) 
1τ  1.48   1.28   1.16    
2τ  4.22  3.88    3.79    
3τ  5.41   5.03    4.94    
Chi-square 101.29*** 197.39*** 143.94*** 
N 212 212 212 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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Table 4.11. Robustness Checks: Alternative Specifications with Average Public Opinion 
(MID) 
     
Average Public support 1.64**   (.944) 
1.65**   
(.909) 
1.68**    
(.895) 
1.68**  
(.787) 
Average Public opposition .680**   (.394) 
.709**   
(.402) 
.699**  
(.416) 
.461    
(.488) 
Average Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
2.53***   
(.564) 
2.52***   
(.554) 
2.52***   
(.552) 
2.28***  
(.583) 
Relative capabilities    .595    (.682) 
Contiguity     -.964***  (.378) 
Cold War    -.057   (.371) 
Presidential approval .009    (.007) 
.010*    
(.007)   
GDP growth rate -.022    (.027) 
-.027    
(.024)   
Election year -.235    (.284) 
-.237    
(.297)   
Concurrent crises .111    (.107)    
Cumulative battle deaths -4.2e-06   (1.1e-05)    
1τ  .636   .465  .030  .07 
2τ  3.24    3.06    2.61   2.76 
3τ  4.44  4.26    3.81    3.96 
Chi-square 55.53*** 47.55*** 22.88*** 56.46***
N 215 215 215 212 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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Table 4.12. Robustness Checks: Alternative Specifications with Latest Public Opinion (MID) 
     
Latest Public support 1.90**   (1.02) 
1.90**    
(1.01) 
1.93**   
(.991) 
1.86**   
(.825) 
Latest Public opposition 1.12**  (.530) 
1.12**   
(.529) 
1.12**   
(.511) 
.903*    
(.580) 
Latest Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
2.24*** 
(.428) 
2.24***  
(.422) 
2.24***   
(.419) 
2.01***    
(.476) 
Relative capabilities    .437    (.618) 
Contiguity     -1.01***  (.375) 
Cold War    -.154  (.371) 
Presidential approval .009*    (.007) 
.011*    
(.007)   
GDP growth rate -.023    (.027) 
-.026   
(.024)   
Election year -.224   (.331) 
-.224     
(.338)   
Concurrent crises .071    (.104)    
Cumulative battle deaths -4.6e-06    (1.1e-05)    
1τ  .609 .507 .043 -.138 
2τ  3.10  2.99 2.51 2.45 
3τ  4.25   4.15 3.66 3.60 
Chi-square 78.89*** 54.04*** 29.80*** 76.73*** 
N 215 215 215 212 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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Table 4.13. Robustness Checks: Alternative Specifications with Initial Public Opinion (MID) 
     
Initial Public support 1.76**    (.879) 
1.77**    
(.868) 
1.80**    
(.852) 
1.71***    
(.691) 
Initial Public opposition 1.55***  (.303) 
1.56***  
(.302) 
1.55***    
(.289) 
1.30***  
(.378) 
Initial Public 
ambivalence/indifference  
2.24***    
(.547) 
2.23***   
(.535) 
2.23***  
(.518) 
2.01***    
(.569) 
Relative capabilities    .492   (.642) 
Contiguity     -1.01***   (.371) 
Cold War    -.136    (.391) 
Presidential approval .010*   (.007) 
.011*   
(.007)   
GDP growth rate -.024  (.028) 
-.027    
(.026)   
Election year -.212    (.318) 
-.214    
(.326)   
Concurrent crises .074    (.106)    
Cumulative battle deaths -5.9e-06    (1.1e-05)    
1τ  .632 .533 .047 -.073 
2τ  3.09 2.99 2.48 2.48 
3τ  4.24 4.14 3.63 3.63 
Chi-square 119.20*** 65.71*** 41.15*** 104.99 
N 215 215 215 212 
The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors; * p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test.   
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Land force assault is greater when the public is ambivalent or indifferent than when the 
public is supportive of military involvement in a crisis. 
As I discuss in Chapter III, the MID and ICB data were collected using different 
coding rules.  Recall that a key implication of these differences for the present research is 
that the dependent variable is distributed differently across the ICB and MID crises.  
Specifically, the modal category of Crisis response choice in crises identified by the MID 
data is the Show of force option, while the mode for crises identified using ICB is Non-force.  
There is also some divergence in the case selected.  These differences in case selection and 
definition are likely responsible for the different outcomes across these two data sets.   
The military and international-strategic factors do not fare as well in the MID data as 
in the ICB.  Relative capabilities fails to exert a statistically significant influence on Crisis 
response choice, which offers no robust support for Hypothesis 4.  The coefficient for 
Contiguity, while statistically significant in the MID data, suggests that Contiguity has a 
negative effect on Crisis response choice, appearing to refute Hypothesis 5.  Again, the 
coefficients for Cold War fail to attain statistical significance in any of the specifications.   
The control variables perform slightly better in the MID analyses.  Although many of 
these fail to attain statistical significance, among the controls that are systematically 
associated with Crisis response choice include Presidential approval, which contributes to the 
president choosing higher Crisis responses.  According to the incentives provided by the rally 
effect, the estimated impact of Presidential approval is in the wrong direction – i.e., 
presidents should seek to use force when faced with low approval (Morgan and Bickers 
1992; DeRouen 1995).  But like the results presented here, most of the empirical studies 
(Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Wang 1996) find a positive relationship  
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Table 4.14. Probabilities of Response Category by Average Public Opinion Condition (MID). 
 Presidential Crisis Response 
Average Public Opinion Non-Force Show of force Aerial Bombardment 
Land force 
Assault 
Public support .116* .482 .214* .187* 
Public 
ambivalence/indifference  .055* .376* .272* .297* 
Public opposition .246* .571 .114* .068 
No guidance (baseline)  .328 .551 .078 .043 
Note: Probabilities computed from Average Public Opinion Model in Table 4.9. *The 
difference between the baseline and experimental value is statistically significant at p<.10, one-
tailed.   
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Specifically, the modal category of Crisis response choice in crises identified by the MID 
data is the Show of force option, while the mode for crises identified using ICB is Non-force.  
There is also some divergence in the case selected.  These differences in case  
selection and definition are likely responsible for the different outcomes across these two 
data sets.   
The military and international-strategic factors do not fare as well in the MID data as 
in the ICB.  Relative capabilities fails to exert a statistically significant influence on Crisis 
response choice, which offers no robust support for Hypothesis 4.  The coefficient for 
Contiguity, while statistically significant in the MID data, suggests that Contiguity has a 
negative effect on Crisis response choice, appearing to refute Hypothesis 5.  Again, the 
coefficients for Cold War fail to attain statistical significance in any of the specifications.   
The control variables perform slightly better in the MID analyses.  Although many of 
these fail to attain statistical significance, among the controls that are systematically 
associated with Crisis response choice include Presidential approval, which contributes to the 
president choosing higher Crisis responses.  According to the incentives provided by the rally 
effect, the estimated impact of Presidential approval is in the wrong direction – i.e., 
presidents should seek to use force when faced with low approval (Morgan and Bickers 
1992; DeRouen 1995).  But like the results presented here, most of the empirical studies 
(Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Wang 1996) find a positive relationship  
Overall, the additional analyses using the MID data are generally supportive of parts 
of the theoretical framework.  Specifically, similar relationships between the public opinion 
variables and Crisis response choice are observed using a different set of crises.  However, 
the variables indicating military and international-strategic factors fail to offer robust support.  
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But this exercise constitutes a “hard test” for the theory, one in which public opinion appears 
to have passed.   
CONCLUSION  
The empirical results presented in this chapter are largely supportive of the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter II.  Consistent with the first stage of the Poliheuristic 
account of crisis decision making, presidents tend to rule out alternatives that clearly defy 
public preferences concerning military involvement in international crises.  Specifically, 
presidents tend to choose higher Crisis response choices (i.e., Aerial bombardment and Land 
force assault) when the public is supportive of the use of force.  When the public is 
ambivalent or indifferent about the use of force, presidents tend to choose intermediate 
responses (i.e., Show of force and Aerial bombardment).  In other words, presidents appear 
to reject alternatives that lack sufficient public support.  These relationships are robust, 
holding up in spite of the variable definitions, model specifications, or source data for 
identifying crises.   
Compared with Public support and Public ambivalence/indifference, Public 
opposition is systematically associated with lower Crisis response choices – although Public 
opposition tends to have a positive effect relative to No guidance.  In other words, presidents 
are likely to choose higher Crisis response choices when faced with Public opposition than if 
no public opinion polls were available.  This finding suggests that presidents may anticipate 
the direction and intensity of public opinion toward the use of force and select themselves 
into crises in which they expect some minimum level of support.   
The performance of the public opinion variables strongly suggests that presidents 
make tradeoffs concerning foreign policy success and U.S. casualties, conditional on the 
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direction and intensity of public opinion toward the use of force.  When the public is 
supportive of the use of force, presidents are more willing to risk the lives of troops in order 
to achieve foreign policy objectives.  Presidents are increasingly less willing to sacrifice 
troops for foreign policy goals as support fades into indifference, ambivalence, or opposition.   
The analyses provide limited evidence in favor of the account of the second stage of 
the Poliheuristic decision making process.  Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 indicate that presidents 
choose a final crisis response from among the remaining alternatives based on that 
alternative’s ability to maximize expected benefits on the military and international-strategic 
dimensions.  As an assessment of the president’s calculations with respect to the military 
dimension, the U.S.’s share of relative capabilities is associated with higher Crisis response 
choices in some of the estimations.  Another indicator of military concerns, Contiguity, is 
supportive of the framework in some models, but challenges my expectations in others.  In 
terms of international-strategic factors, a variable for Cold War years failed to demonstrate a 
systematic impact on presidential crisis response choices.   
 
  
117
CHAPTER V 
CLINTON’S DECISION TO LAUNCH AIR STRIKES IN BOSNIA, 1992-1994 
The quantitative analysis in the previous chapter found that the Poliheuristic account 
of presidential crisis response is a useful framework for explaining such decisions.  
Primarily, the analysis indicates that public attitudes toward military involvement in a crisis 
have a profound effect on the president’s Crisis response choice.  But statistical analysis 
tends to be poorly-suited for the evaluation of some of the more nuanced claims developed in 
Chapter II.  The case studies in Chapters V and VI are intended to assess and illustrate three 
central aspects of the theoretical argument as well as explore these nuanced theoretical 
concerns.  The first aspect assessed concerns whether the determinants of public opinion 
toward the use of force (i.e., public’s expected level of casualties and expected value of 
foreign policy success) are consistent with observed public opinion in the way the theory 
specifies?  Second, does the president respond to public opinion by rejecting alternatives that 
clearly violate public preferences?  Finally, is the president’s choice among surviving 
alternatives a product of military and international-strategic concerns?  Other theoretical 
concerns that will be considered in the case studies include the roles of different segments of 
the public (i.e., elites versus masses) in the president’s decision as well as the impact of the 
societal memory of previous U.S. military ventures (e.g., Vietnam and the Gulf War).   
The two cases studies trace presidential Crisis response choices to the Bosnian crisis 
(1992-1994) and the crisis that ensued with Afghanistan immediately following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  In the Bosnian crisis, President Clinton ultimately chose to 
utilize air strikes in response to Bosnian Serb assaults on UN-established Muslim safe 
havens.  After demanding that the ruling Taliban regime turn over terror mastermind Osama 
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bin Laden, President George W. Bush chose to respond to Afghan refusals with a limited 
invasion in cooperation with Afghan rebels.   
I chose these two cases from the more than 200 crises involving the U.S. on the basis 
of standard criteria.  First, the cases were similar on a number of key independent variables 
(Lijphart 1971; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Van Evera 1997).  The presidents burdened 
with decision making were new-comers to the office, facing the crises in the first year of 
office.  Both crises occurred after the end of the Cold War.  The maneuvering and bargaining 
typified by the Cold War era, which is thought to influence presidential decisions on foreign 
policy (see e.g., Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Gaddis 2005), do not need to be considered in 
the analysis.  Both of the crises also took place after the U.S.’s stunning victory in the 1991 
Persian Gulf War.  That victory is thought to have changed popular perceptions about the 
utility of military force since the Vietnam experience (e.g., Sobel 1996).  By choosing cases 
that are similar on a number of respects, I hope to isolate the key causal mechanisms 
associated with presidential Crisis response choices (see e.g., Collier 1993).   
I also chose these two cases because they are, as will be seen, theoretically 
informative (see e.g., Van Evera 1997).  The Bosnia case in particular offers large within-
case variance.  Both cases are useful for testing alternative hypotheses from competing 
theories.  Finally, given that much of the data used in these case studies is readily available, 
the findings presented here can be replicated.   
In order to apply the Poliheuristic account developed in Chapter II to the two cases, I 
identify the alternatives considered by the president during the crisis.  Next, I discuss the 
“values” of the relevant variables associated with each decision making dimension – 
domestic political, military, and international-strategic.  In other words, I discuss the climate 
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of public attitudes toward military involvement as well as the implications of each alternative 
for military and international-strategic factors.  After analyzing the decision in terms of the 
two-stage Poliheuristic process, I discuss whether the decision was compensatory.  I assess 
whether the alternative pursued by the president was actually the result of process by which 
the he sought to yield the highest possible net gain across all dimensions.   
THE BOSNIAN CRISIS 
By the time Bill Clinton took office in 1993, Yugoslavia had splintered into several 
republics.  The fighting in Bosnia between Muslims, Serb and Bosnian Serb paramilitary 
groups and Croats had been escalating for nearly a year, with the Bosnian Serb forces 
capturing 70% of the country (Johnston 1993; Zimmerman 1996).  “Ethnic cleansing” – the 
practice of expelling or killing non-co-ethnics – punctuated the fighting.  Refugees – 
predominantly Muslim – were scattered across Europe and images of gaunt Muslim men in 
Serb prison camps were beamed to the U.S. (Gutman 1992).  The Clinton administration’s 
ultimate response to the crisis in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a 
series of air strikes, which facilitated a negotiated peace between warring factions and the 
insertion of U.S. peacekeepers to enforce/monitor the framework.   
Between 1919 and 1991, Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics with a complex 
patchwork of ethnic groups.20  Equally complex – indeed, too complex to recount here – is 
the complete story of the roots of the crisis that began there in 1991 (see Kaplan 1993; 
Woodward 1995).  However, it is necessary to offer some background information here.  
With the rise to power of Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, who favored Serb 
                                                 
20 The six republics included Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia.  The 
primary ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia prior to 1991 were Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Slovenes, 
Albanians, Macedonians, Magyars, and Poles.  Ethnic identity appears to have been mainly characterized by 
religious identity, which include Orthodox Catholic (Serbs and Macedonians), Roman Catholic (Croats, 
Slovenes, Magyars, and Poles), and Islam (Bosnian Muslims and Albanians).  See Kaplan (1993).   
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supremacy over the other republics in Yugoslavia, nationalist tensions began to be unmasked 
throughout Yugoslavia (Zimmerman 1996).  In response, Slovenia and Croatia succeeded 
from the federation in June of 1991.  Although the Serbian army made only a half-hearted 
attempt to retain Slovenia, a brutal war broke out between the nascent Croat republic and the 
federal forces of Yugoslavia (Haass 1999).  A United Nations (UN) effort, spearheaded by 
the European Community (EC) and Council for Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE), 
was able to secure and oversee a cease fire between Croatia and the remnants of Yugoslavia 
in the spring of 1992 (Johnston 1993; Zimmerman 1996).  However, sporadic fighting would 
continue in disputed Croatian territories until late 1995.   
The “crisis-within-a-crisis” that would capture the world’s attention began with 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s formal declaration of independence in March 1992 (Haass 1999).  
Emboldened by the EC’s recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as well as the UN efforts to 
facilitate Croat sovereignty, the Bosnian government appealed for international recognition 
and protection from impending action by Yugoslav forces to regain control the most 
ethnically-diverse republic in the federation.  Indeed, this ethnic diversity appears to have 
contributed to the inevitable fighting that would ignite Bosnia.21  Bosnian Serbs sought to 
maintain unity with Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, while Bosnian Croats identified with the 
newly independent Croatia.  The Bosnian Muslim population seemed to be inundated by the 
rising tide of increasingly militant nationalism sweeping the Balkan Peninsula (Haass 1999; 
Woodward 1995; Zimmerman 1996).   
Consistent with the expectations of the international community, fighting broke out in 
Bosnia on April 6, 1992 (Zimmerman 1996).  A three-way melee ensued, with Bosnian Serb 
                                                 
21 According to the Bosnian Census, the ethnic makeup in 1991 was 43.6% Muslim, 31.4% Serb, 17.3% Croat, 
and 7.7% other.   
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forces supported by Belgrade fighting Croatian paramilitary units supported by Zagreb – both 
of which were attacking Bosnian Muslim militias and civilians.  The Bosnian Muslims 
clearly bore the brunt of the losses in terms of lives and territory, while the Bosnian Serbs 
conquered more than two-thirds of the country and mounted a brutal siege of Sarajevo – the 
nation’s capital and host of the 1984 Winter Olympics (Johnston 1993).   
During the George H. W. Bush administration, the U.S. largely deferred to Europe 
under the auspices of the CSCE to take charge of the growing crisis.  The Europeans seemed 
eager to take on the task (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996).  During this “hour of Europe,” 
however, European governments seemed divided over what to do.  The bulk of the 
Europeans advocated a policy of “unity and democracy” – which was also the stated policy 
of the Bush administration – while the balance, including Germany, pushed for recognition 
of the new Yugoslav republics (Zimmerman 1996).  The Europeans also lacked a decisive 
response to the fighting that erupted between and within the newly-independent republics.  
By June of 1992, the “hour of Europe” ended when the Europeans requested that the UN 
Security Council take the initiative in the crisis (Hoffman 1996, 98).  The UN, which had 
already deployed peacekeepers to Croatia, expanded the mandate of the UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) to include Bosnia, imposed an arms embargo on the country, and announced 
– but did not enforce – a no-fly zone over Bosnia (Johnston 1993; Haass 1999).  As fighting 
intensified, the UN declared several cities – including Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Zepa – as 
“safe havens” to be off limits to Serb or Croat aggression.  This UN declaration was simply 
ignored (Johnston 1993; Ullman 1996).   
During the 1992 presidential campaign, Candidate Clinton criticized the Bush 
administration’s reluctance to get involved in the Bosnian crisis.  In addition to a general 
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disengagement from the wars in the Balkans, the Bush administration expressed little 
sympathy for the any side in the conflict.  This lack of sympathy for any party stemmed from 
the belief that none of the warring parties were innocent (Sobel 2001, 196).  As media reports 
of Serb atrocities against Muslim civilians continued to saturate the evening news, the 
Clinton campaign announced a pledge to participate in Allied air strikes if Clinton were 
elected.  Clinton called for the preservation of a multi-ethnic state in Bosnia and rejected the 
Bush administration’s stance of neutrality.  He made clear that he believed the Serbs were the 
primary aggressors and that a peaceful, multi-ethnic state could only be achieved if the Serbs 
lost the will to fight (Ullman 1996).   
Upon taking office, however, Clinton did not launch air strikes against aggressive 
forces in Bosnia.  Instead, he called for tighter sanctions and enforcement of the ban on 
military flights in Bosnian airspace.  Contradicting his campaign stance of backing a multi-
ethnic state, Clinton expressed hope that the Vance-Owen plan – which called for the 
division of Bosnia into ten ethnically-distinct, autonomous provinces – would resolve the 
conflict.22  But Clinton also put forward his campaign pledge to the Europeans of air strikes 
coupled with lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.  Like the Bush 
administration, Clinton believed that the Bosnian crisis was primarily within the purview of 
the EC and CSCE.  Consequently, he sought European support for air strikes and the lifting 
of the arms embargo, which would be dubbed, “lift and strike.”   
Secretary of State Warren Christopher was sent to Europe in May 1993 to sell the lift 
and strike policy to the U.S.’s NATO allies.  However, these efforts proved unsuccessful 
because of the Europeans’ fears of Serb reprisals against their troops serving as part of the 
                                                 
22 Clinton would later withdraw his support for the Vance-Owen plan, leading (in part) to its failure.  See, for 
example, Boutros-Ghali (1999) and Sobel (2001).   
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UNPROFOR in response to air strikes.  Moreover, the Clinton administration refused to 
consider sending U.S. ground forces to Bosnia, which hurt the White House’s position in the 
eyes of the Europeans – Clinton was willing to expose European troops to Serb acts of 
vengeance by conducting air strikes, but was unwilling to place U.S. troops in such a 
situation.  Because Clinton was unwilling to initiate air strikes unilaterally (Clinton 1995, 
182), U.S. efforts to implement the lift and strike policy faded.   
While Christopher’s requests for forceful action fell on deaf ears in the capitals of 
Europe, the U.S. and its NATO allies dropped humanitarian supplies in besieged Muslim 
communities in Bosnia and began patrolling the UN no-fly zone (Grimmett 1999).  But 
negotiations among the warring parties stagnated and the Serb sieges of UN safe havens 
continued.  In addition, Bosnian Croats and Muslims began fighting in areas not controlled 
by the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs assaulted UN personnel seeking to deliver humanitarian 
aid (Kissinger 1996).  Europe began to pressure the United States to take the lead in 
restarting negotiations and Congress set in motion a series of non-binding resolutions 
declaring its support of the Bosnian Muslims (Drew 1995; Zimmerman 1996).  As the 
Clinton presidency passed the one year mark, no real progress toward securing Clinton’s 
foreign policy goals was evident.  Indeed, in February 1994, the Serb siege of Sarajevo 
reached a new nadir with the shelling of a market which killed scores of civilians (Lippman 
1994).   
The Clinton administration threatened to launch air strikes against Serb positions in 
response to the marketplace shelling in Sarajevo (Lippman 1994).  Meanwhile, peace seemed 
possible with a U.S. negotiated agreement cobbling together a Bosnian Croat and Muslim 
federation (U.S. Department of State 1994).  Notably, Serb nationalist and Yugoslav 
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president Slobodan Milosevic endorsed the peace plan, but Bosnian Serb leader Radovan 
Karadzic balked at the agreement.  Consequently, the creation of a Bosnian federation of 
Croats and Muslims had the effect of building a unified counter to Bosnian Serb efforts, but 
did little to bring about peace.  In fact, Bosnian Serbs ignored U.S. and NATO threats and 
continued to storm UN safe havens.  Although U.S. planes patrolling the no-fly zone shot 
down four Serb military aircraft on March 1, 1994 (Grimmett 1999), Bosnian Serb forces 
showed little regard for Clinton’s pledges to take more forceful action if the Serbs failed to 
comply with the international community’s demands.   
Following the Serb shelling of the UN safe haven of Gorazde in early April 1994, 
NATO forces finally delivered on their promises.  On April 12, President Clinton announced 
that U.S. forces had participated in air strikes against Serb positions around Gorazde and 
promised more strikes if the Bosnian Serbs failed to lift the sieges of other safe areas in 
Bosnia (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996; Grimmett 1999).  Ultimately, it would take a sustained 
NATO bombing campaign of Serb positions and installations beginning in August 1994 to 
break the sieges of the Muslim enclaves and bring the Serbs to the bargaining table (Daalder 
1998; Haass 1999).  The Dayton Peace Accords signed by representatives of the three 
warring groups in November 1995 marked the end of the Balkan wars and paved the way for 
a U.S.-led NATO peacekeeping mission (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).    
THE ALTERNATIVES 
Clinton’s inauguration marked a shift in the position of U.S. foreign policy toward the 
crisis in Bosnia, but brought about little immediate change in U.S. action aimed at quelling 
the conflict.  The Clinton administration clearly sided with the Bosnian Muslims, who 
appeared to be suffering the most from the fighting, and plainly criticized the Bosnian Serbs 
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as the aggressors (Ullman 1996).  But the new administration seemed as paralyzed over what 
to do as the Europeans had been; policy meetings concerning the crisis are characterized as 
more like group therapy than policy making (Drew 1995, 150).   
The paralysis of the new administration was due, in part, to the complexity of the 
conflict.  Several factors were unclear to policy makers at the time: the nature of the conflict, 
the U.S.’s interests concerning the Balkan Peninsula, and the effectiveness of forceful action 
on the part of the U.S. in resolving the crisis (Haass 1999: 39).  First, it was unclear whether 
the conflict was a civil war between ethnic groups in Bosnia, or an interstate war involving 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia, both of which had designs on Bosnian 
territory to integrate into ethnically homogenous nation-states (Gompert 1996).  Either way, 
the conflict began to assume the trappings of a humanitarian disaster as Bosnia hemorrhaged 
refugees and the populations of “safe havens” were cut off from food and medical supplies 
(Woodward 1995).  Second, the nature of U.S. interests in the region had yet to be 
established.  Some policy makers and presidential advisors characterized the crisis as an 
unfortunate event with no strategic implications for the U.S. (see e.g., Quinn-Judge 1994; 
Haass 1999), while others believed that the crisis presented the U.S. with an opportunity to 
enforce international norms and stop the spread of violence to other parts of Europe with 
ethnically diverse societies (Haass 1999; Daadler 1998).  Finally, there was no consensus 
with respect to the effectiveness of forceful action to stop the crisis.  Would U.S. military 
activity exacerbate an already fragile humanitarian situation, or would the insertion of 
American troops entangle the U.S. in an inextricable quagmire representing ancient ethnic 
hatreds (Drew 1995)?   
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Clearly, the layers of complexity represented by the Bosnian crisis complicated policy 
making.  Eventually, President Clinton developed and articulated his preferred policy 
objective: he did not simply wish to stop the fighting in Bosnia, but to stop the fighting and 
preserve a viable, multiethnic state there (e.g., Drew 1995; Daalder 1998).  Although Clinton 
advocated U.S.-led NATO air strikes from July 1992 until April 1993, he wavered and 
seemed to withdraw his proposal early in his presidency.  Consequently, a large number of 
possible Crisis responses remained “up in the air” until Clinton ultimately decided to initiate 
the use of force against the Bosnian Serbs in April 1994.   
During the period beginning with his inauguration (January 1993) and the order to 
lead NATO air strikes (April 1994), Clinton considered a number of alternatives  in pursuit 
of this two-pronged foreign policy objective.  Each of these alternatives can be assigned to 
one of the four Crisis response categories.  In terms of Non-force alternatives, the president 
could do nothing.  Doing nothing would eventually lead to peace with the ethnic cleansing 
and partitioning of Bosnia between Croatia and Yugoslavia.  Similarly, the president could 
pursue a negotiated peace between warring parties.  During 1992-1993, the viable peace 
proposals solidified Serb and Croat gains, creating a Muslim state within a patchwork of 
noncontiguous city-states surrounded by Serb or Croat-held territory.23  Alternatively, 
members of Congress as well as prominent White House advisors favored lifting the arms 
embargo on Bosnia – either generally to benefit all warring parties, or selectively in order to 
provide an advantage to the Muslims in defending themselves and possibly reversing 
Bosnian Serb gains (e.g., Broder and McManus 1993; Zimmerman 1996).   
                                                 
23 This was the essence of the failed Vance-Owen plan developed by former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance and British statesman Lord David Owen (see e.g., Daalder 1998; Haass 1999).   
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The Clinton administration also seriously considered at least two alternatives that can 
be characterized as Show of force responses.  The president could send ships and warplanes 
to the Balkans to patrol the waters and skies to deter violations of UN sanctions and the no-
fly designation (e.g., Broder and McManus 1993; Drew 1995).  Similarly, the president could 
send U.S. peacekeeping troops as part of the UNPROFOR mission, or a new mission under 
U.S. command and control, to observe and verify compliance with UN resolutions.   
A more forceful alternative utilizing air power was also contemplated.  An Aerial 
bombardment response entailed either limited air strikes against forces – primarily, Bosnian 
Serb – attacking UN designated safe havens (Economist 1994), or a sustained bombing 
campaign against Bosnian Serb and/or Bosnian Croat forces and installations (Rosegrant and 
Watkins 1996).   
 Finally, a Land force assault alternative remained within the realm of possibility for 
the Clinton administration.  This would have involved inserting U.S. combat forces into 
Bosnia.  Essentially, U.S. forces would act as a “peacemaking” force, engaging any offensive 
forces in Bosnia until peace between the warring parties was established.  Estimates of the 
number of U.S. troops required for a successful peacemaking operation were in the hundreds 
of thousands.24   
The alternatives that the Clinton administration considered in pursuit of creating a 
viable, peaceful, and multiethnic Bosnia can be summarized as follows:  
A. Non-force alternatives 
1) continue current course of action; e.g., diplomatic efforts, negotiations  
2) lift the arms embargo on Bosnia 
                                                 
24 In a CBS interview in January 1993, former Defense Secretary Cheney indicated that it would take hundreds 
of thousands of troops to “pacify that part of Yugoslavia” (quoted in Sobel 2001, 208; see also Perry 1995).   
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B. Show of force alternatives 
3) step-up sanctions/no-fly zone enforcement  
4) send U.S. troops as observers/peacekeepers 
C. Aerial bombardment alternatives 
5) carry out air strikes against parties assaulting safe havens 
D. Land force assault alternatives 
6)  insert U.S. troops to engage aggressive forces   
While an exhaustive set of all possible alternatives available to the president at that 
time was probably much larger than the six items above, this is a good representation of the 
choice set that could have been constructed, given the information available during the crisis.  
It should be obvious that the specific alternatives considered by the Clinton team have 
opposing implications with respect to foreign policy success and risk of troop casualties.  
Moreover, as we move from item number 1 (“continue current course of action”) up to item 
number 6, each alternative promises a greater likelihood of foreign policy success as well as 
a reduction in the minimization of friendly fatalities.  By March 1993, Clinton chose a 
combination of responses dubbed “lift and strike” – lift the arms embargo on the Muslims 
and conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb installations and forces.  Although there is 
evidence that Clinton had arrived at the air strikes component of this policy during the 1992 
presidential campaign (Ullman 1996), it was not until the spring of 1994 that the president 
actually implemented the policy.  In the sections that follow, I discuss the process that lead to 
Clinton’s series of decisions.   
  
129
STAGE 1: THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIMENSION  
Recall that, according to the Poliheuristic account developed in chapter II, the 
president rules out Crisis response choices in the first stage of the decision making process 
which threaten his electoral fortunes.  Given that the public is the arbiter of the president’s 
political fate, public attitudes toward the use of force are intimately linked to the president’s 
decision in the first stage.  The president should reject alternatives that fail to clearly comport 
with public preferences.   
During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton seized upon the Bosnian crisis to call 
into question the Bush administration’s supposed preeminence in foreign policy.  President 
Bush had largely deferred to Europe concerning how to respond to the growing crises in the 
Balkans.  Europe’s efforts seemed timid and futile in the face of Serb aggression, while 
President Bush was publicly reluctant to pledge U.S. military resources to UN-led efforts to 
assuage the crises.  Meanwhile, intense American media coverage of Balkan atrocities 
contributed to a sense of urgency among commentators and public figures (Drew 1995; 
Zimmerman 1996).  These factors opened the way for the Clinton campaign to draw attention 
to the Bush administration’s “failed” Bosnia policy in the service of defeating the incumbent 
in the upcoming election.   
At the end of July 1992, the Clinton campaign announced that, if elected, Clinton 
would carry out air strikes against Serb forces in Bosnia.  However, Clinton would not have 
the capacity to implement his preferred policy until late January of the following year.  The 
Clinton campaign’s advocacy of air strikes seemed to have promoted public interest in such a 
crisis response.  By the time Clinton took office in January 1993, a series of detailed opinion 
polls had been conducted on public preferences toward a variety of Crisis response choices.  
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Clinton would not actually carry out air strikes against Serb positions in Bosnia until April 
1994 – by which time, a useful collection of polls were available (see e.g., Sobel 1998).   
Rather than order air strikes upon his inauguration – as advocated during the 
campaign – President Clinton appealed to the international community to tighten sanctions, 
take action to prevent the spread of the crisis to Macedonia, and enforce the UN flight 
restriction over Bosnian airspace (Drew 1995).  Although NATO pursued these efforts, the 
U.S.’s European allies rejected Clinton’s “lift and strike” policy – in spite of the Serb capture 
of the UN safe haven of Srebrenica in April 1993.   
However, it is not clear that the Europeans’ reluctance to launch air strikes was 
sufficient to prevent Clinton from pursuing this alternative.  To be sure, Clinton’s statements 
throughout this period suggest that the range of acceptable policies that might serve the 
ultimate aim of the Clinton administration – establishing a peaceful, multi-ethnic state in 
Bosnia – was limited by public opinion.  While a significant segment of the American people 
were disgusted by the horrors of the Balkan war, others were reluctant to risk the lives of 
U.S. troops to quell a conflict that seemed as much like a tribal feud as it did a humanitarian 
catastrophe (e.g., Sobel 2001).   
Relative Value and the Balkan Intervention 
Recall that, according to the theoretical framework developed in chapter II, public 
attitudes toward the use of force are driven by the extent to which the public believes that the 
foreign policy objectives of a proposed military operation are worth the costs in terms of 
expected casualties.  The public is willing to tolerate more casualties when the foreign policy 
objectives are deemed worthwhile (Larson 1996).  In other words, the public conducts a 
relative value assessment when considering whether to support or oppose military action in 
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an international crisis.  Opinion polls concerning the Bosnian crisis indicate that the public 
was unsure of whether the foreign policy benefits of a U.S. intervention were worth any U.S. 
troop fatalities.   
Public opinion polls from the period preceding U.S. air strikes in Bosnia are 
suggestive of a sharp ambivalence about U.S. military intervention in the conflict.  A 
majority of respondents consistently supported sending U.S. troops for the purpose of 
distributing humanitarian relief supplies (Sobel 1996).  But American sympathy for the plight 
of Bosnian civilians was not tantamount to interests worthy of entering the conflict as a 
combatant.  For example, a May 1993 Gallup poll showed a narrow split among the public 
concerning the U.S. interests at stake in the Balkans: 49% believed that U.S. national security 
interests were at stake, while 47% did not.  Such polls led the Clinton administration to admit 
that “the American people, seeing no vital interests at stake, would not support the level of 
commitment and casualties that might be required for an intervention to succeed” (Gompert 
1996: 132).   
Another way to assess the extent to which the public believed that the benefits of 
armed intervention in the Balkans were worth the costs is by comparison to previous U.S. 
conflicts.  Some scholars (e.g., Roskin 1974; Vertzberger 1990) argue that decision makers 
and opinion leaders use analogical reasoning to identify appropriate responses to 
international crises.  By the same token, we may expect the public to compare a present crisis 
to previous cases, which may have a profound impact on its willingness to tolerate casualties.  
For example, the public is thought to have compared Vietnam to Korea (Karnow 1983; 
Khong 1987) and the experience of Vietnam continues to have consequences for how a large 
portion of the American public perceives military involvement abroad (Holsti and Rosenau 
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1984; Sobel 2001).25  Similarly, the 1991 Gulf War has had an impact on the public’s 
expectations of casualties as well as the utility of military force to achieve foreign policy 
objectives in subsequent conflicts (Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999).  Whereas Vietnam is the 
archetypal military defeat in the collective conscience of America, the Gulf War evokes a 
model of a near-costless and speedy victory.   
Not surprisingly, during the prelude to U.S. air strikes in Bosnia, public opinion 
pollsters frequently referred to Vietnam and the Gulf War to gauge public expectations 
concerning a use of force in the Balkans.  For example, one prominent question asked by the 
Gallup organization several times during this time was “If the United States were to send 
troops to Bosnia, do you think that situation would end up being more like the Vietnam War 
or more like the Persian Gulf War?”  In January 1993, 41% of respondents believed that U.S. 
involvement in Bosnia would resemble Vietnam, while 47% thought it would be like the 
Gulf War.  By May 1993, the proportion of respondents expecting another Vietnam had risen 
only slightly to 43%, with an increase in those anticipating a Gulf War-like victory also 
rising to 49%.  Similarly, when asked about the comparison between Vietnam and a U.S. 
armed intervention in Bosnia, the public seemed torn.  In May 1993, 48% of respondents 
found the comparison at least somewhat convincing, while 43% did not.  Just before the first 
U.S.-led air strikes were launched in April 1994, this ambivalence persisted; 41% found the 
comparison of Bosnia with Vietnam convincing, while 56% did not.  That the public was of 
two minds about the expected costs and likelihood of success in Bosnia is evident from these 
polls.   
                                                 
25 Indeed, the Bush administration frequently referenced Vietnam when justifying its reluctance to become 
involved in Bosnia (Gompert 1996).   
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The results of poll questions comparing the Bosnian crisis to Vietnam as well as those 
querying the public’s perception of U.S. interests at stake in that conflict are telling.  They 
suggest that the public held contradictory notions about its expectations of costs in terms of 
casualties.  The number of respondents believing that a U.S. intervention in Bosnia would 
resemble a Gulf War-style victory with few casualties consistently outweighed those 
anticipating a Vietnam-like quagmire.  However, the differences between these two groups 
remained narrow during the entire period.   
Public Opinion and the Rejection of Alternatives 
Consistent with the discussion of relative value above, public opinion on the use of 
force in Bosnia was largely ambivalent during the entire crisis.  The figure on page 136 plots 
the intensity of public support and opposition to the use of force in the Bosnian crisis from 
the middle of 1992 until April of 1994, just before air strikes were launched.  Each data point 
represents the average of all polls taken that month concerning public attitudes toward 
forceful action by the U.S. in Bosnia.  By “forceful action,” I mean that the poll question 
queried public preferences toward military force in general, or air strikes and/or sending in 
ground forces, in particular.  To summarize the general movement of public opinion during 
the period, the moving average for support and opposition are included in the figure.  
Throughout the period covered in the figure, the public appears to be torn between support 
and opposition, with a slightly greater tendency toward opposition.  On the one hand, it was 
difficult to turn a blind eye to the horrors of the crisis reported by the media, but on the other 
hand, the public did not seem convinced that military involvement was likely to be effective 
or without risks.  Average monthly opposition to the use of force exceeded 60% during three 
months, while support for the use of force never breached the 60% threshold.   
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Throughout much of the 16-month period from Clinton’s inauguration until NATO 
air strikes were carried out, members of the Clinton administration insisted that forceful 
action was nearly impossible in the face of the opposition of the American people (Rosegrant 
and Watkins 1996).  Although Clinton denied that opinion polls served as a guide to policy 
making, he admitted in 1994 that “I have used polling information to make sure I know 
where the American people are, what they know, what they don’t know” (Sobel 2001, 214).  
Like President Clinton, Secretary of Defense William Perry explicitly acknowledged his 
concern for public opinion with this statement: “[If] we wanted to determine the outcome of 
that war (in Bosnia) … we would have to enter with substantial ground combatant forces.  
We’re not prepared to recommend that.  I don’t believe the American people are prepared to 
accept that” (Sobel 2001, 225).  Secretary of State Warren Christopher – who rarely 
explicitly recognized the role of public opinion in foreign policy formulation – approached 
the problem as an effort to sell a policy to the public: “If we made the recommendation (to 
use force in Bosnia), we would certainly … try very hard to persuade the American people 
… to carry it out” (Sobel 2001, 220).  Throughout this period, the Clinton administration 
seemed to be grappling with a response to the Bosnian crisis.   
But the important point here is that public opinion placed limits on the alternatives 
available throughout the period leading to the Clinton’s administration’s decision to launch 
air strikes.  Recall from chapter II that when both support and opposition are below 60% (i.e., 
ambivalent/indifferent), the president is likely to rule out Crisis response choices laying at the 
extremes of the choice set (i.e., Non-force responses and Land force assault) and should 
ultimately choose between the two intermediate Crisis response categories (i.e., Show of 
force or Aerial bombardment alternatives).  As figure 5.1 shows, public attitudes toward the 
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use of force were predominantly ambivalent – although tending toward opposition during 
three months.  However, the average levels of support and opposition for the entire period are 
38.75% and 50.67%, respectively.  Moreover, the moving averages for support and 
opposition never exceed 60% during the Clinton presidency.  Consequently, Clinton ruled 
out Non-force and Land force assault alternatives in the first stage of the Poliheuristic 
decision making process.   
The Impact of Elites 
Up until now, I have treated the public as an undifferentiated entity, which is segmented only 
with respect to those portions of the public that favor or oppose military involvement in a 
given crisis.  However, a large literature (e.g., Almond 1950; Rosenau 1961; Neumann 1986) 
posits a distinction within the public according to an elite or attentive public versus a mass, 
inattentive public.  While some studies (e.g., Wittkopf 1990) find similar preferences across 
the elite and the mass publics, others find marked differences between these groups 
concerning the overall direction – interventionist versus isolationist – of U.S. foreign policy 
(Rielly 1991; Page and Barabas 2000).  It is worth exploring whether elites had a 
disproportionate impact on President Clinton’s decision to rule out troops and Non-force 
alternatives in the first stage of the decision making process.   
There is some evidence that the Clinton White House felt pressure from elite opinion 
during the Bosnian crisis.  A group of “liberal humanitarians,” embodied by such 
organizations as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, seemed to advocate 
military force to end the crisis in Bosnia (Western 2002; Human Rights Watch 1995).  A 
Human Rights Watch memo calls for the U.S. to engage in active “interference” of Bosnian 
Serb efforts to conquer UN-established safe havens.  Similarly, members of the elite press 
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Figure 5.1. Public Opinion toward the Use of Force in Response to the Bosnian Crisis, July 1992 – April 1994. 
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Note: The data points were computed by taking the monthly average of all polls asking respondents whether they supported or 
opposed any sort of military force by the U.S. in Bosnia.  Average support for the entire period is 38.75%, while Average opposition is 
50.67%.   
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elite press used the editorial pages of, for example, The New York Times and Washington 
Post to implore the Clinton administration to take forceful action in Bosnia (Auerbach 
and Bloch-Elkon 2005).  Another elite group – consisting of members of Congress and 
prominent citizens led by Senator Robert Dole – called for lifting the arms embargo on 
the Bosnian Muslims (Congressional Quarterly 1992; Zimmerman 1996).   
At first blush, it seems difficult to determine whether Clinton’s decision was a 
response to one (or all) of these elite groups or the public in general.  But a closer look at 
the specific policy recommendations of the elites offers some insight into whether 
President Clinton heeded the elites over the masses.  The human rights organizations 
advocated the use of U.S. ground troops to engage Bosnian Serbs in order to protect safe 
havens and stop ethnic cleansing.  Members of the media primarily offered criticism of 
the Clinton administration for backing off of its “lift and strike” position (see e.g., 
Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon 2005).  The group led by Senator Dole sought to allow the 
transfer of arms to the Bosnian Muslims so that they could defend themselves against the 
better-equipped Bosnian Serbs.   
In the end, Clinton was unable to muster sufficient public support for the 
deployment of ground troops, as the humanitarian groups demanded.  Nor was Clinton 
able to secure support – either at home or abroad – for lifting the arms embargo.  
Domestic public opinion was generally tepid toward lifting the arms embargo, while the 
U.S.’s NATO allies along with Russia opposed lifting the ban (Zimmerman 1996).  
However, the advocacy of military intervention espoused by the elite press seems largely 
consistent with the aggregate preferences of the mass public.  Editorials frequently called 
for action but not at great risk to U.S. service members’ lives (e.g., Lewis 1993; 
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Rosenthal 1994; Safire 1994) – specifically, calls to carry out the threat of air strikes.  
Although the opinions of elite members of the media and the mass public were largely 
congruent throughout the Bosnian crisis, I cannot conclude that the preferences of 
journalists had a disproportionate influence on actual policy.   
Although Clinton was cognizant of the range of alternatives the public would 
accept, he did not arrive at an ultimate decision until April 1994.  Prior to initiating air 
strikes, Clinton wavered between calling for Show of force (i.e., enforcement of the UN 
no-fly zone, insertion of peacekeepers) and Aerial bombardment (i.e., lift and strike) 
responses during negotiations with NATO allies for the balance of the period leading to 
air strikes in April 1994.  However, he kept a close eye on public opinion during these 
months to insure that he did not overstep his bounds.  In the sections that follow, I discuss 
the president’s calculus concerning military and international-strategic factors.   
STAGE 2: MILITARY AND INTERNATIONAL-STRATEGIC FACTORS 
In the second stage of the decision making process, the Clinton administration 
weighed the implications of the remaining alternatives on the military and international-
strategic dimensions.  The surviving alternatives were evaluated in the second stage 
according to their ability to maximize benefits (minimize costs) simultaneously with 
respect to military and strategic factors.   
Military Dimension 
On the military dimension, the president compared the implications of the 
remaining alternatives – no-fly zone enforcement, sending in U.S. peacekeepers, and air 
strikes – for such military considerations as capabilities, logistics, and the likelihood of 
success.  Although the Bosnian Serbs had significant forces relative to the Bosnian 
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Muslims and Croats, their military capabilities would not be sufficient to substantially 
frustrate the U.S.’s pursuit of these alternatives (Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2002).  
Logistical concerns were also of little consequence; the U.S. would be able to pursue the 
surviving alternatives with relative ease given the presence of aircraft carriers in the 
Adriatic and Mediterranean as well as land-based assets in Italy and Turkey (Grimmett 
1999).  In the Bosnian crisis, the likelihood of success became a salient factor.   
The likelihood of success on the military dimension was defined as establishing 
the conditions necessary to turn Bosnia into a peaceful, multi-ethnic state.  The Clinton 
administration saw these conditions as the halt in Serb aggression (Broder and McManus 
1993; Economist 1994; Johnson, Mueller and Taft 2002).  Obviously, peace is not 
satisfied in the presence of war, but the fighting also continued to be accompanied by 
ethnic cleansing.  The successful Serb siege of each Muslim enclave was typically 
followed by the expulsion and/or massacre of the local population (Gompert 1996).  As 
long as ethnic cleansing continued, the task of preserving Bosnia’s multi-ethnic character 
would become nearly impossible.   
None of the alternatives surviving the first stage of the decision making process 
held much promise of bringing about the conditions necessary to turn Bosnia into a 
peaceful, multi-ethnic state.  Enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia would deny 
Serb forces air support as well as the transfer of troops and material via aircraft.  But like 
a naval blockade, the success of this coercive measure depends largely on the target’s 
ability to cope with the action (see e.g., George, Hall and Simons 1971).  If the Bosnian 
Serbs could sustain their sieges without air support or air deliveries of reinforcements and 
supplies, denial of Bosnian air space would do little to stop Serb aggression.   
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The contribution of U.S. troops to peacekeeping operations was also unlikely to 
satisfy the military objectives.  If there is no peace to keep, peacekeepers under 
UNPROFOR rules of engagement (ROE) serve as little more than observers.  Permitted 
only to act in self defense, UNPROFOR peacekeepers were not authorized to interfere in 
the activities of warring parties, nor were they able to engage any group observed 
committing unlawful acts (Berkowitz 1994).  The Bosnian Serbs had already proved that 
international observation alone would not deter their efforts.  Consequently, a U.S. 
contribution to UNPROFOR appears unlikely to have yielded the desired result.   
Although air strikes would have a more direct impact on Serb military assets on 
the ground, the success of this alternative would depend on two key variables.  The first 
variable is the strategy of the military conducting air strikes.  The U.S. could seek to 
“punish” the Serbs by targeting civilian populations and economic centers, or the U.S. 
could pursue a “denial” strategy in which air strikes would target deployed forces and 
military installations (Pape 1996).  The second variable concerns the extent to which the 
target is susceptible to a bombing campaign.  Air strikes intended to “punish” assume that 
the target’s political leaders are unwilling to countenance civilian losses and/or that 
attacks on economic centers would damage the ability of the target to sustain operations 
(Pape 1996).  On the other hand, a “denial” strategy tends to assume that target forces are 
“conventional” in terms of tactics and organization.  The success of denial strategy is 
largely contingent on whether target forces are concentrated along a frontline, while 
supported by identifiable command and support centers in the rear (e.g., Pape 1996; 
Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999; Horowitz and Reiter 2001).   
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A punishment strategy was never seriously considered by the Clinton 
administration.  Although the U.S. had carried out such campaigns during World War II, 
bombing population and economic centers inside Serb-held Bosnian territory would have 
been directly counter to one of the prominent aims of U.S. policy – preserving the lives of 
innocents (e.g., Perry 1995).  However, air strikes intended to deny the Bosnian Serb 
leadership the use of its military assets was contemplated (Beal 1997).  However, these 
efforts would be complicated by the tactics and organization of the Bosnian Serb military 
structure.  There was no conventional frontline in Bosnia; Bosnian Serb forces held 70% 
of the territory and much of the Muslim-held territory was encircled.  Consequently, 
Bosnian Serb forces were diffused throughout most of Bosnia and frequently resembled 
small groups of armed bandits rather than recognizable, professional military units 
(Mueller 2004).  Moreover, military installations throughout the former Yugoslavia tend 
to be small and located either under ground or within population centers.   
In spite of the difficulties of targeting Bosnian Serb forces, the air strikes 
alternative appears to have maximized net benefits on the military dimension.  Carrying 
out air strikes promised a greater likelihood of halting Serb aggression than no-fly zone 
enforcement or the insertion of U.S. peacekeepers.  U.S. participation in no-fly zone 
enforcement would have done much to deny the Bosnian Serbs use of the airspace over 
Bosnia.  But patrols by U.S. warplanes would have done little to stop the ground 
offensive and sieges of Muslim safe havens encircled by Bosnian Serb forces.  Sending 
U.S. troops as part of a peacekeeping mission would have done practically nothing to 
contribute to peace in Bosnia.  Although these forces on the ground would have gained 
the capacity to report on atrocities, they would have lacked the authority to intervene.  
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But air strikes offered some hope of creating peaceful conditions in Bosnia.  At a 
minimum, air strikes would effectively provide close air support for Muslim and Croat 
ground forces repelling Serb advances (Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999; Johnson, Mueller 
and Taft 2002).  At a maximum, an aerial bombardment would break the Serbs’ will 
and/or ability to continue fighting (see e.g., Pape 1996).  Thus, the air strikes alternative 
appears to have been the best alternative according to the military dimension.   
International-Strategic Dimension 
On the international-strategic dimension, the Clinton administration weighed the 
implications of the remaining alternatives for such factors as the global balance of power 
and grand strategy.  With the end of the Cold War and collapse of Soviet-dominated 
World Communism, the U.S. became the undisputed, lone superpower.  Consequently, 
the maintenance or improvement of the U.S.’s global power position was not seriously 
considered.  But throughout the 1990s, the U.S. began to pursue a grand strategy 
“democratic enlargement” – the promotion of democracy around the world (see e.g., 
Posen and Ross 1996; Brinkley 1997).  The Clinton administration, in particular, 
subscribed to the proposition that the larger the community of democratic nations, “the 
safer and more prosperous Americans will be, since democracies are demonstrably more 
likely to maintain their international commitments, less likely to engage in terrorism or 
wreak environmental damage, and less likely to make war on each other” (Talbott 1996).  
Another important aim of U.S. grand strategy was the maintenance of strategic alliances 
such as NATO (Art 1998; Haley 2004).  President Clinton believed that NATO should 
“remain an anchor for European and Atlantic stability” – especially with the advent of a 
new wave of European and former Soviet democracies (Lake 1993).   
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The remaining alternatives were gauged according to the extent to which they 
served or threatened the international-strategic goals of democratic enlargement and the 
maintenance of NATO.  With respect to promoting democracy, there were no easy 
choices in the Bosnian crisis.  Any of the ethnic leaders the Clinton administration could 
choose to support were fervent nationalists with fascistic tendencies (Zimmerman 1996; 
Gompert 1996).  However, the worst alternative appeared to be the Bosnian Serb 
leadership in Pale and Belgrade, who were clearly out of step with international 
community of democratic nations.  An alternative that had the best chance of preventing 
a Serb-dominated Bosnia would also serve the grand strategy of democratic enlargement.  
Because air strikes would likely be more successful than no-fly zone enforcement or the 
insertion of peacekeepers in reversing Bosnian Serb gains, an aerial bombardment 
alternative seemed to have the highest score with respect to promoting enlargement of the 
democratic community.   
Concerning the maintenance of NATO, the U.S.’s NATO allies were initially 
opposed to air strikes (Drew 1995).  They feared that NATO air strikes would lead to 
Bosnian Serb reprisals against their UNPROFOR troops on the ground in Bosnia.  
Instead, NATO issued a series of threats to carry out air strikes, but subsequently backed 
down in the face of additional Serb atrocities (Rosegrant and Watkins 1996).  The 
paralysis of the Atlantic alliance to carry out decisive action threatened their international 
prestige and endangered future efforts to signal their resolve.  By early 1994, it was 
becoming clear that NATO must make good on its threats or become an irrelevant 
alliance (Economist 1994).  Thus, by preserving the relevancy and respect of the NATO 
alliance, air strikes would serve to maintain the alliance as a force for stability in Europe.   
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Air strikes, rather than a continuation of no-fly zone enforcement or the insertion 
of peacekeepers, maximized net benefits on the international-strategic dimension.  
Because air strikes against Serb positions had some promise of ultimately degrading the 
influence of fervent Serb nationalism in a Bosnian government, this alternative would 
better serve the Clinton administration’s grand strategy of democratic enlargement.  Air 
strikes also had the best hope of preserving the NATO alliance.  Bosnian Serb defiance of 
NATO threats during the period from March 1993 until April 1994 endangered the 
alliance’s relevance and prestige.  Forceful action would be required to reverse the 
damage to the alliance credibility.   
In summary, the Poliheuristic analysis of Clinton’s decision to launch U.S.-led 
NATO air strikes suggests that a number of alternatives failing to satisfy the public 
opinion prerequisite were rejected in the first stage of the decision making process.  The 
public was largely ambivalent throughout the crisis period about using force in the 
Balkans.  While a significant segment believed that greater involvement to rectify the 
growing humanitarian crisis was necessary, a comparable proportion of Americans 
seemed to suggest that the benefits simply failed to outweigh the costs of risking U.S. 
troops’ lives.  In accordance with this public ambivalence, the Clinton administration 
ruled out Non-force alternatives as well as Land force assault alternatives in the first 
stage of the decision making process.  This left three alternatives: enforcement of the UN 
no-fly zone, insertion of U.S. peacekeepers, and air strikes against Serb positions and 
installations in Bosnia.  These surviving alternatives were compared based on their ability 
to maximize net benefits on the military and international-strategic dimensions.  In the 
end, the air strikes alternative had the best chance of reversing Serb gains and 
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establishing a peaceful, multi-ethnic state in Bosnia.  Additionally, that alternative – if 
successful – was believed to be an adequate way to promote international democracy and 
buttress NATO’s credibility as a force for stability in Europe and the Atlantic.   
WAS THE DECISION COMPENSATORY? 
Before we can conclude that Clinton’s decision to launch air strikes against Serb 
positions in Bosnia was driven by a Poliheuristic process, we must assess whether the 
decision was actually compensatory.  According to the Poliheuristic account of 
presidential crisis response I develop in chapter II, the president follows a 
noncompensatory strategy of decision making, ruling out alternatives in the first stage 
that fail to clearly satisfy public opinion without regard for how well these alternatives 
perform on other dimensions.  Compensatory models include expected utility theory 
(e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; 1984) and the cybernetic theory (e.g., Steinbruner, 1974; 
Ostrom and Job, 1986).  These models differ from one another in their assumptions of 
information processing.  The expected utility approach asserts that decision makers 
choose from an exhaustive set of choices the alternative that is expected to yield the 
“largest net gain (expected utility)” (Bueno de Mesquita, 1984: 228).  Cybernetic theory 
emphasizes the constraints placed on leaders’ processing capabilities and suggests that 
they engage in a limited information search and respond to conditions within different 
decision environments, choosing the alternative that “satisfices” certain criteria across 
these environments (Ostrom and Job, 1986).  However, according to both approaches, a 
low score for an alternative on one dimension can be compensated by a high score on 
another (Mintz, 1993).   
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In contrast to these compensatory models, the Poliheuristic Theory argues that a 
key dimension is noncompensatory – regardless of how well an alternative maximizes net 
benefits on less important dimensions, it cannot compensate for a low score on the key 
dimension.  For President Clinton during the Bosnian crisis, I contend that the domestic 
political dimension was noncompensatory.  Public opinion toward military involvement 
dominated the domestic political dimension.  An alternative’s performance with respect 
to military and international-strategic factors could not compensate for a poor showing 
among the public.   
During the Bosnian crisis, public opinion toward military involvement in the 
Balkans indicated that the American public saw the need to do something forceful about 
the crisis, but not at the expense of U.S. service members’ lives.  Any alternative that 
failed to address these twin concerns may have endangered Clinton’s electoral fortunes in 
the upcoming presidential race.  Consequently, on this dimension, the alternatives can be 
ranked according to how well each choice optimizes between minimizing potential U.S. 
casualties, while maximizing success – where success is defined in terms of establishing 
peace in Bosnia.  It should be clear by now that air strikes is the optimal choice given the 
constraints of public opinion.  Because the Bosnian Serbs were thought to be responsible 
for the fighting, U.S. air power had the capacity to contribute to peace by degrading Serb 
forces and installations (Daalder 1998).  Moreover, air strikes could be conducted with 
minimal risk to U.S. combat troops (Horowitz and Reiter 2001).  The remaining 
alternatives sacrifice either the safety of troops or the likelihood of success.  For example, 
the insertion of ground troops to engage Bosnian Serb forces – though likely to break the 
will of the aggressor – would have placed a potentially large number of U.S. service 
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members directly in harm’s way.  On the other hand, such alternatives as sending 
peacekeepers or enforcing the no-fly zone promised a reduced risk to U.S. troops, but 
held less promise in terms of establishing peace.  Similarly, Non-force alternatives 
carried no risk to U.S. troops, but also promised little in the way of success in resolving 
the Bosnian crisis.   
On the military dimension, operational success is paramount.  As discussed 
above, the military objectives – establishing peace – served the foreign policy aim of 
creating a peaceful, multi-ethnic state in Bosnia.  The alternatives can be ranked 
according to how well each choice was likely to successfully create the conditions under 
which peace could be established.  Clearly, the deployment of U.S. combat troops into 
Bosnia to engage aggressive forces would have had the greatest promise of success.  
Soon after the U.S. cobbled together a federation between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, 
the U.S. could have inserted a large number of ground troops into Bosnia via Croatia, 
enabling the deployment of armor and cavalry units.  Such a deployment would likely 
have proved to be overwhelming to the scattered Bosnian Serb forces harassing Muslim 
enclaves.  The next-best alternative in terms of operational success was the air strikes 
option.  Air strikes promised to contribute to peace by degrading Bosnian Serb forces 
and/or serving as close air support for Bosnian Croat-Muslim defenders (Johnson, 
Mueller and Taft 2002).  The capitulation of Bosnian Serb forces was both necessary and 
sufficient for peace in Bosnia.   
Following the air strikes alternative, both of the Show of force alternatives – no-
fly zone enforcement and deployment of U.S. peacekeepers – held the potential next-to-
the worst potential for contributing to peace.  At a maximum, these Show of force options 
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would have been useful for denying Bosnian Serbs the use of air space (in the case of no-
fly zone enforcement) or deterring further Bosnian Serb attacks on Muslim enclaves (in 
the case of deployment of U.S. peacekeepers).  But as I discuss above, denial of air space 
was unlikely to place the Bosnian Serbs at a relative disadvantage, as they would 
continue to be able to move troops and equipment overland.  Similarly, given the Bosnian 
Serbs’ history of disregard for international peacekeepers (Daalder 1998), the insertion of 
U.S. peacekeepers operating under rules of engagement restricting their behavior to 
observation would have done little to evoke desired behavior.  Finally, the least effective 
set of alternatives involved Non-force responses.  The Clinton administration had already 
experienced a number of disappointments in the performance of negotiations and 
economic sanctions.  Lifting the arms embargo – an alternative initially favored by 
Clinton and promoted by Congress – also offered little hope in the way of resolving the 
conflict.  A renewed flow of arms could potentially be intercepted by Bosnian Serb 
forces, or simply embolden the Muslims to keep fighting (Drew 1995). 
On the international-strategic dimension, a decision maker using a compensatory 
decision making strategy would have ranked the alternatives according to their ability to 
maximize the goals of promoting democracy and maintaining the credibility of NATO.  
Again, the Land force assault alternative had the best chance of maximizing these factors 
on the international-strategic dimension.  As I discuss above, U.S. combat troops could 
have promoted democracy through the support of the least autocratic faction in the war – 
the Bosnian Muslims – by actively interfering with Bosnian Serb aggression.  Also, the 
insertion of combat troops would have served the aim of shoring-up NATO’s credibility 
by fulfilling its series of threats.   
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The balance of alternatives simply would not have been as effective in 
immediately serving the international-strategic goals of the Clinton administration.  
Although air strikes would have (and, eventually, did) proved to be effective in degrading 
Bosnian Serb forces, the aerial bombardment option left much to chance in terms of 
U.S./NATO control over the outcome of the conflict, jeopardizing the goal of promoting 
democracy.  Relative to a Land force assault, air strikes also signaled reluctance and 
timidity on the part of the NATO alliance relative to an overwhelming land force 
operation.  The very nature of high-technological warfare by which damage is inflicted 
without sinking costs (i.e., ground troops, heavy equipment, and logistical infrastructure) 
into the conflict can be easily interpreted as a lack of willingness to commit to the 
outcome (Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999).   
The Show of force and Non-force alternatives also failed to serve the 
international-strategic goals of the Clinton administration.  Because they failed to provide 
sufficient support for the least-autocratic warring party – the Bosnian Muslims – none of 
these alternatives would have promoted the creation of a democratic Bosnia.  Moreover, 
as piecemeal and largely ineffectual measures, the Show of force and Non-force 
alternatives supported the growing characterization of the NATO alliance as a paper tiger 
(Economist 1994).   
Table 5.1 summarizes the scores of the alternatives on each dimension.  The 
scores range from a minimum of “1” to a maximum of “6” – though, because some of the 
alternatives essentially tie with others, the actual minimum is 2.  Higher scores on a 
dimension indicate that an alternative is relatively better able to satisfy that dimension’s 
criteria.  On the domestic political dimension, the alternatives are scored from highest to 
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lowest according to their expected ability to optimize between minimizing U.S. troop 
casualties and maximizing the expectation of stopping the fighting in Bosnia.  On the 
military dimension, they are ranked according to their ability to successfully achieve the 
military objectives – stopping the fighting.  On the international-strategic dimension, the 
alternatives are scored according to their ability to promote democracy as well as 
maintain the NATO alliance.  The fifth column of Table 5.1 shows the total scores for 
each alternative.   
Clearly, Clinton’s decision was not compensatory.  The Land force assault alternative 
was expected to bode well for U.S. international-strategic interests as well as yield high 
net benefits on the military dimension.  But the combat troop option was rejected because 
of its inability to satisfy the domestic political imperative of minimizing U.S. troop 
casualties.  Indeed, when the scores are summed across dimensions in accordance with 
expected utility or cybernetic theory, this option received a higher total score than the air 
strikes alternative.  Had Clinton used another type of compensatory decision making 
strategy such as “majority of confirming dimensions” (MCD), in which the alternative 
that receives the highest score on the most dimensions is selected, (e.g., Russo and 
Dosher, 1983; Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993: 27), the table suggests that the combat 
troops alternative was again the most desirable considered.  Although the compensatory 
models may have pointed to the implementation of a Land force assault option, this 
alternative’s high scores on the military and international-strategic dimensions were 
unable to compensate for a low score on the domestic political dimension.   
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Table 5.1. The Bosnian Crisis: Scores of Alternatives on the Relevant Dimensions. 
 
Alternatives 
 
Dimensions 
 
 
 Domestic Political Military 
International-
Strategic Total 
Non-force 
alternatives     
Continue current 
course of action 3 2 2 7 
Lift arms 
embargo 4 3 3 10 
Show of Force     
Enforce No-fly 
zone  5 4 4 13 
Send U.S. 
peacekeepers  5 4 4 13 
Aerial 
bombardment     
Launch air 
strikes against 
Bosnian Serbs 
6 5 5 16 
Land force 
assault      
Insert U.S. 
combat troops 5 6 6 17 
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CONCLUSION  
This chapter has examined the process by which President Clinton arrived at the 
decision to launch air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces in 1994.  In the first stage of the 
Poliheuristic procedure, Clinton ruled out the use of combat ground troops to quell the 
Bosnian Serb sieges of UN-established safe havens.  He also ruled out Non-force 
alternatives, which had evoked nothing more than Bosnian Serb defiance.  Public opinion 
toward military involvement during the Bosnian crisis indicates that the public – in the 
aggregate – favored a response that would break the sieges of Muslim enclaves without 
placing an undue risk on the lives of U.S. troops involved in the operation.  By ruling out 
Land force assault and Non-force alternatives, President Clinton eliminated the 
alternatives that appeared to clearly flout the preferences of the public.  In the second 
stage of the decision making process, the president chose a final response among the 
remaining alternatives on the basis of its ability to maximize expected benefits on the 
military and international-strategic dimensions.  On the military dimension, the air strikes 
option received the highest “score” because it was able to promise a greater likelihood of 
operational success than Show of force alternatives.  On the international-strategic 
dimension, the air strikes alternative held a greater potential to simultaneously promote 
democracy in the region as well as enhance the credibility of the beleaguered NATO 
alliance.   
President Clinton’s decision was not compensatory.  Despite the ability of the 
combat troop option to better serve the interest of peace in the region, the president was 
unwilling to pursue an alternative that ran counter to the wishes of the public.  Thus, the 
high “score” of the combat troop option on the military and international-strategic 
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dimensions could not compensate for its low “score” on the more important domestic 
political dimension.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
BUSH’S DECISION TO LAUNCH A LIMITED INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, 
2001 
On October 7, 2001, U.S. forces – in cooperation with coalition partners and a 
combination of Northern Afghan forces – launched a limited invasion of Afghanistan to 
topple the Taliban government and destroy al Qaeda elements headquartered there.  The 
operation was the ultimate response to the terrorist attacks on New York City and 
Washington, DC on September 11, which claimed the lives of thousands of civilians.  
The American people were thought to be grief-stricken and vengeful, supporting a strong 
military retaliation (e.g., Milbank and Morin 2001; Lake 2002; Traugott et al. 2002).  But 
rather than pursue a “brute-force” war fighting strategy (as the U.S. had done in every 
major war fought in the twentieth century), or an exclusive air power operation (as the 
U.S. had increasingly pursued since the mid-1980s); President Bush approved an 
alternative characterized by finesse and innovation (see e.g., Conetta 2002; O’Hanlon 
2002).  The ensuing action involved a mixture of air strikes, special operations missions, 
and light infantry maneuvers designed to target Taliban and al Qaeda forces only in a 
country with a political landscape as diverse and formidable as its topography (Neuman, 
Block and Whalen 2001).   
This chapter analyzes President George W. Bush’s decision to launch Operation 
Enduring Freedom in the wake of the terrorist attacks.  First, I briefly discuss the event 
leading to the action – the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in Washington, DC and 
New York City.  Then, I identify the alternatives considered by the Bush administration 
in the wake of the attacks.  Next, I apply the Poliheuristic account developed in chapter II 
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to the president’s decision.  I find that, in the first stage of the decision making process, 
the president ruled out Non-force alternatives, which were clearly incommensurate the 
public’s preferences after the terror attacks.  In the second stage, the president maximized 
net benefits across the military and international-strategic dimensions, choosing an 
alternative – a limited invasion of Afghanistan – that would overcome logistical 
difficulties and regional political realities.  After analyzing the decision in terms of the 
two-stage Poliheuristic process, I discuss whether the decision was compensatory.  I 
assess whether the alternative pursued by the president was actually the result of process 
by which the he sought to yield the highest possible net gain across all dimensions.   
9/11 AND AFGHANISTAN 
Between 8:48 a.m. and 10:10 a.m., three hijacked commercial jetliners struck the 
World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC.  Another 
hijacked jet went down in Pennsylvania, killing all aboard.  Almost immediately, Osama 
bin Laden’s al Qaeda network was identified as the culprit.26  President Bush announced 
later in the day that the United States was at war and would “make no distinction between 
the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them” (Bumiller and 
Sanger 2001).   
The White House’s verbal reaction to the 9/11 attacks signaled a departure from 
previous policies toward terror attacks.  This was not the first act of terrorism carried out 
or supported by bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization.  For example, Al Qaeda participated 
in attacks against U.S. troops in Aden and Somalia in 1992-93, had links to the Manila air 
plot of 1994-95, carried out bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, and 
                                                 
26 Newspapers published anonymous admissions by intelligence officials that the administration believed 
that al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks on September 12, 2001 (e.g., Bumiller and Sanger 2001).   
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deployed a “boat-bomb” in 2000 against the USS Cole in Yemen (National Commission 
2004).  But of these, only the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa provoked 
a visible military response.   
A military response to the terrorist attacks, however, was not the favored 
alternative of the entire Bush administration.  Following a National Security Council 
meeting at Camp David on September 15, President Bush called on the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan to hand over bin Laden and other al Qaeda members (Purdum 
2001).  Secretary of State Colin Powell reached out to Taliban benefactors Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia to put diplomatic pressure on Afghanistan to comply with U.S. demands.  
CIA chief George Tenet was authorized to begin funneling money to tribal leaders in 
northern Afghanistan – the Northern Alliance – to seek and destroy al Qaeda members 
and their camps (Woodward 2002).  But the Taliban rebuffed the overtures of Pakistani 
and Saudi delegations.  Taliban forces also successfully repulsed Northern Alliance 
attacks aimed at al Qaeda installations (Warshaw 2003).   
As the Bush administration’s diplomatic and covert efforts appeared increasingly 
unlikely to succeed, Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began working to 
secure agreements with other states in and near Central Asia for overflight rights and use 
of U.S. military bases for launching offensive operations against Afghanistan.  By the end 
of September, President Bush had decided to launch a “novel kind of war” against the 
Taliban and al Qaeda (Sanger and Bumiller 2001).  A final ultimatum to turn over bin 
Laden and other al Qaeda members was issued to the Taliban on September 20 (Hundley 
2001).  Seventy-two hours later, the Taliban refused and U.S. forces were built up in the 
region (Cushman 2001).   
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THE ALTERNATIVES 
Following September 11, 2001, the Bush administration vowed to punish the 
perpetrators of the terrorist attacks.  This would become Bush’s foreign policy goal in the 
crisis.  However, the administration was not of one mind on how to respond.  Even after 
al Qaeda – headquartered in the Taliban’s Afghanistan – was linked to the attacks, 
members of the Bush administration advocated a range of disparate policy responses.  
The primary difference of opinion concerned the choice of targets – should the U.S. 
target state sponsors of terror organizations or selectively target the terror organizations 
themselves?  Targeting terror organizations only would require the cooperation of the 
states harboring terrorists, while going after the states would permit the U.S. a relatively 
free hand in seeking out terrorists within sovereign territory.  Moreover, attaining the 
cooperation of states meant that U.S. operations would take on an appearance of law 
enforcement, rather than forceful military action.   
At the National Security Council meeting at Camp David on September 15, Bush 
considered a number of alternatives thought to serve his objective of punishing the 
terrorists responsible for the attacks.  Each of these alternatives can be assigned to one of 
the four Crisis response categories.  In terms of Non-force alternatives, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell suggested negotiations with the regime of Afghanistan, as well as its 
neighbors and benefactors, to persuade the Taliban to hand over members of al Qaeda 
(Mufson 2001).  Because the Taliban was not directly responsible for the attacks on U.S. 
soil, negotiating with the Taliban would not contradict the president’s stated foreign 
policy goal.  Alternatively, CIA director George Tenet argued in favor of arming tribal 
militant groups in northern Afghanistan that would destroy al Qaeda camps (Woodward 
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2002: 75-79).  Arming the Afghan opposition had proved successful against the Soviets 
during the final decade of the Cold War (Daalder and Lindsay 2001).   
Show of force alternatives were never seriously considered in the crisis with 
Afghanistan.  As I discuss below, Afghanistan is a land-locked country with mountainous 
terrain.  It is bordered primarily by states – Iran and Pakistan – that would be reluctant to 
allow U.S. forces on their soil (O’Hanlon 2002).  These factors would make a Show of 
force operation unrealistic.  Consequently, alternatives that included the massing or 
mobilization of U.S. forces on or near Afghanistan’s borders simply were not brought to 
light in discussions of the National Security Council.   
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton noted the availability 
of two Aerial bombardment responses.  The first proposal was to send in cruise missiles 
and destroy suspected al Qaeda camps.  This cruise missile strike would be a replay of 
the 1998 strikes ordered by Clinton following the al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. embassies 
in east Africa.  Option two included manned bombers with the cruise missile strikes to 
conduct a sustained air campaign against terrorist camps as well as Taliban forces and 
infrastructure (Woodward 2002).   
In terms of Land force assault alternatives, General Shelton and Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld pointed out more ambitious military responses, which included the use 
of ground forces (Woodward 2002).  There were two possible plans falling within this 
category.  The first was a blitzkrieg-style campaign coupling air power with heavy armor 
and infantry forces on the ground.  Such a full-scale assault had been previously 
employed by U.S. commanders in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War 
(O’Hanlon 2002).  The other Land force assault alternative called for a limited insertion 
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of light infantry forces to work in concert with the Afghan Northern Alliance (O’Hanlon 
2002; Conetta 2002).  This ground operation would be just large enough to compel the 
concentration of Taliban and al Qaeda forces, making them suitable targets for bombing 
sorties (see e.g., Daalder and O’Hanlon 1999; Conetta 2002).   
The alternatives that the Bush administration considered in pursuit of punishing 
the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks can be summarized as follows:  
A. Non-force alternatives 
1) negotiate the extradition of al Qaeda members 
2) arm the Northern Alliance  
B. Aerial bombardment alternatives 
3) carry out a limited cruise missile strike 
4) carry out a bombing campaign  
C. Land force assault alternatives 
5) insert light infantry units 
6) invade Afghanistan with heavy armor and infantry forces    
Like Clinton’s decision to launch air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs (chapter 
V), it is clear that the specific alternatives considered by the Bush administration have 
opposing implications with respect to foreign policy success and risk of troop casualties.  
As we move from item number 1 (“negotiate the extradition of al Qaeda members”) up to 
item number 6, each alternative promises a greater likelihood of foreign policy success as 
well as a reduction in the minimization of friendly fatalities.  By the end of September, 
President Bush had made his decision (Sanger and Bumiller 2001) – a light infantry force 
would be inserted into Afghan territory to act as a “fulcrum” for the “lever” of air power 
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(Conetta 2002: 17-18).   
STAGE 1: THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIMENSION  
According to the Poliheuristic account developed in chapter II, the president rules 
out Crisis response choices in the first stage of the decision making process which 
threaten his electoral fortunes.  Because the president’s electoral fate is inextricably 
rooted in the public’s evaluation of his performance, the president should reject 
alternatives that fail to clearly comport with public preferences.   
Twenty-six days elapsed between the terror attacks on the U.S. and the start of 
military operations against Afghanistan.  During that time, a host of public opinion polls 
were conducted, gauging Americans’ reactions.  Public attitudes toward military force 
against Afghanistan revealed two central features during that time.  First, the public 
expected a long and costly conflict with many U.S. battle deaths.  Second, the public 
seemed to clearly support a forceful response in spite of the expected costs.  In other 
words, the public believed that the foreign policy objectives outweighed the costs of 
military involvement.  The Bush administration ruled out Non-force responses and did 
not seriously consider Show of force responses as a result of public opinion.  Thus, only 
the forceful Crisis response choices survived the first state of the decision making 
process.   
Relative Value and the Use of Force against Afghanistan 
According to the theoretical framework developed in chapter II, public attitudes 
toward the use of force are driven by the extent to which the public believes that the 
foreign policy objectives of a proposed military operation are worth the costs in terms of 
expected casualties.  The public is willing to tolerate more casualties when the foreign 
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policy objectives are deemed worthwhile (Larson 1996).  In other words, the public 
conducts a relative value assessment when considering whether to support or oppose 
military action in an international crisis.  Opinion polls following 9/11 indicate that the 
public believed the foreign policy benefits of a U.S. attack on Afghanistan were worth a 
good deal of sacrifice in terms of U.S. troop fatalities.   
The attacks in New York City and Washington, DC had a profound impact on 
Americans’ sense of security.  Previous terrorist attacks in the U.S. or against its citizens 
abroad were typically viewed as isolated incidents perpetrated by a few fanatics.  In 
contrast, the events of 9/11 were seen by the public as a national trauma committed by a 
sophisticated, transnational organization (Traugott, et al. 2002).  Although a wave of 
patriotism and national unity swept over the country (Putnam 2002; Traugott, et al. 
2002), substantial numbers of Americans believed that they or their family members 
would be targeted by a terrorist attack in the U.S. (Huddy, Khatib and Capelos. 2002).  
According to a poll conducted by CBS in late September, 78% of respondents believed 
that more attacks on the U.S. were likely to occur (Huddy, Khatib and Capelos. 2002; see 
also Traugott, et al. 2002).  The foreign policy benefits of an attack against Afghanistan 
and al Qaeda would consist of a reduction in the level of insecurity being experienced by 
most Americans following the al Qaeda-orchestrated attacks.27   
In chapter V, I used the public’s analogical reasoning as an alternative indicator of 
the costs and benefits expected by the public.  This constituted a comparison of an 
anticipated conflict with a prominent conflict in the past to assess the public’s perception 
of the relative value of military involvement – which is in accordance with studies 
                                                 
27 Of course, some citizens and public figures believed that retaliation for 9/11 would lead to further attacks 
in the U.S. (e.g.,Dembner 2001; Miga 2001).   
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suggesting that past conflicts continue to have consequences for how a large portion of 
the American public perceives military involvement abroad (Holsti and Rosenau 1984; 
Vertzberger 1990; Sobel 2001).  For example, pollsters asked the public whether they 
believed a U.S. military intervention in Bosnia would be more like the U.S.’s experience 
in Vietnam or the Gulf War.28   
Rather than summon societal memories of Vietnam or the Gulf War, the attacks 
of 9/11 evoked images of Pearl Harbor and the start of World War II (Schildkraut 2002).  
Newspaper editorials drew parallels between 9/11 and the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 
(e.g., Bartley 2001; Brokaw 2001; Friedman 2001), anticipating a long and costly war in 
response to the attacks.  The public tended to agree with the similarities.  For example, 
when asked by an NBC News Poll, 91% of respondents indicated that the 9/11 attack was 
as bad as or worse than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  The connections 
acknowledged between Pearl Harbor and the terror attacks suggest that the public 
expected sacrifice.   
President Bush reinforced public expectations by asserting that any operation 
conducted in Afghanistan – or anywhere else in the world – in the pursuit of terrorists 
would likely be a long and costly endeavor (Woodward 2002: 49).  Regardless of the 
president’s forewarning, the public supported launching a war against terrorists generally 
and Afghanistan, in particular.  Perhaps most telling are four public opinion polls taken 
between September 15 and September 27 querying public support for the use of force, 
given an expectation of U.S. casualties.  Table 6.1 summarizes these polls.  Note that 
support for the use of force never dips below 66%, regardless of how ominous the  
                                                 
28 Vietnam is the paradigmatic costly and protracted defeat, while the Gulf War is the archetypal brief and 
costless victory (see e.g., Roskin 1974; Vertzberger 1990; Sobel 2001).   
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Table 6.1 Public Opinion toward Casualties in Response to 9/11, September 2001. 
Support  Oppose  Question Date Source 
65% 30% 
Would you support or oppose 
the US taking military action if 
you knew [that] 1,000 
American troops would be 
killed? 
15-Sep 
GALLUP, 
C.N.N., U.S.A. 
TODAY  
77% 9% 
Do you favor or oppose taking 
military action, including the 
use of ground troops, to 
retaliate against whoever is 
responsible for the terrorist 
attacks even if it means that US 
armed forces might suffer 
thousands of casualties? 
17-Sep PEOPLE & THE PRESS  
76% 16% 
Would you support or oppose 
the US continuing a campaign 
against terrorism if you knew 
that 5,000 US troops would be 
killed? 
22-Sep 
GALLUP, 
C.N.N., U.S.A. 
TODAY  
66% 26% 
What if it meant getting into a 
long war with large numbers of 
US troops killed or wounded-- 
would you support or oppose 
taking military action against 
the groups or nations 
responsible for these attacks? 
27-Sep WASHINGTON POST  
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conjecture may be in terms of expected casualties.  In the run-up to the U.S. military 
action against Afghanistan, Americans expected many casualties in a war on terrorism.  
But it also appears as though the public believed that the benefits of prosecuting such a 
war would be worth the costs.   
Public Opinion and the Rejection of Alternatives 
Consistent with the discussion of relative value above, public opinion was clearly 
supportive of a use of force in response to the 9/11 attacks (see Figure 6.1).  Despite 
President Bush’s frequent claim that he makes policy “based upon principle and not polls 
and focus groups” (e.g., Harris 2001; Foyle 2004), there is some evidence that he ruled 
out Crisis response choices that were clearly at odds with public preferences.  Some 
scholars (Foyle 2004; Gibbs 2004) are unequivocal in their conclusions that the public 
guided the administration’s response to the attacks: retaliate against al Qaeda and any 
nation harboring those responsible.  President Bush acknowledged that “[w]hat 
Americans were feeling was that the country had suffered at the hands of al Qaeda” 
(Woodward 2002, 48).  Moreover, the president, in a colloquial manner, indicated his 
intent to be responsive to public opinion: “The American people want a big bang” 
(Woodward 2002, 49).  Secretary of State Colin Powell agreed: “The American people 
want us to do something about al Qaeda.”29   
Recall from chapter II that when Public support for the use of force exceeds 60%, 
the president is likely to rule out lower Crisis response choices (i.e., Non-force and Show 
of force alternatives).  President Bush’s decision making process appears to adhere with 
this account of Poliheuristic decision making.  Figure 6.1 plots the intensity of public 
support and opposition to the use of force during the interlude between the terrorist  
                                                 
29 Quoted in Foyle (2004, 275).   
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Figure 6.1. Public Opinion toward the Use of Force in Response to the Afghan Crisis, September 2001.  
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Note: The data points were computed by taking the daily average of all available polls asking respondents whether they supported or 
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strikes and the initiation of military operations against Afghanistan.30  Each data point 
represents the average of all polls taken during the corresponding day concerning public 
attitudes toward forceful action by the U.S. against parties responsible for the attacks.  By 
“forceful action,” I mean that the poll question queried public preferences toward military 
force in general, or air strikes and/or sending in ground forces, in particular.  To summarize the 
general movement of public opinion during the period, the moving average for support and 
opposition are included in the figure.  Throughout the period covered in the figure, the public 
overwhelmingly supports forceful action.  Average daily support for the use of force never 
falls below 60%, while opposition to the use of force never breaches 30%.  Consequently, 
President Bush ruled out Non-force and Show of force alternatives in the first stage of the 
decision making process.   
The Impact of Elites 
In chapter V, I distinguished between an elite (i.e., attentive) and mass (i.e., inattentive) 
public to explore whether elites have a disproportionate impact on presidential crisis decision 
making (see e.g., Almond 1950; Rosenau 1961; Neumann 1986).  It is also worth exploring the 
relative impact of elites in President Bush’s decision to rule out Non-force and Show of force 
alternatives in the first stage of the decision making process following the 9/11 attacks.   
A rift within the Bush administration emerged at a National Security Council meeting 
on September 12.  While most of the members of the administration were contemplating how 
to deal with al Qaeda and Afghanistan, Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld advocated an immediate operation against Iraq to remove the 
potential threat of Saddam Hussein (Woodward 2002; Warshaw 2003; Foyle 2004).  Secretary 
                                                 
30 The polls used in the construction of Figure 6.1 did not use questions alluding to the costs or benefits of a use of 
force.   
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of State Powell was a vocal critic of this proposal, arguing that “the American people want us 
to do something about al Qaeda” (Woodward 2002, 184).  With public opinion in mind, 
President Bush sided with Powell over Iraq: “Let’s not make the target so broad that it misses 
the point and fails to draw support from normal Americans” (Woodward 2002, 48).  Although 
Bush backed toppling Saddam Hussein Iraq eventually, he felt that the only viable option in the 
short-run was to go after al Qaeda in Afghanistan (Woodward 2002).  However, the missing 
detail from the difference of opinion in the White House in the aftermath of 9/11 was whether 
Cheney and Rumsfeld opposed action against Afghanistan in favor of Iraq.  The evidence 
seems to suggest that these key members of the administration may have favored a multi-front 
war, with operations in Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously (Foyle 2004; Gibbs 2004; 
Warshaw 2003), but this is largely speculative.  Whatever the case, Bush chose an alternative 
that was consistent with public opinion rather than an option that satisfied members of his 
administration immediately after 9/11.   
The American public – including elites and masses – seemed to be of one mind about 
how to respond in the wake of the terror attacks: take the fight to al Qaeda and Afghanistan 
(e.g., Entman 2003; Foyle 2004; Gibbs 2004).  With the exception of a few columnists who 
suggested that the U.S. should go after Saudi Arabia, the American press largely echoed the 
president’s account of events and policy proposals (e.g., Entman 2003; Coe, et al. 2004).  
Some academic elites favored a measured, restrained military response (see e.g., Lake 2002; 
Layne 2002), but there does not seem to have been a vocal opposition among the American 
elite to the use of force against al Qaeda and Afghanistan.   
Overall, it is very difficult to gauge the relative impact of elite versus mass opinion in 
President Bush’s decision to attack Afghanistan.  This difficulty rests in the fact that opinions 
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across the elite-mass divide were largely indistinguishable.  The main differences seem to have 
concerned the inclusion of additional targets and the intensity of the retaliation.  But, citing the 
demands of the public in general, the president was wary of diffuse targets and restrained 
responses (Woodward 2002).  As Colin Powell recalled of a September 15 National Security 
Council meeting, “where the president came down was that Afghanistan was the place that we 
had to attack because the world and the American people would not understand if we didn’t go 
after the source of the 9/11 terrorists.”31   
Clearly, President Bush was aware of the range of alternatives the public would accept 
in response to the 9/11 attacks.  Anything less than a military operation aimed at bin Laden’s al 
Qaeda organization in Afghanistan would likely result in an eventual public backlash against 
the Bush administration (Foyle 2004).  Consequently, the president ruled out those alternatives 
that were not in step with public opinion – Non-force alternatives.  In the sections that follow, I 
discuss the president’s calculus concerning military and international-strategic factors.   
STAGE 2: MILITARY AND INTERNATIONAL-STRATEGIC FACTORS 
In the second stage of the decision making process, the Bush administration weighed 
the implications of the remaining alternatives on the military and international-strategic 
dimensions.  The surviving alternatives were evaluated in the second stage according to their 
ability to maximize benefits (minimize costs) simultaneously with respect to military and 
strategic factors.   
Military Dimension 
On the military dimension, President Bush weighed the implications of the surviving 
alternatives – cruise missile strike, bombing campaign, light infantry assault  (limited 
invasion), and heavy armor-infantry assault (extensive invasion) – for such military 
                                                 
31 Quoted in Foyle (2004, 276).   
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considerations as capabilities, logistics, and the likelihood of success.  In terms of capabilities, 
some of the al Qaeda foreign fighters and Taliban forces had a good deal of military expertise 
after a decade of fighting the Soviets (e.g., Neuman, Block and Whalen 2001; Conetta 2002; 
O’Hanlon 2002).  In addition to their mastery of Afghanistan’s brutal landscape and climate, 
much of the U.S. adversary’s military hardware was supplied to the Afghan mujahideen during 
the war with the Soviets (Daalder and Linsay 2001).   
The Taliban’s and al Qaeda’s capabilities, enhanced by terrain and expertise, appear to 
militate against the use of ground troops in Afghanistan.  But two other factors favored 
inserting troops on the ground.  The first was U.S. technology.  Supported by satellite imaging 
and precision munitions delivered from the air, ground forces would be able to overcome the 
advantages associated with knowledge of local terrain (O’Hanlon 2002).  The second factor 
was the Northern Alliance.  Another heir to the anti-Soviet mujahideen, the Northern Alliance 
had been engaged in a civil war with the Taliban since the religious sect took power in 1996 
(Daalder and Linsay 2001).  A U.S. ground operation in Afghanistan would be effectively 
augmented by Northern Alliance forces working toward the overthrow of the Taliban (Conetta 
2002; O”Hanlon 2002).  Consequently, relative capabilities – and the factors influencing this 
balance – appeared to favor the insertion of U.S. ground forces.   
Another concern on the military dimension surrounds the logistics of deploying troops 
and equipment to the theater of operations.  Although many of the logistical impediments to 
launching a full-scale attack seemed to be easily overcome with the U.S. military’s technology, 
a number of aspects of Afghanistan’s terrain and location would prove difficult.  Afghanistan 
is a land-locked country with mountainous features and an unforgiving climate (Neuman, 
Block and Whalen 2001).  In order to supply and reinforce a heavy ground force in 
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Afghanistan, the U.S. would need reliable access to secure bases in the area as well as use of a 
seaport in the immediate vicinity (Conetta 2002; O’Hanlon 2002).  However, as I discuss in 
greater detail below, the international-strategic circumstances made access to Afghanistan 
uncertain.  Iran and Pakistan – the country’s neighbors with sea access – were unwilling to host 
U.S. bases or permit U.S. forces to deploy via their territory (O’Hanlon 2002).  This set of 
logistical circumstances reduced the estimation of using ground forces on the military 
dimension.   
Aerial bombardment alternatives appeared to be relatively more attractive than ground 
force options in light of the set of logistical challenges.  A cruise missile strike or bombing 
campaign could have easily overcome the logistical impediments associated with 
Afghanistan’s location and terrain.  U.S. air and naval forces were already in the theater of 
operations prior to 9/11 – specifically, Uzbekistan and the Indian Ocean island of Diego 
Garcia.  Aircraft in the Persian Gulf region would be able to fly sorties from their bases to 
targets in Afghanistan (O’Hanlon 2002).  Thus, either of the Aerial bombardment alternatives 
appears to have been better-suited with respect to logistical concerns than the ground force 
options.   
The final concern on the military dimension is the likelihood of success.  Each of the 
surviving alternatives was evaluated according to how well it was expected to punish the 
terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks as well as their allies.  Cruise missile strikes launched 
against al Qaeda training camps during the Clinton administration had failed to either kill 
important al Qaeda leaders or thwart future attacks (Woodward 2002).  The cruise missile 
option was regarded as carrying a low likelihood of success.  Alternatively, a strategic 
bombing campaign pursued in cooperation with the Northern Alliance would probably be 
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successful in toppling the Taliban, but held little hope in rooting out members of al Qaeda.  
Ironically, the presence of the Northern Alliance made a bombing campaign rather 
unattractive.  There was some suspicion on the part of U.S. military planners that the Northern 
Alliance would work against U.S. goals after the war (Daalder and Linsay 2001; Conetta 
2002).  An Aerial bombardment option would support the Northern Alliance’s ground 
operations, but severely curb the U.S. role in establishing a post-War Afghan regime or in 
hunting remaining al Qaeda members (Daalder and Linsay 2001; Conetta 2002).  These 
realities made Aerial bombardment alternatives undesirable in light of the likelihood of 
operational success.  A ground force alternative – either a limited invasion or an extensive 
invasion – appeared to be more likely to bring about the desired outcome.  With boots on the 
ground, American military personnel would be able to pursue U.S. objectives.   
Overall, on the military dimension, a limited invasion promised the highest net benefits 
among the surviving alternatives.  U.S. ground forces were expected to be augmented by the 
Northern Alliance, inflating the balance of capabilities in favor of the U.S.  With respect to 
logistical concerns, an Aerial bombardment response had the best chance of overcoming the 
logistical difficulties associated with Afghanistan’s location and terrain.  But the U.S. would 
have to insert ground forces in order to successfully pursue al Qaeda members.  The size of the 
U.S. ground force contingent would be dictated, in part, by the constraints of deploying and 
supplying troops.   
International-Strategic Dimension 
On the international-strategic dimension, the Bush administration weighed the 
implications of the remaining alternatives for such factors as the global balance of power and 
grand strategy.  The attacks of 9/11 altered U.S. policy goals.  Similar to the start of the Cold 
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War, the U.S. would seek to assemble a coalition of partners in an ongoing war on terror that 
would be fought on several fronts (Daalder and Linsay 2001).  Because al Qaeda and its related 
organizations are transnational and rooted in the Muslim world, the U.S. would require 
international cooperation in stemming the flow of funding for terrorist operations, the capture 
of known terrorists, and intelligence gathering to thwart future attacks from states in that 
region (Daalder and Lindsay 2001).  But the president would also need to signal resolve in 
going after states thought to harbor terrorists (Bumiller and Perlez 2001; U.S. Department of 
Defense 2001).  Despite his Manichean division of the world into good and evil (e.g., Entman 
2004), President Bush considered the implications of the remaining alternatives with respect to 
building and maintaining a global coalition in the war on terror, while simultaneously 
demonstrating a willingness to forcefully prosecute such a war.   
The alternative that would receive the highest “score” on the international-strategic 
dimension would be the one that promised to both strengthen U.S. relations with states in the 
Muslim world and deter them from serving as bases of terrorist operations.  Unfortunately, 
these dual goals would come into conflict (Tyler and Perlez 2001; Dunham 2001; Fidler 2001).  
The Bush administration began acquiring allies in the region – primarily, Russia and the 
former Soviet Republics of Central Asia – to facilitate combat operations and capture terrorists.  
Similarly, U.S. diplomats persuaded Pakistani President Musharraf to work with the U.S., 
allowing over-flights of Pakistani territory and aiding in sealing Pakistan’s border with 
Afghanistan (O’Hanlon 2002).  But with the exception of Pakistan and Oman, Muslim states – 
although sympathetic in the wake of 9/11 – were reluctant to offer cooperation in support of a 
U.S. military operation against a Muslim state (Daalder and Lindsay 2001).  The 
administration would have to tread lightly in order to avoid alienating Muslim governments.   
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A limited invasion promised the appropriate mix of sensitivity to Muslim governments 
and demonstration of resolve.  In order to signal resolve, the selected alternative would have to 
achieve operational success.  As demonstrated in 1998, cruise missile strikes were unlikely to 
be successful in dismantling al Qaeda and the Taliban.  Similarly, a bombing campaign alone 
was also thought to be inadequate to achieve the foreign policy objectives – primarily, because 
such a strategy would effectively act as air support for the Northern Alliance, which had 
divergent goals from the U.S.  An extensive invasion, while likely to succeed in toppling the 
Taliban and wreaking havoc with the al Qaeda organization, would likely alarm many 
members of the U.S. coalition in the Muslim world (Tyler and Perlez 2001; Dunham 2001; 
Fidler 2001).  Consequently, a limited invasion optimized between the competing 
international-strategic goals of strengthening U.S. relations with states in the Muslim world 
and deterring states from serving as bases of terrorist operations.   
In summary, the Poliheuristic analysis of Bush’s 2001 decision to launch a limited 
invasion in Afghanistan suggests that a number of alternatives failing to satisfy the public 
opinion prerequisite were rejected in the first stage of the decision making process.  The public 
was clearly supportive of a use of force against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.  Despite 
the expected costs of pursuing a war against terrorist organizations and the states providing 
them sanctuary, a large proportion of Americans believed that the benefits of prosecuting such 
a war would outweigh the costs of risking U.S. troops’ lives.  In accordance with this public 
support, the Bush administration ruled out Non-force alternatives as well as Show of force 
alternatives in the first stage of the decision making process.  This left four alternatives: cruise 
missile strikes, aerial bombing campaign, limited invasion, and an extensive invasion 
enforcement.  These surviving alternatives were compared based on their ability to maximize 
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net benefits on the military and international-strategic dimensions.  In the end, the limited 
invasion alternative had the best chance of overcoming logistical impediments, while achieving 
the U.S.’s operational goals.  Additionally, that alternative was believed to be optimal in terms 
of maintaining international support for the U.S.-led war on terror, while signaling U.S. resolve 
in going after states harboring terrorists.   
WAS THE DECISION COMPENSATORY? 
In chapter V, I assess whether President Clinton’s decision to launch air strikes against 
Serb positions in Bosnia was actually driven by a Poliheuristic process, or it was the product of 
a compensatory process.  I repeat this evaluation for President Bush’s 2001 decision to launch 
a limited invasion of Afghanistan.  The key claim of the Poliheuristic account of presidential 
crisis response I develop in chapter II, is that the president follows a noncompensatory strategy 
of decision making, ruling out alternatives in the first stage that fail to clearly satisfy public 
opinion without regard for how well these alternatives perform on other dimensions.  This 
process is at odds with compensatory models such as expected utility theory (e.g., Bueno de 
Mesquita 1981; 1984) and the cybernetic theory (e.g., Steinbruner 1974; Ostrom and Job 
1986).  These compensatory models suggest that a low score for an alternative on one 
dimension can be compensated by a high score on another (Mintz 1993).  In contrast to these 
compensatory models, the Poliheuristic Theory argues that a key dimension is 
noncompensatory – regardless of how well an alternative maximizes net benefits on less 
important dimensions, it cannot compensate for a low score on the key dimension. 
Was President Bush’s decision actually compensatory?  In order to address this 
question, I will rank the entire set of alternatives considered according to how well they 
satisfied goals on each dimension.  On the domestic political dimension, use of force responses 
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– including Aerial bombardment and Land force assault alternatives – clearly would have 
scored higher than Non-force responses.  During the period between the 9/11 attacks and the 
beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the American public was adamantly in support of a 
military endeavor aimed at those responsible for the attacks (Milbank and Morin 2001).  The 
Bush administration believed that the public desired retaliation and was unyielding in its desire 
to see al Qaeda and the Taliban destroyed (e.g., Bowman, Matthews and Gibson 2001; 
McManus 2001; Sanger 2001).  Consequently, the alternatives can be ranked on the domestic 
political dimension in terms of their ability to punish and/or destroy U.S. adversaries in 
Afghanistan, with the extensive invasion option receiving the highest score.   
On the military dimension, the Bush administration had to optimize between competing 
goals of overcoming logistical constraints and asserting autonomy in Afghanistan in order to 
hunt members of al Qaeda (Conetta 2002; O’Hanlon 2002).  Although the Non-force 
alternatives – negotiate the extradition of al Qaeda members and arm the Northern Alliance – 
may have overcome the logistical difficulties associated with Afghanistan’s location, these 
responses were unlikely to enhance U.S. influence in Afghanistan (Bumiller and Perlez 2001; 
U.S. Department of Defense 2001).  Aerial bombardment alternatives would have been better 
able to satisfy these military goals than the Non-force alternatives (e.g., Marshall 2001).  But 
these responses continued to leave too much to the Northern Alliance on the ground (Daalder 
and Lindsay 2001).  As I discuss above, the limited invasion response was optimum in terms of 
overcoming logistical constraints and asserting autonomy in Afghanistan.   
On the international-strategic dimension, the Bush administration also faced a pair of 
conflicting aims – demonstrate U.S. resolve to combat terrorism and encourage support and 
cooperation in the Muslim world for the U.S. war on terror.  The Non-force alternatives would 
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have maximized the score with respect to gaining international cooperation from Muslim 
governments, but failed to demonstrate U.S. resolve.  On the other hand, an extensive invasion 
of Afghanistan would have forcefully signaled U.S. resolve, but threatened to alienate many 
Muslim governments (Mahoney 2001; Kaplow 2001).  The Aerial bombardment alternatives, 
at first glance, appear to be able to optimize between these competing international-strategic 
goals.  However, as I discuss above, the alternative selected needed to promise the successful 
achievement of the Bush administration’s stated foreign policy in order to demonstrate resolve.  
Relative to the Land force assault alternatives, neither of the Aerial bombardment responses 
under consideration had the potential to facilitate the U.S.’s stated aim of hunting terrorists in 
Afghanistan (Marshall 2001).  The limited invasion alternative had the best chance of not 
offending Muslim governments while demonstrating the U.S.’s resolve in forcing compliance 
with its demands in the war on terror.   
Table 6.2 shows the alternatives considered by the Bush administration in the wake of 
9/11 rank-ordered according to each of the decision dimensions.  Note that the limited invasion 
alternative receives the highest total score.  A comparison of the total scores indicates that I 
cannot rule out that the process by which the president arrived at his ultimate decision followed 
an expected utility or cybernetic process.  To be sure, this analysis is consistent with a decision 
making process by which the decision maker simply sums across the dimensions in order to 
select an alternative.  Thus, President Bush’s 2001 decision to launch a limited invasion in 
Afghanistan does not provide us with a critical case by which we can distinguish between 
noncompensatory and compensatory decision making processes by comparing the decision 
makers’ evaluations of alternatives across dimensions.  Nor can we rule out the possibility that 
the president’s decision was noncompensatory.  The alternative the president ultimately  
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Table 6.2. The Response to 9/11: Scores of Alternatives on the Relevant Dimensions. 
 
Alternatives 
 
Dimensions 
 
 
 Domestic Political Military 
International-
Strategic Total 
Non-force 
alternatives     
Negotiate the 
extradition of al 
Qaeda members 
 
1 1 1 3 
Arm the 
Northern 
Alliance  
 
2 2 3 7 
Aerial 
bombardment     
Launch cruise 
missile strikes 3 3 4 10 
Commence 
bombing 
campaign 
4 4 5 13 
Land force 
assault      
Limited invasion 5 6 6 17 
Extensive 
invasion 6 5 2 14 
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selected – limited invasion – did not have a low score that was compensated by a higher score 
on subsequent dimensions.   
In order to judge between the theoretical perspectives, we must imagine a different set 
of circumstances – one in which an alternative rejected in the first stage of the decision making 
process would have received a higher score on a subsequent dimension (i.e., military or 
international-strategic dimension), but a low score on the key dimension (i.e., domestic 
political dimension).  For instance, if all of the Aerial bombardment and Land force assault 
alternatives would have threatened to preclude cooperation from important Muslim 
governments, the Non-force responses would have been more favorably evaluated on the 
international-strategic dimension.  Indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that this was the 
initial position of many Muslim governments in the region (e.g., Dunham 2001; Fidler 2001; 
Tyler and Perlez 2001).  For example, the Taliban regime was a protégé of both Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan – important, albeit reluctant, U.S. allies in the war on terror (Conetta 2002; 
Mahoney 2001; Kaplow 2001).  However, many Muslim governments subsequently changed 
course upon the realization that President Bush faced severe domestic political consequences if 
he did not use force against Afghanistan after 9/11 (Conetta 2002; O’Hanlon 2002).  In 
reaction to the unyielding position of the U.S., most Muslim governments chose to cooperate at 
some level rather than to find themselves on the wrong side of the U.S.’s war on terror.   
Was the president’s decision noncompensatory?  This question can be answered 
cautiously with a counterfactual: if the Muslim governments had refused to cooperate with a 
U.S. use of force, the evidence suggests that the president would have launched a military 
operation anyway.  The Muslim governments themselves appear to have positioned themselves 
in anticipation of a U.S. use of force regardless of their approval (e.g., Dunham 2001; Fidler 
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2001; Tyler and Perlez 2001).  The president’s statements suggest that he was prepared to 
launch an attack with or without the blessings of the Muslim world (e.g., Bowman, Matthews 
and Gibson 2001; McManus 2001; Sanger 2001).32  Thus, we can carefully conclude that the 
president’s decision was noncompensatory.   
The case of Bush’s 2001 decision to launch a limited invasion in Afghanistan illustrates 
the interrelationships between decisional dimensions.  These interrelationships complicate the 
discovery of the decision making process employed by the president – i.e., compensatory 
versus noncompensatory.  Specifically, concerns along the international-strategic dimension 
were influenced by the domestic political dimension in a strategic interaction.  Muslim 
governments recognized the American public’s mood and behaved strategically (e.g., Putnam 
1988; Fearon 1998).33  Rather than oppose any use of force by the U.S., these governments 
severed ties with the Taliban and gave tacit approval for a limited invasion.   
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the process by which President Bush arrived at the decision 
to launch a limited invasion into Afghanistan in the wake of the al Qaeda attacks of September 
11, 2001.  In the first stage of the Poliheuristic procedure, Bush ruled out negotiations with the 
Taliban regime for the extradition of al Qaeda members as well as providing materiel support 
to the Northern Alliance to bring about the ouster of the Afghan government.  Public opinion 
toward military action following the events of 9/11 clearly favored a forceful response against 
the perpetrators of the attacks.   Moreover, the public was unyielding in its preferences, 
believing that the benefits of military force were worthwhile regardless of the likely costs in 
                                                 
32 Indeed, the president had offered so many overt threats by the time international cooperation was secured that 
he had to carry out his threats or suffer domestic political ramifications.  This is consistent with the audience costs 
perspective (e.g., Fearon 1994).    
33 There are some suggestions that the U.S. made concessions to Muslim governments as well, tailoring military 
strikes to minimize infuriating fundamentalists (Mahony 2001; Kaplow 2001).   
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terms of combat fatalities.  By ruling out Non-force alternatives, President Bush eliminated the 
alternatives that appeared to clearly flout the preferences of the public.  In the second stage of 
the decision making process, the president chose a final response among the remaining 
alternatives on the basis of its ability to maximize expected benefits on the military and 
international-strategic dimensions.  On the military dimension, the limited invasion option 
received the highest “score” because it was better able to optimize between logistical 
constraints and the likelihood of operational success than the other surviving alternatives.  On 
the international-strategic dimension, the limited invasion alternative held a greater potential to 
avoid alienating Muslim governments, while signaling U.S. resolve to strike at states harboring 
terrorists.   
President Bush’s decision was not compensatory.  However, the president’s decision 
making process was not (prima facie) inconsistent with other decision making approaches, 
such as the expected utility or cybernetic theories.  Indeed, the limited invasion response 
received the highest total score of all of the alternatives considered.  But this response was not 
selected solely on the basis of its score on subsequent dimensions – military and international-
strategic dimensions.  To the contrary, it appears as though considerations by Muslim 
governments in the wake of 9/11 altered the implications of a limited invasion.  In other words, 
Muslim governments – behaving strategically – offered tacit approval for U.S. action in 
Afghanistan in response to American public opinion, rather than end up on the wrong side of a 
vengeful U.S.  The cooperation of the Muslim world suggests an interrelationship among 
decisional dimensions that may complicate analysis.  However, the possibility of strategic 
behavior – which raised the esteem of a limited invasion on the international-strategic 
dimension – points to the possibility that public opinion in the U.S. was noncompensatory.  
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Moreover, this strategic interaction indicates that not only was the president compelled to the 
public’s bidding, but that other governments around the world appreciated his position.   
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has argued that presidents can tailor Crisis response choices to suit 
public opinion, military imperatives, and international realities.  For instance, the president 
may pursue economic sanctions or diplomatic efforts.  Presidents may also employ such 
military force alternatives as the mobilization of forces, air strikes, and/or the insertion of 
ground forces.  Although factors such as relative capabilities and U.S. grand strategy are 
important in determining the president’s choice, public opinion is the most important 
consideration.  Presidents are reluctant to defy the preferences of the citizenry when making 
foreign policy decisions.  Consequently, they rule out alternatives that clearly violate the 
wishes of the people (Mintz, et al. 1997; Mintz 2004).  Because public attitudes toward the use 
of force are driven by the public’s prospective evaluations of the foreign policy benefits of 
using force relative to the expected costs in terms of American casualties (e.g., Russett 1990; 
Larson 1996; Mueller 1996), presidents rule out alternatives that fail to comport with this 
relative value assessment.   
I have also argued that presidential crisis decision making follows a Poliheuristic 
process (e.g., Mintz, et al. 1997; Mintz 2004), which posits a two-stage decision making 
process.  Presidents eliminate crisis response alternatives in the first stage of the decision 
making process that are clearly at odds with the public’s assessment – regardless of the 
potential benefits of those alternatives on other decision making dimensions (i.e., military, 
international-strategic).  When a large majority stands in support of military involvement in a 
crisis, the president is likely to reject such non-force alternatives as economic sanctions and 
diplomatic efforts.  Conversely, when the president is faced with a large majority of the public 
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opposing the use of force, he is likely to eliminate the military alternatives from consideration.  
But when the public is ambivalent or indifferent toward international crises (e.g., Redd 2001; 
Brulé and Mintz 2005), the president is likely to rule out, non-force alternatives as well as the 
alternatives that place large numbers of U.S. troops in harm’s way.  In the second stage of the 
decision making process, the president selects a choice among the remaining alternatives on 
the basis of that alternative’s ability to maximize expected benefits with respect to such 
military and international-strategic concerns as relative capabilities, and the president’s foreign 
policy reputation.   
FINDINGS  
Quantitative Analysis 
In chapter IV, I used statistical analyses to examine presidential crisis response choices 
across all crises involving the U.S. during the period 1949-2001.  This quantitative analysis 
indicates that public opinion is systematically associated with the president’s crisis response 
choice.  Specifically, presidents choose alternatives that place more troops in harm’s way when 
the public is supportive of military action, and presidents pursue “safer” alternatives when the 
public is not clearly supportive of the use of force.  However, relative to cases in which no 
public opinion polls are available, presidents are likely to choose higher Crisis response 
choices when faced with public opposition.  I attribute this surprising finding to a selection 
effect – in anticipation of likely public opinion, presidents select themselves into international 
crises (or make public comments about ongoing crises) on the basis of expected public support, 
foregoing involvement in those in which they expect opposition.   
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The results also reveal that most of the military and international-strategic factors, 
thought to be important in the second stage of the decision making process, fail to 
systematically influence the president’s decision.   
Case Studies 
The statistical analysis provided a systematic comparison of all crises in which the U.S. 
was involved, revealing which variables – especially public opinion – were related with 
presidential crisis response choice.  But it could not provide a detailed rationale for why public 
opinion influences crisis response choices.  For example, the statistical analysis did not show 
whether public attitudes toward the use of force are driven by the public’s relative value 
assessment.  Consequently, I also examined two individual cases in detail.  These case studies 
not only illustrate the theoretical argument, they also facilitate the testing of the hypotheses by 
revealing limitations of the theory.  The case study method also aids in the effort to examine 
nuance in key theoretical concepts that cannot be readily captured by operationalized variables 
– such as factors affecting evaluations along the military and international-strategic 
dimensions.   
In chapters V and VI, I analyzed President Clinton’s 1994 decision to launch air strikes 
against the Bosnian Serbs and President Bush’s 2001 decision to conduct a limited invasion of 
Afghanistan, respectively.  The case studies support the account of public opinion and Crisis 
response choice I develop in chapter II.  Public attitudes toward the use of force reflected the 
public’s relative value assessments in the Bosnian crisis as well as the Afghan War.  Moreover, 
presidents are sensitive to the concerns of the public, ruling out alternatives that fail to comport 
with the public’s relative value assessment.  In the Bosnian crisis, the public was torn between 
saving Bosnian lives and preserving the lives of U.S. service men and women.  In response, 
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President Clinton ruled out options that weighted one of these goals over the other.  In the 
wake of 9/11, the public unequivocally favored military action against those responsible 
regardless of the risks to U.S. combat forces.  Consequently, President Bush rejected options 
that would minimize risk to U.S. troops at the expense of the foreign policy goals.  The case 
studies also provide support for the role of military and international-strategic factors in the 
second stage of the president’s decision making process, which were difficult to detect in the 
statistical analysis.   
CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the linkage between domestic 
politics and international conflict behavior by specifying the mechanisms by which public 
preferences are translated into presidential responses in crisis decision making.  To that end, 
there are three contributions.  First, I developed a new categorical dependent variable, crisis 
response choice, which enabled this research to exploit additional information than previously 
examined in the dichotomous, use of force/no use of force characterization of crisis outcomes.  
The examination of a categorical dependent variable revealed the president’s ability to take the 
concerns of the public into consideration.   
Second, this dissertation expands a new dataset on public opinion toward the 
presidential use of force, which contributes to the accumulation of scientific knowledge.  A 
wealth of research questions concerning public opinion and the use of force abroad remain 
unaddressed, or under-addressed.  These data and related materials will continue to serve the 
advancement of our understanding of the domestic-international nexus in political science.   
Finally, this dissertation has shown the theoretical merit of assuming that public 
attitudes toward the use of force are driven by a relative value assessment by the public.  The 
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public chooses whether to support or oppose the use of force based on its ex ante evaluation of 
whether the benefits of a foreign policy success outweigh the potential costs accrued in the 
currency of American blood.  This assumption is both realistic and fruitful.   
IMPLICATIONS 
Related to the theoretical contributions of the dissertation are the implications of this 
research for other international relations research.  The theory developed here differs from 
others primarily by asserting that the public’s concerns about the utility of U.S. casualties 
determine its preferences, and by extension, the president’s crisis response decision.  An 
obvious implication of the findings is that public attitudes toward the use of force are 
systematically related to the specific choices presidents make in response to international 
crises.  This is contrary to the theoretical perspective asserting that the public simply does not 
matter in presidential decisions to use force (e.g., Lipset 1966; Cohen 1973; Morgenthau 
1973).   
But the ideas presented here also speak to two other debates in the international 
relations literature.  First, the dissertation provides an explicit evaluation of one of the key 
assumptions of the democratic peace.  This literature suggests that democratic leaders are 
unable to pursue military responses to international crises in the face of public opposition (e.g., 
Doyle 1986; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994).  In other words, democratic publics are the 
root of peaceful relations among democracies.  I find qualified support for this assumption.  
Relative to crises in which the public is supportive or ambivalent/indifferent toward the use of 
force, public opposition is associated with lower crisis response choices.  But to fruitfully 
incorporate this assumption into a dyadic formulation of the democratic peace, we must also 
assume that democratic publics are frequently averse to military action against each other (see 
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e.g., Mintz and Geva 1993; Owen 1994).  Otherwise, as the results also bear out, democratic 
leaders may be essentially compelled to use force against each other when their publics are 
unyieldingly supportive of military actions (e.g., Brulé and Mintz 2005; Layne 1994). 
Second, this dissertation also addresses the process by which public opinion and 
foreign policy decisions interact.  Two perspectives offer competing explanations of this 
relationship.  One of these posits a top-down process, arguing that policy makers manipulate 
the public through framing, issue campaigns, and actual uses of force (e.g., Margolis and 
Mauser 1989; Wittkopf and McCormick 1993; Ostrom and Job 1986).  According to this 
literature, a direct relationship between public support and higher levels of crisis response is 
the result of efforts by the president to gain public approval for his most-preferred policy.  A 
second perspective asserts an interactive process of mutual influence in which presidents 
propose policy alternatives with the preferences of the public in mind (e.g., Russett 1990a; 
Powlick and Katz 1998; Sobel 2001).  Presidents use their agenda-setting powers to select 
crises in which they expect an acceptable level of public support (e.g., Kusnitz 1984; Stimson 
1991; Foyle 1999).  The quantitative analyses and case studies are supportive of the interactive 
account of the public opinion-foreign policy linkage.  Presidents may attempt to persuade 
public opinion (e.g., Storrs and Serafino 1993; 2001; Hinckley 1992), but when they are 
unsuccessful, they act in accordance with the wishes of the public (see e.g., Edwards 2003).   
Overall, this dissertation offers a rather optimistic view of the democratic control of 
foreign policy.  The empirical analysis and case studies indicate that a key assumption of 
democratic theory is satisfied.  In decisions to use force, presidents are typically unwilling to 
violate the preferences of the public.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
CRISES ANALYZED 
 
Table A.1. International Crises 
Crisis Number Crisis Name Start Year Primary Adversary 
131 Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia 1949 Soviet Union 
132 Korea  War I 1950 North Korea 
133 Korea  War II 1950 China 
134 Hula Drainage 1951 Syria 
135 Punjab War Scare I 1951 India 
136 Suez Canal 1951 Egypt 
137 Catalina Affair 1952 Soviet Union 
138 Burma Infiltration 1953 Burma 
139 Invasion of Laos I 1953 Laos 
140 Korea War III 1953 North Korea 
141 E. German Uprising 1953 Soviet Union 
142 Trieste II 1953 Yugoslavia 
143 Qibya 1953 Israel 
144 Guatemala 1953 Guatemala 
145 Dien Bien Phu 1954 North Vietnam 
146 Taiwan Strait I 1954 China 
147 Costa Rica/Nicaragua II 1955 Nicaragua 
148 Baghdad Pact 1955 Egypt 
149 Gaza Raid-Czech. Arm 1955 Egypt 
152 Suez Nationalization War 1956 Soviet Union 
153 Qalqilya 1956 Israel 
154 Poland Liberalization 1956 Soviet Union 
155 Hungarian Uprising 1956 Soviet Union 
156 Mocoron Incident 1957 Nicaragua 
157 Jordan Regime 1957 Egypt 
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Table A.1 (continued).  
Crisis Number Crisis Name Start Year Primary Adversary 
158 France/Tunisia 1957 France 
159 Syria/Turkey Confrontation 1957 Soviet Union 
160 Ifni 1957 Spain 
161 West Irian I 1957 Netherlands 
164 Abort. Coup Indonesia 1958 Indonesia 
165 Iraq/Lebanon Upheaval 1958 Iraq 
166 Taiwan Strait II 1958 China 
168 Berlin Deadline 1958 Soviet Union 
170 Central America/Cuba I 1959 Cuba 
171 China/India Border I 1959 China 
172 Shatt-Alb I 1959 Iraq 
175 Failed Assassination Venezuela 1960 Cuba 
176 Congo Itanga 1960 Belgium 
178 Central America/Cuba II 1960 Cuba 
180 Pathet Lao Offensive 1961 Thailand 
181 Bay of Pigs 1961 Cuba 
182 Pushtunistan III 1961 Pakistan 
185 Berlin Wall 1961 Soviet Union 
186 Vietcong Attack 1961 Vietnam 
187 West Irian II 1961 Netherlands 
190 Goa II 1961 India 
192 Taiwan Strait III 1962 China 
193 Namtha 1962 Vietnam 
194 China/India Border II 1962 China 
195 Yemen War I 1962 Egypt 
196 Cuban Missiles 1962 Soviet Union 
197 Malaysia Federation 1963 Indonesia 
198 Dominican Rep./Haiti II 1963 Haiti 
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Table A.1 (continued).  
Crisis Number Crisis Name Start Year Primary Adversary 
200 Cuba/Venezuela 1963 Cuba 
202 Cyprus I 1963 Turkey 
203 Jordan Waters 1963 Egypt 
206 Panama Flag 1964 Panama 
208 Ogaden I 1964 Somalia 
210 Gulf of Tonkin 1964 Vietnam 
211 Congo II 1964 Soviet Union 
212 Yemen War III 1964 Egypt 
213 Pleiku 1965 Vietnam 
214 Rann of Kutch 1965 India 
215 Dominican Intervention 1965 Dominican Republic 
216 Kashmir II 1965 Pakistan 
218 Rhodesia's Udi 1965 Zimbabwe 
219 Yemen War IV 1966 Yemen 
220 El Samu 1966 Israel 
221 Che Guevara-Bolivia 1967 Cuba 
222 Six Day War 1967 Soviet Union 
223 Cyprus II 1967 Greece 
224 Pueblo 1968 North Korea 
225 Tet Offensive 1968 Vietnam 
226 Karameh 1968 Israel 
227 Prague Spring 1968 Soviet Union 
228 Esse Quibo I 1968 Venezuela 
229 Beirut Airport Str. 1968 Israel 
230 Vietnam Spring Off. 1969 Vietnam 
231 Ussuri River 1969 Soviet Union 
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Table A.1 (continued).  
Crisis Number Crisis Name Start Year Primary Adversary 
232 War of Attrition 1969 Egypt 
233 Ec-121 Spy plane 1969 North Korea 
235 Football War 1969 Honduras 
237 Invasion of Cambodia 1970 Vietnam 
238 Black September 1970 Syria 
239 Cienfuegos Sub. Base 1970 Soviet Union 
240 Conakry Raid 1970 Portugal 
241 Invasion of Laos II 1971 Vietnam 
242 Bangladesh 1971 India 
246 Vietnam-Ports Mining 1972 Vietnam 
249 Christmas Bombing 1972 Vietnam 
254 Cod War I 1973 Iceland 
255 Yom Kippur War 1973 Soviet Union 
256 Oman/South Yemen 1973 Yemen (YPR) 
257 Cyprus III 1974 Greece 
258 Final N. Vietnam Offensive 1974 Vietnam 
259 Mayaguez 1975 Cambodia 
260 War in Angola 1975 Soviet Union 
261 Moroccan March 1975 Algeria 
263 Cod war II 1975 Iceland 
265 Lebanon-Civil War I 1976 Syria 
267 Operation Thrasher 1976 Zimbabwe 
272 Aegean Sea I 1976 Greece 
273 Nagomia Raid 1976 Zimbabwe 
274 Poplar Tree 1976 North Korea 
275 Syria Mobilization 1976 Syria 
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Table A.1 (continued).  
Crisis Number Crisis Name Start Year Primary Adversary 
277 Shaba I 1977 Angola 
278 Mapai Seizure 1977 Zimbabwe 
279 Belize II 1977 Guatemala 
281 Egypt/Libya Clashes 1977 Libya 
282 Ogaden II 1977 Ethiopia 
283 Rhodesia Raid 1977 Zimbabwe 
286 Chimoio-Tembue Raids 1977 Zimbabwe 
287 Beagle Channel I 1977 Argentina 
289 Litani Operation 1978 Israel 
291 Cassinga Incident 1978 South Africa 
292 Shaba II 1978 Angola 
293 Air Rhodesia Incident 1978 Zimbabwe 
294 Nicaragua Civil War II 1978 Nicaragua 
295 Beagle Channel II 1978 Argentina 
296 Fall of Amin 1978 Libya 
298 Sino/Vietnam War 1978 Vietnam 
301 North/South Yemen II 1979 Yemen (YPR) 
303 Afghanistan Invasion 1979 Soviet Union 
306 Soviet Threat/Pak. 1979 Soviet Union 
307 Rhodesian Settlement 1979 Zimbabwe 
309 US Hostages in Iran 1979 Iran 
310 Colombia/Nicaragua 1979 Nicaragua 
311 Raid on Gafsa 1980 Libya 
315 Solidarity 1980 Soviet Union 
317 Onset Iran/Iraq War 1980 Iran 
319 Jordan/Syria Confrontation 1980 Syria 
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Table A.1 (continued).  
Crisis Number Crisis Name Start Year Primary Adversary 
321 Chad/Libya V 1981 Libya 
322 Ecuador/Peru Border II 1981 Peru 
324 Iraq Nuclear Reactor 1981 Israel 
327 Al-Biqa Missiles I 1981 Syria 
329 Coup Attempt Gambia 1981 Gambia 
330 Gulf of Syrte I 1981 Libya 
331 Operation Protea 1981 Angola 
332 Galtat Zemmour I 1981 Mauritania 
335 Khorram Shahr 1982 Iran 
336 Falklands/Malvinas 1982 Argentina 
337 War in Lebanon 1982 Syria 
338 Ogaden III 1982 Ethiopia 
340 Libya Threat/Sudan 1983 Libya 
342 Chad/Libya VI 1983 Libya 
343 Invasion of Grenada 1983 Cuba 
344 Able Archer 83 1983 Soviet Union 
347 Operation Askari 1983 South Africa 
348 Basra-Kharg Island 1984 Iran 
350 Omdurman Bombing 1984 Libya 
351 Vietnam-Thailand 1984 Vietnam 
352 Sino/Vietnam Clashes 1984 Vietnam 
354 Nicaragua MiG-21 1984 Nicaragua 
355 Botswana Raid 1985 South Africa 
356 Expulsion-Tunisians 1985 Libya 
357 Al-Biqa Missiles II 1985 Syria 
358 Egypt Air Hijacking 1985 Libya 
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Table A.1 (continued).  
Crisis Number Crisis Name Start Year Primary Adversary 
360 Lesotho Raid II 1985 South Africa 
361 Capture of Al-Faw 1986 Iran 
362 Chad/Libya VII 1986 Libya 
363 Gulf of Syrte II 1986 Libya 
365 South African Raid 1986 South Africa 
369 Contras II 1986 Nicaragua 
370 Chad/Libya VIII 1986 Libya 
376 Aegean Sea III 1987 Turkey 
380 S. African Intervention-Angola 1987 Angola 
383 Contras III 1988 Nicaragua 
385 Iraq Recapture-Al-Faw 1988 Iran 
386 Libyan Jets 1988 Libya 
388 Cambodia Peace Conf. 1989 Cambodia 
391 Invasion of Panama 1989 Panama 
392 Kashmir III-Nuclear 1990 India 
393 Gulf War 1990 Iraq 
395 Liberia/Sierra Leone 1991 Sierra Leone 
397 Yugoslavia I-Croat./Sloven 1991 Yugoslavia 
398 Bubiyan 1991 Iraq 
399 Foreign Intervention Zaire  1991 Zaire 
400 Ecuador/Peru Border IV 1991 Ecuador 
401 Nagornyy Karabakh 1991 Azerbaijan 
403 Yugoslavia II-Bosnia 1992 Yugoslavia 
406 Iraq No-Fly Zone 1992 Iraq 
408 N. Korea Nuclear I 1993 North Korea 
409 Operation Accountability 1993 Lebanon 
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Table A.1 (continued).  
Crisis Number Crisis Name Start Year Primary Adversary 
411 Haiti Military Regime 1994 Haiti 
412 Iraq Deploy/Kuwait 1994 Iraq 
413 Ecuador/Peru Border V 1995 Ecuador 
415 Taiwan Strait IV 1995 China 
416 Red Sea Islands 1995 Eritrea 
417 Aegean Sea IV 1996 Turkey 
418 Operation Grapes of Wrath 1996 Lebanon 
419 Desert Strike 1996 Iraq 
420 N. Korea Submarine 1996 North Korea 
421 Zaire Civil War 1996 Zaire 
422 UNSCOM I 1997 Iraq 
423 Cyprus/Turkey Missiles 1998 Turkey 
424 Eritrea/Ethiopia 1998 Eritrea 
425 Ind/Pak Nuclear Test 1998 India 
426 DRC Civil War 1998 Angola 
427 US Embassy Bombings 1998 Afghanistan 
428 UNSCOM II 1998 Iraq 
429 Kosovo 1999 Yugoslavia 
430 Kargil 1999 Pakistan 
431 East Timor II 1999 Indonesia 
432 Caspian Sea 2001 Iran 
433 Afghanistan/US 2001 Afghanistan 
434 India Parliament Attack 2001 Pakistan 
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Table A.2. Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
634  1949 China 
2006  1949 China 
633  1950 China 
51 Korean War 1950 North Korea 
2052  1951 China 
1286 Yugoslavia vs. Cominform countries 1951 Soviet Union 
1702  1952 Ecuador 
50  1953 China 
208  1953 Soviet Union 
2035  1953 China 
2244 Korean war truce violations 1954 China 
2033  1954 China 
1193  1954 Nicaragua 
1705  1954 Ecuador 
3209  1954 Switzerland 
3243  1955 Peru 
3242  1955 Peru 
2032  1955 China 
2843  1956 Egypt 
53  1956 China 
200 Sinai War 1956 Egypt 
3222  1956 Mexico 
607 Turkey/Syria 1957 Syria 
2049  1957 China 
2849  1957 Soviet Union 
2845  1957 Chile 
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Table A.2 (continued).  
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
2857  1958 Albania 
2187  1958 North Korea 
125 US intervention in Lebanon 1958 Lebanon 
2215 Soviet downing of a C-118 transport plane 1958 Soviet Union 
2854  1958 East Germany 
173  1958 China 
608 1958-1959 Berlin Deadline Crisis 1958 Soviet Union 
2216  1958 Soviet Union 
1124  1958 Guatemala 
1742 Cuban Threat 1959 Cuba 
2870  1959 Switzerland 
2867  1959 Dominica 
246 Bay of Pigs Invasion 1960 Cuba 
253 U-2 and RB47 Incidents 1960 Soviet Union 
2002  1960 China 
2876  1960 Austria 
1363  1961 Vietnam 
1801  1961 Dominican Republic 
2217 Operation Mongoose 1961 Cuba 
27 Berlin Wall Crisis 1961 Soviet Union 
2219  1961 Soviet Union 
3361  1961 China 
61 Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Soviet Union 
172  1962 China 
1353  1962 Vietnam 
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Table A.2 (continued).  
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
2188  1962 North Korea 
3244  1962 Peru 
1108 Yemen Civil War I 1962 Egypt 
2899  1963 Soviet Union 
2218  1963 Soviet Union 
1002  1963 Haiti 
1803  1963 Ecuador 
2189  1963 North Korea 
2220  1964 Soviet Union 
2909  1964 Soviet Union 
611 Vietnam War 1964 Vietnam 
1213  1964 Vietnam 
2901  1964 Soviet Union 
1379 DMZ Clashes 1964 North Korea 
2906  1964 Egypt 
251  1965 China 
2916  1965 North Korea 
2910  1965 Soviet Union 
2929  1965 China 
1216  1965 Vietnam 
2921 Helicopter in W. Germany 1966 Soviet Union 
2608  1966 Guinea-Bissau 
1805  1967 Ecuador 
1217  1967 Vietnam 
2934  1967 Soviet Union 
2931  1967 Soviet Union 
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Table A.2 (continued).  
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
2930  1967 Soviet Union 
345  1967 Soviet Union 
347 Seizure of USS Pueblo 1968 North Korea 
1806  1968 Vietnam 
2924  1968 Egypt 
2928  1968 Soviet Union 
350  1969 Peru 
2941  1969 North Korea 
2936  1969 China 
1039  1970 Jordan 
2221  1970 Soviet Union 
1158 Tuna Boats I 1971 Ecuador 
2946  1971 Cuba 
2947  1971 China 
2943  1971 Cuba 
601  1972 Peru 
2949  1972 Soviet Union 
2948  1972 China 
602 Tuna Boats II 1972 Ecuador 
2950  1973 Libya 
353 Yom Kippur 1973 Soviet Union 
2951  1974 Cuba 
2952  1974 Canada 
356 Seizure of Mayaguez 1975 Cambodia 
1472  1975 North Korea 
2954  1975 Cuba 
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Table A.2 (continued).  
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
2953  1975 Canada 
2958  1976 Cuba 
2957  1976 Panama 
362 Tree  Trimming Incident 1976 North Korea 
2335 Israeli attack on US oil rigs 1976 Israel 
2960  1976 North Korea 
2222 Seizure of two Fishing boats 1977 Soviet Union 
2962  1977 Cuba 
2192 North Korean Economic Zone 1977 North Korea 
2223 US aircraft task force to Iran 1978 Iran 
2193  1979 North Korea 
2225 Soviet Combat Unit in Cuba 1979 Soviet Union 
2224 Capture of US Torpedo Boat 1979 Soviet Union 
2968  1979 Canada 
3021 US maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra 1979 Libya 
3020 Iran hostage crisis 1979 Iran 
2967  1979 Peru 
2226 Baltic Sea Maneuvers 1980 Soviet Union 
2227 US threat after Tito's death 1980 Soviet Union 
3105 US/Ecuador 1980 Ecuador 
2228 US seizure of Soviet cargo 1981 Soviet Union 
2972  1981 Cuba 
2971  1981 North Korea 
3099 Gulf of Sidra air clash 1981 Libya 
3098 Libyan air raids into Sudan 1981 Libya 
2979  1982 North Korea 
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Table A.2 (continued).  
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
2978  1982 Libya 
2977  1982 Nicaragua 
3088  1982 Libya 
2229 Militarization of Kuril Islands 1982 Soviet Union 
2982  1982 Soviet Union 
3613  1982 Yemen 
2195  1983 North Korea 
3071  1983 Iran 
3072 Libyan pressure on Sudan I 1983 Libya 
2347  1983 Nicaragua 
2981  1983 Cuba 
2176  1983 Greece 
3065 Pressure on Libya 1983 Libya 
3634  1983 Libya 
3062 USA/Syria clashes in Lebanon 1983 Syria 
3058 Invasion of Grenada 1983 Cuba 
2231 
Deployment of Soviet SS-22 
missiles and US Pershing 
missiles 
1983 Soviet Union 
3541  1984 Iran 
3051 Libyan pressure on Sudan II 1984 Libya 
2230  1984 Soviet Union 
2196  1985 North Korea 
2232 Shooting of Major Arthur D. Nicholson Jr. 1985 Soviet Union 
2559  1985 Czechoslovakia 
3620  1985 Libya 
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Table A.2 (continued).  
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
3625  1985 Iran 
3636  1986 Libya 
2578  1986 Iran 
3637  1986 Soviet Union 
2353  1986 Nicaragua 
2233  1986 Soviet Union 
2740  1987 Iran 
2739  1987 Iraq 
2742  1987 Cuba 
2741  1987 Panama 
2774  1988 Iraq 
2834  1988 Iran 
2775  1988 Libya 
3901  1989 Panama 
3903  1989 Libya 
3900  1989 Canada 
3950  1990 Cuba 
3957 Persian Gulf War 1990 Iraq 
3974 Iraqi No-fly-zone Violations 1991 Iraq 
3973  1991 Iran 
3972  1991 Canada 
3550  1992 Peru 
3551  1992 Yugoslavia 
3552  1992 Iraq 
3568  1993 Iraq 
4021  1993 North Korea 
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Table A.2 (continued).  
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
4299  1993 Iraq 
4016  1993 Haiti 
4022  1993 North Korea 
4046  1994 Yugoslavia 
4065  1994 China 
4269  1994 Iraq 
4087  1994 North Korea 
4270  1994 Iraq 
4064 Taiwan independence moves 1995 China 
4196  1996 Cuba 
4195  1996 Libya 
4190  1996 Syria 
4271  1996 Iraq 
4183  1997 Canada 
4174  1997 Russia 
4273 Operation Desert Fox 1997 Iraq 
4216  1997 Iran 
4137 NATO/Yugoslavia 1998 Yugoslavia 
4217 Embassy retaliation 1998 Sudan 
4227 Embassy retaliation 1998 Afghanistan 
4254  1998 Liberia 
4342 NATO v. Russia 1999 Russia 
4125  1999 North Korea 
4088 Taiwan independence moves 1999 China 
4186 KFOR v. Yugoslavia 2000 Yugoslavia 
4213  2000 Russia 
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Table A.2 (continued). Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Dispute 
Number Dispute Name (if any) Start Year Primary Adversary 
4218  2000 North Korea 
4298  2000 Yugoslavia 
4220  2000 Russia 
4261  2000 Venezuela 
4197  2000 Russia 
4343  2000 Yugoslavia 
4336  2001 China 
4281 Taiwan independence moves 2001 China 
4280 spy plane collision 2001 China 
4283 Taliban/Osama  2001 Afghanistan 
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APPENDIX B 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
This appendix includes two types of analyses.  First, it includes explorations of the 
empirical thresholds of Public support and opposition.  Second, the appendix includes 
alternative model specifications – variations on the number of variables included in a model as 
well as exclusions of certain crises.  Concerning the former, one way to discover the precise 
state of public opinion associated with the Crisis response choices is to identify the values of 
support and opposition – using continuous measures of public opinion – associated with the 
cutpoint at which the probability of a given Crisis response choice is greater than .50 (see e.g., 
Long 1997).  However, as I discuss in chapter III, the public did not register its preferences 
concerning military involvement for all of the crises in which the US is a participant.  If 
continuous measures of public opinion are employed, there is no theoretically-informed way to 
replace missing values and many crises would be excluded from the analyses.  Excluding a 
substantial number of observations on the basis of absent data may constitute a selection bias 
(see e.g., King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Collier and Mahoney 1996).  An effort to avoid 
selection bias resulted in the decision to construct categorical measures of public opinion.  But 
the categorical measures do not allow us to identify the specific values of support or opposition 
systematically associated with presidential Crisis response choices.   
In order to empirically identify the threshold values of public opinion, I vary the 
measurement definitions of the Public support and Public opposition variables and reestimate 
the models.  For example, I redefine Latest public support as polls in which more than 51% of 
respondents support military involvement and estimate its impact on Crisis response choice.  
Then, I redefine Latest public support as polls in which more than 52% of respondents support 
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military involvement and analyze the model again.  I repeat this procedure, raising the 
threshold to the maximum value of public support.  This series of analyses is conducted for all 
three measures of public support.  Next, I redefined the three measures of public opposition, 
first, redefining Latest public opposition as polls in which more than 51% of respondents 
oppose military involvement and estimate its impact on the use of force.  Then, I redefined 
Latest public opposition as polls in which more than 52% of respondents oppose military 
involvement and analyze the model again.  Again, this procedure was repeated until I reached 
the maximum value of public opposition.  These analyses enable us to identify the specific 
thresholds of support and opposition associated with presidential crisis decision making and 
also bolster the extent to which we are confident with our theoretical framework.   
The specifications of the models constituting the sensitivity analysis are identical to 
those appearing on the last columns of the “Alternative Specifications” tables in chapter III.  
However, I also redefine Public ambivalence/indifference to account for crises in which public 
opinion polls were available, but that public support and opposition did not meet the defined 
levels.  Consequently, the significance of the included public opinion variables suggests 
whether they differ systematically in their influences on Crisis response choice relative to No 
guidance.  The specification is summarized  
Z = 1β (Public Support) + 2β (Public Opposition) + 3β (Public Ambivalence/indifference) + 
4β ( Relative Capabilities) + 5β ( Contiguity) + 6β ( Cold War) + ε  
 
where z is an underlying index of the propensity of the president to choose a given crisis 
response choice.   
The results of the sensitivity analyses are displayed in the tables below.  These results 
are largely unsurprising.  All three measures of public support remain positive and significant 
when public support is defined as greater than 51% through the maximum observed values in 
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analyses using the ICB data to identify crises.  But for the analyses in which crises are 
identified by the MID data, the significance of the effect of Average public support is obscured 
once it is defined as greater than 76%.  The results of the threshold analyses for the measures 
of public opposition reveal a somewhat different pattern.   
In general, all three measures of public opposition are consistently associated with 
lower Crisis response choices relative to Public support and Public Ambivalence/indifference 
beginning with the opposition greater than 49% threshold and for all thresholds up to 
opposition greater than 61%.  Within this range, Public opposition has a larger positive impact 
on the response categories than No guidance.  However, beyond the opposition greater than 
61% the effect of some of the measures of Public opposition are statistically indistinguishable 
from No guidance.  This suggests that higher levels of opposition have a similar impact on 
Crisis response choice as No guidance at these levels of opposition.   
This appendix also includes alternative specifications of models shown or discussed in 
Chapter IV.  Table B.13 is a replication using the MID data of the Logit analysis in which the 
dependent variable is redefined to take on the value of “1” when the crisis outcome was a Land 
force assault and zero otherwise.  Tables B.14 and B.15 summarize the results of the analyses 
in which costly wars (i.e., Korean and Vietnam Wars) are excluded from the set of crises 
examined.  In Tables B.16 and B.17, I show the results of specifications in which only one of 
the three theoretically-important public opinion variables (Public Support, Public 
ambivalence/indifference, and Public opposition) is included in the model without any of the 
others.  These analyses weigh the impact of the included variables relative to the excluded 
categories.  Finally, Tables B.18 through B.23 show additional empirical threshold tests.  
Although these are similar to those appearing near the front of the appendix, these consist of 
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only redefinition of the Public opposition dummy variables while excluding the other public 
opinion variables.   
Overall, these analyses are very informative.  In some cases, they point to the 
robustness of the findings presented in Chapter IV, while in others; the analyses suggest the 
limits of the measures employed.  For example, the analyses showing the exclusion of the 
crises that were part of costly wars are very similar to the findings presented earlier.  On the 
other hand, the analyses that include only one category of public opinion suggest the 
importance of including as many categories as mathematically possible.  
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Table B.1.  Sensitivity Analyses of Latest Public Support (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 54 55 57 58 59 63 67 69 80 81 
Latest Public 
support 3.64* 3.86* 4.09* 3.53* 3.51* 3.33* 3.48* 3.99* 3.40* 3.80* 
Latest Public 
opposition 1.38* 1.38* 1.37* 1.37* 1.37* 1.38* 1.38* 1.39* 1.40* 1.41* 
Latest Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference  
2.13* 2.10* 2.07* 2.27* 2.31* 2.37* 2.36* 2.38* 2.42* 2.43* 
Relative 
capabilities .957 1.02 1.06 .917 .972 .996 .942 1.09 .970 .697 
Contiguity  .427* .442* .449* .314 .301 .309 .397 .447 .380 .285 
Cold War .054 .117 .187 .098 .114 -.052 -.022 -.148 -.163 -.113 
1τ  2.83 2.94 3.04 2.82 2.89 2.77 2.75 2.79 2.66 2.44 
2τ  4.23 4.38 4.51 4.20 4.26 4.12 4.10 4.14 3.99 3.78 
3τ  5.28 5.38 5.54 5.14 5.19 5.04 5.02 5.06 4.90 4.69 
Chi-square 62.50* 74.13* 159.52* 62.68* 59.95* 57.62* 48.49* 55.14* 47.60* 53.94* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable identified in 
the title of the table.  Latest public support>87 failed converge.   
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Table B.2.  Sensitivity Analyses of Latest Public Opposition (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 49 50 51 52 56 57 58 59 60 
Latest Public 
support 3.30* 3.29* 3.27* 3.25* 3.25* 3.25* 3.23* 3.32* 3.33* 
Latest Public 
opposition 1.73* 1.70* 1.75* 1.72* 1.73* 1.69* 1.78* 1.46* 1.38* 
Latest Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.46* 2.46* 2.40* 2.35* 2.32* 2.33* 2.23* 2.36* 2.37* 
Relative 
capabilities .913 .905 .842 .831 .840 .859 .714 .987 .996 
Contiguity  .289 .293 .308 .339 .297 .300 .316 .305 .309 
Cold War -.097 -.104 -.124 -.149 -.155 -.161 -.150 -.051 -.052 
1τ  2.65 2.64 2.57 2.54 2.54 2.55 2.43 2.76 2.77 
2τ  4.00 3.98 3.90 3.87 3.87 3.88 3.75 4.11 4.12 
3τ  4.92 4.91 4.82 4.79 4.78 4.80 4.65 5.02 5.04 
Chi-square 45.76* 45.96* 47.95* 48.65* 55.94* 56.46* 60.08* 56.80* 57.62* 
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Table B.2 (continued).   
Variable 61 64 66 70 71 73 77 78 
Latest Public 
support 3.39* 3.36* 3.41* 3.37* 3.31* 3.29* 3.31* 3.28* 
Latest Public 
opposition 1.12* 1.20* .975* 1.05* 1.23* 1.33* 1.00* 1.12* 
Latest Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.42* 2.37* 2.44* 2.39* 2.30* 2.26* 2.29* 2.25* 
Relative 
capabilities 1.09 1.03 1.17 1.08 .928 .848 .765 .702 
Contiguity  .304 .318 .319 .328 .344 .348 .245 .261 
Cold War .024 -.006 .033 .004 -.052 -.078 -.057 -.082 
1τ  2.93 2.84 3.00 2.90 2.71 2.61 2.55 2.47 
2τ  4.30 4.20 4.38 4.26 4.05 3.95 3.89 3.80 
3τ  5.22 5.12 5.31 5.19 4.97 4.86 4.81 4.72 
Chi-square 66.40* 67.22* 74.03* 71.99* 75.84* 75.49* 58.51* 60.66* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable 
identified in the title of the table.  Latest Public opposition >94 failed to converge.   
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Table B.3.  Sensitivity Analyses of Average Public Support (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 57 57.75 58 58.89 76 77 82 
Average Public 
support 4.06* 4.06* 3.49* 3.09* 3.26* 3.53* 4.00* 
Average Public 
opposition 1.02* 1.03* 1.03* 1.04* 1.04* 1.04* 1.04* 
Average Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.45* 2.47* 2.59* 2.63* 2.63* 2.62* 2.63* 
Relative 
capabilities 1.27* 1.30* 1.12* 1.00 1.07* 1.08 .823 
Contiguity  .423 .428 .353 .344 .346 .423 .333 
Cold War .111 .020 .040 .006 -.012 .006 .062 
1τ  3.17 3.12 2.97 2.83 2.87 2.90 2.71 
2τ  4.61 4.55 4.36 4.22 4.26 4.29 4.09 
3τ  5.60 5.53 5.30 5.15 5.20 5.23 5.04 
Chi-square 64.38* 57.32* 58.71* 52.14* 49.25* 45.41* 48.65* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the 
variable identified in the title of the table.  Average public support > 87 failed to converge.   
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Table B.4.  Sensitivity Analyses of Average Public Opposition (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 50 52 52.17 53 53.5 54 55 56 56.5 
Average Public 
support 3.14* 3.12* 3.09* 3.06* 3.09* 3.12* 3.12* 3.11* 3.10* 
Average Public 
opposition 1.68* 1.72* 1.76* 1.84* 1.76* 1.69* 1.65* 1.61* 1.51* 
Average Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.63* 2.56* 2.50* 2.38* 2.46* 2.51* 2.51* 2.51* 2.51* 
Relative 
capabilities .757 .722 .671 .652 .729 .760 .770 .754 .716 
Contiguity  .297 .311 .319 .349 .355 .352 .366 .375 .394 
Cold War -.176 -.203 -.227 -.269 -.247 -.197 -.203 -.211 -.228 
1τ  2.44 2.39 2.32 2.28 2.36 2.43 2.44 2.42 2.37 
2τ  3.80 3.73 3.65 3.59 3.69 3.77 3.78 3.76 3.72 
3τ  4.72 4.65 4.57 4.49 4.60 4.69 4.70 4.68 4.64 
Chi-square 39.90* 40.99* 42.75* 45.03* 42.78* 41.94* 41.95* 42.21* 42.65* 
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Table B.4 (continued).   
Variable 57 58 58.5 58.7 59 60 60.7 60.9 61 
Average Public 
support 3.12* 3.10* 3.14* 3.21* 3.26* 3.26* 3.28* 3.24* 3.24* 
Average Public 
opposition 1.39* 1.44* 1.24* 1.16* 1.04* 1.04* .789* .854* .693 
Average Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.58* 2.53* 2.60* 2.61* 2.63* 2.63* 2.63* 2.58* 2.58* 
Relative 
capabilities .765 .726 .750 .973 1.07* 1.07* 1.20* 1.13* 1.13* 
Contiguity  .408 .410* .420 .332 .346 .346 .421 .427* .450* 
Cold War -.211 -.232 -.133 -.116 -.012 -.012 -.019 -.053 -.058 
1τ  2.43 2.38 2.48 2.70 2.87 2.87 3.00 2.91 2.90 
2τ  3.80 3.73 3.85 4.08 4.26 4.26 4.41 4.30 4.30 
3τ  4.73 4.66 4.79 5.02 5.20 5.20 5.34 5.23 5.23 
Chi-square 41.77* 42.46* 43.09* 50.97* 49.25* 49.25* 54.58* 53.93* 55.22* 
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Table B.4 (continued).   
Variable 65 66 70 71 72 77 78 83 
Average Public 
support 3.30* 3.27* 3.23* 3.17* 3.14* 3.11* 3.09* 3.06* 
Average Public 
opposition .547 .623 .708 .895 1.02* 1.14* 1.27* 1.42* 
Average Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.56* 2.52* 2.47* 2.38* 2.35* 2.31* 2.27* 2.23* 
Relative 
capabilities 1.28* 1.23* 1.14* .989 .750 .709 .644 .586 
Contiguity  .327 .344 .352 .367* .240 .262 .277 .292 
Cold War -.058 -.089 -.118 -.174 -.191 -.217 -.243 -.268 
1τ  3.03 2.96 2.85 2.67 2.43 2.37 2.29 2.22 
2τ  4.43 4.34 4.22 4.01 3.76 3.69 3.60 3.52 
3τ  5.36 5.26 5.14 4.92 4.66 4.59 4.50 4.42 
Chi-square 73.36* 76.50* 73.39* 79.05* 55.46* 57.45* 60.35* 62.31* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable 
identified in the title of the table.  Average public opposition > 93 failed to converge.   
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Table B.5.  Sensitivity Analyses of Initial Public Support (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 49 52 55 57 74 76 80 
Initial Public 
support 3.65* 3.60* 3.58* 3.56* 2.98* 3.19* 3.40* 
Initial Public 
opposition 1.34* 1.34* 1.33* 1.33* 1.34* 1.34* 1.34* 
Initial Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.24* 2.33* 2.36* 2.40* 2.50* 2.50* 2.50* 
Relative 
capabilities .721 .765 .804 .830 .619 .438 .417 
Contiguity  .465* .427* .415* .401* .368* .359* .352* 
Cold War -.097 -.057 -.038 -.022 -.149 -.083 -.084 
1τ  2.49 2.56 2.61 2.65 2.35 2.24 2.22 
2τ  3.91 3.95 3.99 4.02 3.70 3.58 3.57 
3τ  4.87 4.90 4.93 4.95 4.61 4.50 4.49 
Chi-square 96.11* 84.57* 75.62* 68.72* 69.83* 60.16* 59.35* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the 
variable identified in the title of the table.  Initial public support > 83 failed to converge.   
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Table B.6.  Sensitivity Analyses of Initial Public Opposition (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 50 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 
Initial Public 
support 2.92* 2.90* 2.88* 2.88* 2.94* 2.94* 2.92* 2.93* 2.98* 
Initial Public 
opposition 1.72* 1.69* 1.76* 1.73* 1.59* 1.64* 1.49* 1.37* 1.30* 
Initial Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.69* 2.61* 2.48* 2.45* 2.53* 2.47* 2.48* 2.55* 2.54* 
Relative 
capabilities .507 .522 .461 .492 .530 .519 .438 .449 .501 
Contiguity  .291 .342 .348 .301 .288 .295 .311 .310 .320 
Cold War -.250 -.282 -.282 -.291 -.216 -.185 -.219 -.221 -.134 
1τ  2.16 2.15 2.09 2.11 2.21 2.22 2.12 2.13 2.25 
2τ  3.50 3.49 3.42 3.43 3.55 3.55 3.46 3.49 3.61 
3τ  4.43 4.41 4.32 4.34 4.47 4.47 4.37 4.41 4.53 
Chi-square 54.17* 55.42* 57.61* 62.69* 71.57* 72.33* 76.17* 74.02* 72.60* 
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Table B.6 (continued).   
Variable 60 64 66 70 74 77 81 84 87 
Initial Public 
support 2.98* 2.97* 2.99* 2.97* 2.95* 2.95* 2.91* 2.94* 2.92* 
Initial Public 
opposition 1.34* 1.26* 1.07* 1.18* 1.33* 1.43* 1.66* 1.54* 1.68* 
Initial Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.50* 2.50* 2.50* 2.41* 2.29* 2.26* 2.19* 2.20* 2.17* 
Relative 
capabilities .619 .594 .569 .683 .427 .492 .422 .520 .476 
Contiguity  .368* .381* .410* .463* .350 .321 .333 .290 .308 
Cold War -.149 -.161 -.122 -.153 -.117 -.128 -.171 -.154 -.177 
1τ  2.35 2.32 2.33 2.41 2.20 2.25 2.15 2.25 2.19 
2τ  3.70 3.67 3.69 3.76 3.52 3.56 3.45 3.55 3.49 
3τ  4.61 4.58 4.61 4.66 4.41 4.45 4.33 4.44 4.37 
Chi-square 69.83* 69.79* 75.85* 69.99* 65.59* 66.53* 68.44* 73.75* 75.63* 
Note: * p<.10; two-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable 
identified in the title of the table.  Initial public opposition > 92 failed to converge.   
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Table B.7.  Sensitivity Analyses of Latest Public Support (MID; N=212) 
Variable 55 57 58 59 63 64 67 69 80 81 
Latest Public 
support 2.25* 2.30* 2.12* 2.05* 1.87* 2.02* 1.82* 2.18* 1.25 3.28* 
Latest Public 
opposition .899* .897* .899* .900* .903* .901* .901* .901* .903* .901* 
Latest Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
1.90* 1.90* 1.95* 1.97* 2.00* 1.98* 1.99* 1.97* 2.01* 1.96* 
Relative 
capabilities .412 .419 .436 .443 .437 .444 .437 .454 .395 .404 
Contiguity  -1.04* -1.05* -1.03* -1.03* -1.02* -1.02* -1.03* -1.02* -1.04* -1.03* 
Cold War -.103 -.088 -.118 -.131 -.155 -.140 -.150 -.140 -.155 -.097 
1τ  -.130 -.114 -.118 -.119 -.139 -.123 -.139 -.114 -.186 -.127 
2τ  2.46 2.48 2.47 2.47 2.45 2.47 2.45 2.48 2.41 2.46 
3τ  3.62 3.64 3.63 3.62 3.60 3.62 3.60 3.63 3.56 3.63 
Chi-square 70.07* 69.61* 74.69* 74.72* 76.73* 80.39* 83.78* 75.70* 73.50* 72.48* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable identified in 
the title of the table.  Latest public support > 83 failed converge.   
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Table B.8.  Sensitivity Analyses of Latest Public Opposition (MID; N=212) 
Variable 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 59 
Latest Public 
support 1.83* 1.82* 1.82* 1.82* 1.83* 1.83* 1.84* 1.82* 1.84* 1.87* 
Latest Public 
opposition 1.48* 1.49* 1.46* 1.51* 1.37* 1.39* 1.30* 1.37* 1.11* .894* 
Latest Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.05* 2.02* 2.05* 1.92* 1.97* 1.95* 2.01* 1.91* 1.98* 2.03* 
Relative 
capabilities .264 .248 .245 .301 .321 .358 .390 .316 .440 .452 
Contiguity  -1.08* -1.08* -1.08* -1.07* -1.08* -1.07* -1.06* -1.06* -1.02* -1.01* 
Cold War -.167 -.169 -.178 -.183 -.180 -.162 -.169 -.180 -.228 -.185 
1τ  -.311 -.326 -.335 -.287 -.272 -.223 -.200 -.270 -.192 -.151 
2τ  2.24 2.22 2.22 2.26 2.28 2.33 2.36 2.28 2.38 2.45 
3τ  3.38 3.36 3.36 3.39 3.42 3.47 3.50 3.41 3.53 3.60 
Chi-square 90.30* 91.85* 94.30* 100.14* 102.86* 101.57* 99.07* 89.07* 83.80* 81.04* 
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Table B.8 (continued).   
Variable 60 61 63 64 71 73 76 78  
Latest Public 
support 1.87* 1.84* 1.84* 1.84* 1.86* 1.86* 1.89* 1.86*  
Latest Public 
opposition .903* 1.03* 1.16* 1.18* .890 .906 .545 .847  
Latest Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.00* 1.92* 1.84* 1.82* 1.87* 1.85* 1.90* 1.85*  
Relative 
capabilities .437 .334 .313 .360 .428 .399 .461 .417  
Contiguity  -1.02* -1.05* -1.08* -1.07* -1.07* -1.07* -1.07* -1.06*  
Cold War -.155 -.162 -.140 -.123 -.114 -.090 -.070 -.092  
1τ  -.139 -.241 -.250 -.192 -.128 -.134 -.070 -.118  
2τ  2.45 2.33 2.30 2.36 2.43 2.42 2.51 2.44  
3τ  3.60 3.47 3.44 3.49 3.58 3.56 3.66 3.58  
Chi-square 76.73* 81.64* 87.72* 87.51* 82.61* 86.62* 79.48* 100.34*  
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.    The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable 
identified in the title of the table.  Latest public opposition > 92 failed converge.   
  
241
Table B.9.  Sensitivity Analyses of Average Public Support (MID; N=212) 
Variable 52 57 57.75 58 63 67 69 72 76 77 
Average Public 
support 2.45* 2.32* 2.24* 1.98* 1.68* 1.48* 1.58* 1.26* 1.81 2.55 
Average Public 
opposition .437 .439 .442 .450 .461 .464 .459 .463 .450 .443 
Average Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.13* 2.17* 2.18* 2.23* 2.28* 2.30* 2.27* 2.30* 2.23* 2.18* 
Relative 
capabilities .650 .627 .629 .616 .595 .571 .572 .518 .584 .646 
Contiguity  -1.00* -1.00* -.995* -.981* -.965* -.957* -.963* -.955* -.976* -.985* 
Cold War .016 .007 -.005 -.029 -.057 -.051 -.029 -.008 -.008 -.004 
1τ  .166 .140 .135 .110 .074 .060 .077 .048 .100 .154 
2τ  2.85 2.82 2.81 2.79 2.77 2.76 2.77 2.76 2.79 2.83 
3τ  4.05 4.01 4.01 3.98 3.96 3.96 3.97 3.96 3.98 4.03 
Chi-square 44.34* 46.79* 47.59* 56.95* 56.46* 56.15* 52.49* 51.52* 55.95* 55.58* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable identified in 
the title of the table.  Average public support > 79 failed converge.   
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Table B.10.  Sensitivity Analyses of Average Public Opposition (MID; N=212) 
Variable 50 50.5 51 52 53 53.5 54 54.5 
Average Public 
support 1.54* 1.53* 1.53* 1.54* 1.54* 1.54* 1.54* 1.54* 
Average Public 
opposition 1.59* 1.60* 1.57* 1.54* 1.56* 1.48* 1.56* 1.44* 
Average Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.00* 1.96* 2.00* 2.01* 1.98* 2.05* 1.93* 1.98* 
Relative 
capabilities .249 .233 .236 .302 .313 .349 .311 .331 
Contiguity  -1.07* -1.07* -1.07* -1.05* -1.04* -1.03* -1.04* -1.02* 
Cold War -.179 -.181 -.187 -.195 -.196 -.205 -.193 -.216 
1τ  -.330 -.345 -.347 -.291 -.281 -.255 -.277 -.273 
2τ  2.22 2.21 2.21 2.27 2.28 2.31 2.28 2.29 
3τ  3.36 3.34 3.35 3.41 3.41 3.45 3.41 3.42 
Chi-square 92.70* 93.82* 96.60* 99.62* 98.50* 98.17* 86.79* 84.47* 
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Table B.10 (continued).   
Variable 55 55.65 56 56.7 56.75 57 58.4 59 
Average Public 
support 1.54* 1.55* 1.55* 1.56* 1.60* 1.62* 1.64* 1.67* 
Average Public 
opposition 1.44* 1.18* 1.18* 1.06* .836* .826* .704* .567 
Average Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
1.98* 2.09* 2.09* 2.16* 2.24* 2.22* 2.25* 2.29* 
Relative 
capabilities .331 .363 .363 .384 .404 .515 .522 .516 
Contiguity  -1.02* -.993* -.993* -.980* -.967* -.940* -.935* -.934* 
Cold War -.216 -.227 -.227 -.240 -.197 -.158 -.112 -.060 
1τ  -.273 -.250 -.250 -.240 -.191 -.056 -.015 .016 
2τ  2.29 2.34 2.34 2.37 2.45 2.58 2.65 2.71 
3τ  3.42 3.49 3.49 3.53 3.63 3.76 3.83 3.90 
Chi-square 84.47* 75.67* 75.67* 73.23* 67.90* 67.14* 63.47* 62.27* 
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Table B.10 (continued).   
Variable 60 61 61.5 62 65 67 71 83 
Average Public 
support 1.68* 1.63* 1.64* 1.60* 1.58* 1.58* 1.57* 1.57* 
Average Public 
opposition .461 .559 .426 .632 .846* .846* .849* .863* 
Average Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.28* 2.15* 2.14* 2.01* 1.95* 1.93* 1.91* 1.89* 
Relative 
capabilities .595 .490 .545 .521 .476 .457 .425 .394 
Contiguity  -.965* -.967* -1.00* -1.05* -1.05* -1.04* -1.05* -1.05* 
Cold War -.057 -.099 -.097 -.115 -.129 -.138 -.147 -.120 
1τ  .074 -.042 -.007 -.051 -.095 -.116 -.150 -.156 
2τ  2.77 2.60 2.65 2.55 2.48 2.45 2.41 2.40 
3τ  3.96 3.78 3.82 3.71 3.63 3.61 3.56 3.55 
Chi-square 56.46* 65.36* 60.40* 75.51* 95.74* 95.24* 95.72* 97.01* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable 
identified in the title of the table.  Average public opposition > 92 failed to converge.   
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Table B.11. Sensitivity Analyses of Initial Public Support (MID; N=212) 
Variable 50 52 57 63 67 74 79 80 
Initial Public 
support 2.03* 2.11* 2.14* 1.71* 1.58* 1.69* 4.22* 3.63* 
Initial Public 
opposition 1.29* 1.29* 1.29* 1.30* 1.31* 1.30* 1.30* 1.29* 
Initial Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
1.93* 1.90* 1.90* 2.01* 2.03* 2.00* 1.87* 1.90* 
Relative 
capabilities .493 .497 .500 .492 .483 .482 .350 .409 
Contiguity  -1.04* -1.04* -1.04* -1.02* -1.01* -1.02* -1.06* -1.05* 
Cold War -.095 -.090 -.083 -.136 -.140 -.122 .037 -.024 
1τ  -.047 -.041 -.033 -.074 -.083 -.072 -.076 -.069 
2τ  2.51 2.52 2.52 2.49 2.48 2.49 2.49 2.49 
3τ  3.66 3.67 3.68 3.64 3.63 3.64 3.69 3.66 
Chi-square 77.54* 76.66* 79.46* 104.99* 112.34* 109.47* 113.11* 91.43* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable 
identified in the title of the table.  Initial public support > 83 failed to converge.   
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Table B.12.  Sensitivity Analyses of Initial Public Opposition (MID; N=212) 
Variable 49 50 51 53 54 56 57 59 60 
Initial Public 
support 1.70* 1.69* 1.68* 1.67* 1.69* 1.71* 1.70* 1.72* 1.71* 
Initial Public 
opposition 1.40* 1.46* 1.50* 1.53* 1.46* 1.32* 1.35* 1.29* 1.30* 
Initial Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
2.26* 2.16* 2.06* 1.97* 1.98* 2.07* 2.00* 2.03* 2.01* 
Relative 
capabilities .366 .346 .308 .332 .443 .526 .451 .470 .492 
Contiguity  -1.07* -1.07* -1.07* -1.05* -1.03* -1.02* -1.03* -1.03* -1.02* 
Cold War -.176 -.175 -.183 -.196 -.174 -.142 -.155 -.130 -.136 
1τ  -.232 -.245 -.282 -.264 -.149 -.052 -.127 -.092 -.074 
2τ  2.34 2.32 2.27 2.29 2.40 2.51 2.43 2.47 2.49 
3τ  3.51 3.47 3.42 3.43 3.54 3.67 3.58 3.62 3.64 
Chi-square 99.69* 101.45* 98.42* 89.94* 94.94* 104.80* 103.99* 107.20* 104.99* 
  
247
Table B.12 (continued).   
Variable 61 64 66 69 70 71 76 78 87 
Initial Public 
support 1.70* 1.68* 1.70* 1.69* 1.68* 1.70* 1.70* 1.70* 1.70* 
Initial Public 
opposition 1.32* 1.50* 1.21* 1.26* 1.30* 1.16* 1.20* 1.09* 1.12* 
Initial Public 
ambivalence/ 
indifference 
1.98* 1.87* 1.93* 1.89* 1.87* 1.89* 1.86* 1.86* 1.85* 
Relative 
capabilities .456 .359 .440 .381 .352 .372 .344 .393 .372 
Contiguity  -1.02* -1.06* -1.04* -1.04* -1.05* -1.04* -1.05* -1.06* -1.06* 
Cold War -.143 -.153 -.140 -.153 -.158 -.134 -.118 -.112 -.120 
1τ  -.111 -.210 -.127 -.187 -.217 -.181 -.194 -.152 -.175 
2τ  2.45 2.33 2.43 2.36 2.33 2.37 2.35 2.40 2.37 
3τ  3.59 3.47 3.57 3.50 3.47 3.51 3.49 3.54 3.51 
Chi-square 104.68* 106.19* 94.35* 93.12* 91.99* 104.15* 99.47* 102.52* 100.01* 
Note: * p<.10; one-tailed tests.  The number in the head of each column represents the threshold definition of the variable 
identified in the title of the table.  Initial public opposition > 92 failed to converge.   
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Table B.13.  Logit Estimates of Public Opinion and Land Force Assault, 1949-2001  
(MID; N=212) 
Variable Average Opinion Latest Opinion Initial Opinion 
Public support 3.60*  
3.87* 
 
3.18* 
 
Public opposition -14.41*  
.537 
 
.030 
 
Ambivalence/ 
indifference   
1.68* 
 
1.25* 
 
1.74* 
 
Relative 
capabilities 
13.92* 
 
13.98* 
 
13.87* 
 
Contiguity  -.979  
-.834 
 
-1.04 
 
Cold War 1.78*  
1.81* 
 
1.58* 
 
Constant -17.62*  
-17.72* 
 
-17.36* 
 
Log pseudo-
likelihood -47.05 -49.99 -49.82 
* p<.10 one-tailed test.   
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Table B.14.  Ordered Logit Estimates of Public Opinion and Presidential Crisis Responses Short of Costly War, 1949-2001 
(ICB; N = various) 
Variable 
Average 
Opiniona 
Latest 
Opiniona 
Initial 
Opiniona 
Average 
Opinionb 
Latest 
Opinionb 
Initial 
Opinionb 
Average 
Opinionc 
Latest 
Opinionc 
Initial 
Opinionc 
Public support 3.13*** 3.16*** 2.89*** 3.34*** 3.39*** 3.00*** 3.20*** 3.23*** 2.92*** 
Public opposition 1.12** 1.56*** 1.38*** 1.05** 1.39** 1.35*** 1.14** 1.59*** 1.40*** 
Ambivalence/ 
indifference  2.34*** 1.99*** 2.18*** 2.51*** 2.24*** 2.36*** 2.17*** 1.80*** 1.99*** 
Relative capabilities .634 .365 .243 1.66** 1.55* 1.19* 1.15** .846* .765* 
Contiguity  .483* .496* .505** .613* .586** .628** .782*** .814*** .800*** 
Cold War -.285 -.352 -.360 -.161 -.179 -.264 -.493* -.530* -.520* 
1τ  2.25 1.96 1.84 3.31 3.20 2.79 2.58 2.28 2.21 
2τ  3.81 3.49 3.36 4.76 4.61 4.20 4.24 3.93 3.85 
3τ  4.39 4.07 3.94 5.83 5.67 5.25 4.93 4.64 4.53 
N 197 197 197 203 203 203 194 194 194 
Chi-square 58.68*** 68.20*** 84.37*** 44.75*** 44.60*** 63.50*** 46.33*** 70.90*** 67.94***
* p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test. a Crises involving the Vietnam War are excluded; b Crises involving the Korean War are excluded; c 
Crises involving the Vietnam War and the Korean War are excluded.   
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Table B.15.  Ordered Logit Estimates of Public Opinion and Presidential Crisis Responses Short of Costly War, 1949-2001 
(MID; N = various) 
Variable 
Average 
Opiniona 
Latest 
Opiniona 
Initial 
Opiniona 
Average 
Opinionb 
Latest 
Opinionb 
Initial 
Opinionb 
Average 
Opinionc 
Latest 
Opinionc 
Initial 
Opinionc 
Public support 1.85** 2.05** 1.86*** 1.68** 1.87*** 1.71*** 1.85** 2.05** 1.86*** 
Public 
opposition .651* 1.09** 1.53*** .467 .909* 1.31*** .659* 1.10** 1.55*** 
Ambivalence/ 
indifference  2.44*** 2.13*** 2.10*** 2.25*** 1.97*** 1.96*** 2.41*** 2.09*** 2.05*** 
Relative 
capabilities .664 .501 .512 .537 .379 .420 .599 .436 .429 
Contiguity  -.817** -.871** -.879** -.971*** -1.02*** -1.02*** -.824** -.877** -.888** 
Cold War -.229 -.325 -.312 -.081 -.176 -.159 -.259 -.352 -.341 
1τ  .139 -.080 -.058 .003 -.209 -.157 .058 -.159 -.155 
2τ  3.01 2.67 2.65 2.70 2.39 2.41 2.93 2.60 2.56 
3τ  4.26 3.88 3.86 3.92 3.57 3.59 4.22 3.85 3.81 
N 203 203 203 211 211 211 202 202 202 
Chi-square 67.40*** 101.09*** 140.12*** 50.07*** 65.80*** 99.66*** 57.30*** 80.56*** 122.00***
* p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; one-tailed test. a Crises involving the Vietnam War are excluded; b Crises involving the Korean War are excluded; c 
Crises involving the Vietnam War and the Korean War are excluded.   
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 Table B.16.  Ordered Logit Estimates of Public Opinion and Presidential Crisis Responses, 1949-2001 
(ICB; N=206) 
Variable 
Average 
Opinion 
Average 
Opinion 
Average 
Opinion 
Latest 
Opinion 
Latest 
Opinion 
Latest 
Opinion 
Initial 
Opinion 
Initial 
Opinion 
Initial 
Opinion 
Public support 1.75*   2.03*   1.78*   
Public 
opposition  .020   .442   .244  
Ambivalence/ 
indifference    2.16*   1.69*   1.87* 
Relative 
capabilities .578 .146 .496 .634 -.041 .599 .565 .104 .200 
Contiguity  .696* .693* .467* .707* .688* .439* .693* .677* .539* 
Cold War -.390 -.489 -.090 -.158 -.541 -.387 -.130 -.505 -.540 
1τ  1.10 .58 1.89 1.39 .42 1.58 1.35 .56 1.10 
2τ  2.17 1.63 3.20 2.49 1.47 2.79 2.43 1.61 2.34 
3τ  2.99 2.44 4.13 3.34 2.28 3.65 3.25 2.42 3.24 
Chi-square 12.66* 7.40 35.88* 16.99* 6.81 51.34* 29.98* 6.89 37.21* 
* p<.10 one-tailed test.  
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Table B.17.  Ordered Logit Estimates of Public Opinion and Presidential Crisis Responses, 1949-2001 
(MID, N=212) 
Variable 
Average 
Opinion 
Average 
Opinion 
Average 
Opinion 
Latest 
Opinion 
Latest 
Opinion 
Latest 
Opinion 
Initial 
Opinion 
Initial 
Opinion 
Initial 
Opinion 
Public support .708*   .985*   .847*   
Public 
opposition  -.387   .058   .486*  
Ambivalence/ 
indifference    2.02*   1.66*   1.51* 
Relative 
capabilities -.291 -.315 .316 -.263 -.388 .160 -.288 -.532 .378 
Contiguity  -1.58* -1.59* -1.05* -1.58* -1.58* -1.12* -1.58* -1.57* -1.17* 
Cold War -.033 -.061 -.118 -.009 -.096 -.238 .004 -.137 -.162 
1τ  -1.41 -1.53 -.397 -1.36 -1.57 -.694 -1.37 -1.66 -.553 
2τ  .761 .642 2.22 .825 .596 1.78 .809 .517 1.83 
3τ  1.81 1.69 3.39 1.88 1.64 2.90 1.86 1.56 2.95 
Chi-square 22.27* 27.03* 52.66* 22.35* 22.88* 70.93* 22.91* 37.24* 48.07* 
* p<.10 one-tailed test.  
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Table B.18.  Sensitivity Analyses of Average Public Opposition (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 60.9 61 65 66 70 71 72 77 78 83 
Average Public 
opposition -.203 -.383 -.476 -.398 -.314 -.128 .036 .152 .279 .420 
Relative 
capabilities .215 .260 .301 .277 .248 .190 .146 .124 .104 .084 
Contiguity  .710* .725* .707* .707* .705* .699* .695* .699* .703* .707* 
Cold War -.460 -.443 -.437 -.446 -.456 -.474 -.489 -.499 -.508 -.518 
1τ  .645 .686 .724 .702 .676 .621 .580 .559 .540 .522 
2τ  1.69 1.74 1.77 1.75 1.72 1.67 1.63 1.61 1.59 1.57 
3τ  2.51 2.55 2.59 2.57 2.54 2.48 2.44 2.42 2.40 2.38 
Chi-square 8.34* 8.22* 7.58* 7.60* 7.57* 7.60* 8.43* 8.78* 9.39* 7.69* 
Note: * p<.10; two-tailed tests.    Average public opposition > 93 failed to converge.   
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Table B.19.  Sensitivity Analyses of Latest Public Opposition (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 61 64 66 70 71 73 77 78 
Latest Public 
opposition .178 .256 .013 .093 .268 .364 .037 .152 
Relative 
capabilities .085 .055 .147 .119 .060 .031 .146 .127 
Contiguity  .691* .689* .693* .691* .686* .682* .695* .700* 
Cold War -.510 -.520 -.487 -.497 -.516 -.525 -.489 -.499 
1τ  .523 .496 .582 .555 .500 .473 .580 .563 
2τ  1.57 1.54 1.63 1.60 1.55 1.52 1.63 1.61 
3τ  2.38 2.36 2.44 2.41 2.36 2.33 2.44 2.42 
Chi-square 7.32 7.22 8.18* 8.07* 7.94* 7.22 8.34* 8.51* 
Note: * p<.10; two-tailed tests.    Latest public opposition > 94 failed to converge.   
  
255
 Table B.20.  Sensitivity Analyses of Initial Public Opposition (ICB; N=206) 
Variable 64 66 70 74 77 81 84 87 
Initial Public 
opposition .144 -.065 .064 .248 .386 .601* .561 .702* 
Relative 
capabilities .128 .161 .139 .141 .108 .100 .050 .023 
Contiguity  .683* .699* .686* .686* .691* .688* .717* .719* 
Cold War -.495 -.481 -.490 -.511 -.526 -.542 -.538 -.548 
1τ  .574 .591 .576 .575 .544 .536 .489 .464 
2τ  1.62 1.64 1.62 1.63 1.60 1.59 1.54 1.52 
3τ  2.43 2.45 2.44 2.44 2.41 2.40 2.35 2.33 
Chi-square 7.03 7.36 7.16 7.12 7.00 6.36 6.58 6.47 
Note: * p<.10; two-tailed tests.  Initial public opposition > 92 failed to converge.   
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Table B.21.  Sensitivity Analyses of Average Public Opposition (MID; N=212) 
Variable 61 61.5 62 65 67 71 83 
Average Public 
opposition -.268 -.415 -.228 -.010 -.007 -.007 .009 
Relative 
capabilities -.343 -.315 -.336 -.377 -.378 -.378 -.381 
Contiguity  -1.58* -1.59* -1.59* -1.58* -1.58* -1.58* -1.58* 
Cold War -.078 -.070 -.083 -.095 -.096 -.096 -.096 
1τ  -1.54 -1.53 -1.54 -1.56 -1.56 -1.56 -1.57 
2τ  .622 .641 .627 .600 .599 .599 .597 
3τ  1.67 1.69 1.67 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 
Chi-square 26.81* 23.14* 32.40* 35.49* 33.91* 35.52* 30.66* 
Note: * p<.10; two-tailed tests.    Average public opposition > 92 failed to converge.   
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Table B.22.  Sensitivity Analyses of Latest Public Opposition (MID; N=212) 
Variable 61 63 64 71 73 76 78 
Latest Public 
opposition .157 .258 .323 .035 .055 -.290 .009 
Relative 
capabilities -.390 -.402 -.435 -.385 -.388 -.340 -.381 
Contiguity  -1.57* -1.56* -1.57* -1.58* -1.58* -1.59* -1.58* 
Cold War -.095 -.100 -.110 -.097 -.100 -.076 -.096 
1τ  -1.56 -1.57 -1.60 -1.57 -1.57 -1.53 -1.57 
2τ  .604 .597 .563 .594 .591 .631 .597 
3τ  1.65 1.64 1.61 1.64 1.63 1.68 1.64 
Chi-square 23.81* 25.85* 25.27* 28.27* 27.25* 30.02* 30.66* 
Note: * p<.10; two-tailed tests.    Latest public opposition > 92 failed to converge.   
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 Table B.23.  Sensitivity Analyses of Initial Public Opposition (MID; N=212) 
Variable 61 64 66 69 70 71 76 78 87 
Initial Public 
opposition .503* .685* .357 .405 .435 .302 .346 .219 .248 
Relative 
capabilities -.526 -.604 -.472 -.468 -.465 -.432 -.433 -.421 -.424 
Contiguity  -1.57* -1.55* -1.57* -1.57* -1.57* -1.57* -1.57* -1.57* -1.57* 
Cold War -.134 -.142 -.117 -.113 -.110 -.113 -.126 -.114 -.114 
1τ  -1.66 -1.71 -1.63 -1.62 -1.62 -1.60 -1.61 -1.60 -1.60 
2τ  .524 .481 .544 .550 .555 .565 .555 .565 .562 
3τ  1.57 1.52 1.58 1.59 1.60 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.60 
Chi-square 35.81* 39.30* 41.50* 36.61* 34.08* 38.27* 34.72* 39.43* 35.58* 
Note: * p<.10; two-tailed tests.  Initial public opposition > 92 failed to converge.   
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